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I. INTRODUCTION 
A, The Problem 
Industrial location is defined for the purpose of this study as the 
spatial distribution of industrial plants. The strong industrial growth 
of the U.S. economy in the post World War II era has involved substantial 
investments in new plant and equipment by industrial firms. A signifi­
cant portion of the investment represents the establishment of new 
plants. The new plants may be the first plant of a new company, a 
relocation of an existing plant, or a new branch plant of an established 
firm. 
The general awareness of the benefits of industrialization has 
created an intensely competitive scramble to attract new industry to 
particular regions, states and communities. It has been estimated that 
at least 14,000 industrial development organizations have been created 
to compete for the several hundred annual new plant locations. In other 
words, there is a substantial excess supply of potential plant locations. 
Some communities have been successful in their attempts to attract 
industry, but many others have had little or no success in their indus­
trialization efforts. A community's success in attracting the desired 
types of industry is largely dependent upon an understanding of the fac­
tors that determine industry demand for plant locations, of the process 
by which industrial management makes location decisions, and of the 
importance of various location factors at the different stages of the 
decision process. The community usually is an active participant in firm 
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location decisions, and the final location choice often hinges on what 
the community does or does not do. However, there seems to be a gap 
between what communities do to attract industry and what they could do 
if they better understood the decision process involved in plant location 
selections. This is not necessarily a matter of not doing enough, but 
possibly of doing the wrong things. 
Many location studies have been conducted, but for the most part, 
they have led to a mass of unrelated data, often in the form of lists of 
location factors. Lists of location factors are generally of value only 
as general guides in determining where specific plants will be located, 
A major weakness of most lists is that they do not clearly specify the 
importance of factors within the various stages of the location decision 
process. 
Another class of studies is that which deals with location decisions 
of particular industries. These studies provide little general informa­
tion about the location decision process because the factors considered 
and the process utilized varies widely among different industries. 
Relatively little attention seems to have been devoted to the actual 
decision process, and most of the literature on the problem is not 
definitive. A 1966 article by Thompson (40) represents a useful contri­
bution to knowledge of location problems, but the primary thrust of the 
work is toward the development of a normative model of the location 
decision process. In order for communities to formulate and utilize 
effective industrialization programs, there is a real need to understand 
the actual decision process utilized by locating firmô. The knowledge of 
"what is" seems quite limited. 
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A 1971 study by Kaldor and Dahlke (20) provided some valuable in­
formation with respect to industrialization efforts and experiences in 
rural Iowa communities. The study involved an analysis of the supply of 
potential industrial locations in rural Iowa. The authors found that 
approximately 98 percent of the communities covered by the survey were 
engaged in activities to attract industry (20, p. 2). A substantial 
amount of time, energy and other resources has been expended by the rural 
communities in their industrialization efforts. 
The Kaldor and Dahlke study indicated that the demand by industry 
for plant locations offered by communities varied considerably by 
community, with some communities getting more offers and being more 
successful than others in their efforts to attract industry. A very 
important unanswered question posed by the authors concerned the explana­
tion of why "some communities have been more successful than others in 
attracting new businesses" (20, p. 16). The authors noted that "the 
answer to why some were more successful than others is a critical one 
for the development of more efficient local, state and national policies 
to encourage nonfarm business expansion in rural towns" (20, p. 16). 
Many rural communities, faced with declining employment and income 
associated with the decreased demand for human resources in farming, 
have turned to non-farm industrial development in an attempt to increase 
the export base of their local economies. In order that developmental 
resources may be efficiently allocated, it is essential that rural 
communities understand the process by which industrial firms determine 
their demand for rural plant locations. The basic problem is that this 
understanding is limited. 
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B, Objectives of the Study 
The study presented here was undertaken to clarify certain 
ambiguities and confusions about how industries decided on new plant 
sites in rural areas. In general, the objective of the study is to 
develop a broader understanding of the determinants of the demand for 
rural plant locations. More specifically, the objectives of this study 
are as follows: 
1) to classify and describe the mix and pattern of the population 
of industrial location decisions made favorably for rural Iowa 
communities during the 1968-70 period; 
2) to describe and compare the decision processes used by seven 
carefully selected cases; 
3) to identify the stages in the selection process, and to 
associate the important factors and participants with each 
stage in each location case; 
4) to determine the extent of the existing knowledge of the loca­
tion decision process through a review of the current litera­
ture; 
5) to develop, through analyses of industry background and struc­
ture, insight into location factors important in the different 
stages of the location process used by firms in the selected 
industries; and 
6) to generate a better hypothesis of the industrial location de­
cision process and to help communities use the knowledge 
appropriately. 
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II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A. Theories of Plant Location 
Location theory is composed of principles governing the dispersion 
of economic activity over space. It embraces site selection, survival 
rates by location, spatial industry equilibria, comparative area advantage, 
highest expected value for use of space, and optimum location of activir 
ties for firms. 
Economic theorists, for years, tended to neglect the spatial elements 
of economic activities. Bos stated that "most economic theories today are 
very precise in formulating the assumptions about the time structure of 
their problems, but omit to specify the spatial situation" (4, p. 1). 
However, Isard notes that even the early theory was stated "in a manner 
pregnant with spatial implications" (19, p. 25). In recent years, spatial 
problems have received more attention by economists. Interest has been 
awakened partially because of the challenge of solving important practical 
economic problems relating to the optimal dispersion of economic activi­
ties. 
Johann Heinrich von Thunen is generally considered to have been the 
father of location theorists. The German writer's seminal book, Per 
Isolierte Staat in Beziehung auf Landwirtschaft und Nationalokonomie (55), 
was the real beginning of analytical work in general location theory. Von 
Thunen was primarily concerned with agricultural locations. His formula­
tion of concentric circles around a central town was intended to account 
for the types of crops that would be produced at locations different 
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distances from the central market place. In von Thunen's scheme, the 
location is given and the type of output at specific points is to be 
determined. He analyzed the dispersion of agricultural output around the 
central consumption market. His theory was a least cost theory in which 
the location of agricultural production was determined by differences in 
total cost of particular crops, with locational cost differences dependent 
upon transportation costs and land rents. 
Von Thunen's theoretical developments were the beginning of the 
school of thought professing that the location of activities was deter­
mined by the minimization of total costs. Although von Thunen's theory 
was stated in terms of agricultural production, it is also applicable to 
the location of manufacturing activities. 
Launhardt (23) and Weber (57) were two other German writers instru­
mental in the development of the theory of location. Launhardt seems to 
have "explained the location of industry as the decision resulting from 
two variables; namely, differences in cost and demand at alternative 
locations" (14, p. 254). 
Although von Thunen made significant progress toward a general theory 
of location. Isard (19) credits Weber (57) with "the first attempt to 
construct a general location theory" (19, p. 27). Like von Thunen, Weber 
also formulated a least cost theory of location. He viewed transportation 
costs, labor costs and agglomerating forces as being the basic factors of 
location. The location minimizing the sum of the costs was selected. 
Weber's theory involved substitution between transportation costs and 
other cost items, just as did von Thunen's. However, there were major 
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differences in the approaches used by the two writers. Weber's theory 
searched for the place of location with the type of production given. In 
von Thiinen's work, the location was given and the type of production was 
to be determined. Von Thiïnen assumed perfect competition, homogeneous 
land, homogeneous labor, uniform real wages and one consumption center. 
Weber assumed that perfect compet:ition existed, that land was not homo­
geneous, that raw materials were not uniformly distributed and that there 
were more than one consuming center. 
Given the assumptions made, Weber formulated two locational rules. 
The first rule stated that ". . . the location of manufacturing industries 
is determined (transportation cost being variable, labor costs constant) 
by the ratio between the weight of the localized material and the weight 
of the product" (57, p. xxiv). The larger the resulting "materials 
index", the stronger the tendency to locate at the local materials site. 
The smaller the index, the stronger the tendency to locate near the prod­
uct market. Weber's second locational rule was: "When labor costs are 
varied, an industry deviates from its transport locations in proportion 
to the size of its labor coefficient" (57, p. xxv), where the labor 
coefficient represents the degree of labor intensity of the production 
process. A firm utilizing relatively labor intensive techniques would 
tend to be very sensitive to differences in labor costs, whereas a firm 
utilizing relatively little labor would tend to be insensitive to labor 
cost differences. 
An important contribution made by Weber was his recognition that 
transportation costs are not the only critical locational factor. Von 
Thiinen avoided the consideration of labor costs as a factor by assuming 
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uniform real wages and productivity. Without these assumptions, the 
costs of labor become an important determinant of location. The labor 
cost factor may even exert a stronger locational pull than the trans­
portation cost factor. 
In Weber's formulation, agglomerating or deglomerating forces may 
offset.or reinforce the labor and transportation cost factors. The 
agglomerative and deglomerative forces tend to concentrate or disperse 
industry as the cost savings due to proximity of firms varies. 
The primary weakness of Weber's theory was probably the omission 
of demand considerations and institutional factors. Hoover's (15 and 16) 
work was largely an attempt to strengthen Weber's analysis. Hoover 
expressed his interest in the effect of demand on location and the 
effect of location on demand when he wrote that "the shape of the market 
or supply area is influenced by the advantages of different locations 
for procurement and processing and by the structure of transport costs" 
(16, p. 65). Weber had taken demand as being given. Hoover succeeded 
in clarifying some of Weber's theory, but Greenhut concludes that Hoover's 
theory . . is quite similar to Weber's. The locational choice is 
again a problem of substitution among costs: now production cost and 
transportation cost, the ultimate objective being the minimization of 
these expenses" (14, p. 21). 
The weaknesses of the von Thunen-Weber type of location theory may 
be seen by summarizing the important aspects of the theory. They are: 
(1) the emphasis on the search for the site offering least 
cost, which site provides that unique substitution among 
different factor costs which yields the optimum cost position; 
(2) the assumption of a given demand at a particular point 
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which remains unaffected by the locational selection of a 
firm; and (3) the disregard of the locational interdependence 
of firms (14, p. 257). 
Greenhut goes on to assert that the three main points represent the major 
shortcomings of the von Thllnen-Weber location theory because 
(1) site selection involves substitution among not only 
the cost factors at alternative locations, but also the 
demand factors at the different sites, (2) market demand 
is a variable, significantly affected by, and affecting, 
(3) the locational interdependence of firms (14, p. 257). 
The major weakness in Hoover's attempts to extend the theory of 
location was the failure to fully consider locational interdependence. 
He proposed an explanation of industrial location in a capitalistic 
framework, but he confined the analysis largely to a purely competitive 
system. 
The prevailing real world market structure was later recognized to 
be imperfect rather than perfect competition. Location theorists became 
increasingly aware of the weaknesses of the classical von Thunen-Weber 
purely competitive framework, and efforts were, for some time, concen­
trated upon resolving the problems with the existing theory. Writers 
such as Fetter (11), Hotelling (18), Lerner and Singer (24), Smithies (35) 
and Chamberlin (6) concentrated on the locational interdependence result­
ing from imperfect competition. The demand facing each firm was seen as 
being dependent upon the products and location of other firms in the 
market. Firms with plants at different locations would face different 
demands for their products. 
The interdependence theorists generally abstracted from production 
cost differences, whereas the least-cost theorists had earlier abstracted 
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from demand differences. The interdependence theorists were concerned 
with market area considerations. They analyzed the effects of the 
elasticity of demand, the shape of the marginal cost curve and the 
magnitude of freight costs. Different freight costs and rival locations 
resulted in variable effective demand at alternative locations. Plant 
location was explained in terms of the maximization of product demand. 
The interdependence theory of location represented a new development, 
but it was an inadequate formulation. In abstracting from costs, it was 
only a partial explanation of locational forces. Interdependence theor­
ists criticized least-cost theorists for abstracting from demand, but 
they then committed the equally serious error of abstracting from costs. 
The determination of spatial economic activity is dependent upon both 
demand and cost factors and upon their interactions. 
Losch (25) made a significant contribution to the location theory 
by explicitly recognizing variable demand and costs at different locations. 
He also recognized that, in the long run, adjustments to the forces of 
competition result in minimum transportation costs. However, the force 
of demand was dominant in his analysis. He did not combine cost analysis 
with locational interdependence. 
Writers such as Greenhut (14), Isard (19) and Yaseen (60) extended 
and combined earlier location theories. They analyzed demand, cost and 
personal factors in developing general location theories based upon the 
maximization of profit. The writers recognized that plant location is 
jointly determined by cost and demand factors. The balancing effects of 
costs and demand were explicitly recognized by Greenhut. 
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In every site-selection, a balancing is involved among all 
factors, demand and cost. No theory is general which abstracts 
from either. This scissor was realized early in non-spatial 
economics; paradoxically, it has been missed in the spatial 
world where it is most in evidence (14, p. 291). 
An additional important development by location theorists has been 
the attempts to formulate general equilibrium systems which are both multi-
locational and spatial. Losch's work was outstanding among the various 
attempts. 
Although his approach minimizes the elements of interdependence 
and does not comprehend the space-economy as a whole but as con­
sisting of several major sectors, and, although it has other 
severe limitations, we have here for the first time an attempt 
to encompass general spatial relations in a set of equations 
(19, p. 48). 
Losch failed in his attempt to develop a general equilibrium system, but 
his work generated additional interest. Von Boventer (54) accomplished 
a partial synthesis of the existing theory, and he perhaps "has come 
closest to creating a general system incorporating both distance between 
discrete locations and spatial extent of activities at locations" 
(36, p. 6). Stevens and Brackett go on to say: 
Further conceptual and mathematical problems will still need 
to be solved before a full synthesis of the partial location 
theories can be achieved. Perhaps the most difficult of these 
problems is the systematic consideration of scale and aggomera-
tion economies (36, p. 7). 
Mathematical programming techniques perhaps can be utilized in a 
more complete synthesis of location theories. However, the existence of 
mathematical non-convexities seriously limits the application of program­
ming methods. It also involves static analyses and other questionable 
assumptions such as fixed demands, constant returns to scale, and infinite 
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indivisibility. Despite its severe limitations, Stevens (38) believes 
that the programming approach may prove to be of assistance to location 
theorists in their efforts to synthesize and extend the theory. According 
to Stevens, 
the relevant question is whether the adoption of this approach, 
which appears particularly applicable to location problems, 
can lead to improvements in and systemization of the theory 
and eventually to an integrated general model of location and 
space-economy (38, p. 29). 
Most of the recent developments in location theory have regarded the 
profit maximizing goal as dominant in locational decisions. However, the 
importance of the theory is magnified by the broad scope of the location 
process and its profound effects upon the existence of firms and upon 
social welfare. Karaska and Bramhall (22) indicated the nature of the 
theory in "The Book in Perspective" section of their Locational Analysis 
for Manufacturing: A Selection of Readings. 
The theory of location of manufacturing is essentially an 
exposition of the complex interdependence of forces and 
reactions implicit in the maximum profits objective. We 
describe the major elements of an equation expressing this 
objective as cost items defined as the inputs of each firm, 
industry and region; and revenue items covering output and 
demand factors. These elements are qualified through the 
influence of time and inertia; exogenous forces such as 
national goals, technology and nature; and spatial limits 
to competition (22, p. 10). 
Future efforts to develop and advance the theory of location are 
likely to be within the framework of the contemporary theory of the firm. 
In particular, recent theoretical advances by writers such as Eisner and 
Strotz (8), Treadway (43), Lucas (26) and Tinsley (41) have contributed 
to the integration of the element of time into investment theory. 
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The traditional arbitrary concepts of fixed and variable factors of 
production have been criticized for years. The recent developments have 
introduced an alternative in the concept of "quasi-fixed factors". The 
new formulation introduces the idea of variable speed and cost of adjust­
ment to changing economic conditions. Tinsley (41) developed the theory 
of forward distributed lags and built in a moving target to get a 
sequence of optimizations by the firm. Tinsley's contribution, built 
upon the earlier work of such writers as Eisner and Strotz (8) and 
Lucas (26) presents a more realistic view of how the firm operates. It 
leads to a dynamic theory of the firm. 
The decision to locate a plant is an investment decision. It is 
a decision the outcome of which is strongly influenced by conditions 
changing over time. The theory of location and space economy could per­
haps be improved by an awareness of the recent developments in investment 
theory and other formulations which have tended toward a more representa­
tive theory of the firm. Most of the existing location theory has been 
built upon specific conditions of space and time but, in fact, economic 
adjustment to changing conditions is a continual process. 
B. Industrial Plant Location Decisions 
and Important Locational Factors 
Industrial location decisions in the United States are generally 
made on the basis of objective economic considerations with subjective 
personal factors often playing an important determining role in particular 
decisions. Study after study has indicated that a firm usually attempts 
"to locate its plant where profits will be maximized, and the location 
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decision is made by top management. . ." (I, p. 377). Carrier and 
Shriver (5) "believe that plant locations often involve some response to 
personal considerations but that the dividing line between purely personal 
actions and personal actions marked by an economic motivation would un­
cover few instances of economic 'irrationality'" (5, p. 455). The plant 
location decision is one of the most critical decisions faced by the 
entrepreneurs of industrial firms. The competitive position and profita­
bility of the firm is strongly influenced by the choice of location. For 
most firms, location decisions are not often made and are significantly 
different in nature and importance than the routine decisions faced in 
the day-to-day management of industrial firms. Hopeman (17) suggests 
that "managers usually cannot rely on standard procedures to handle this 
type of decision, but must depend instead on such guides as judgment, 
experience, intuition and rules of thumb" (17, pp. 67-68). 
Plant location choices are made even more difficult by the large 
number of factors that must be taken into account in the determination 
of the impact of particular locations upon the total operation of the 
firm and its profitability. As Smith (34) indicates, 
. . . the location decision is not . . . taken in isolation, 
but is related to other considerations such as scale of operations, 
combinations of factors of production, and market conditions . . . 
The maximum profit location may be different for different sizes 
of factories or different combinations of factors, and demand may 
vary with the choice of location. The interrelation of all these 
factors makes the analysis of location an extremely complex 
matter . . . (34, p. 96). 
Many studies have been conducted on the questions of why and how 
firms choose particular plant locations. Most of the analysis has been 
in terms of important plant location factors. The number and type of 
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factors vary considerably, with authors generally presenting their own 
list of considerations they believe to be of significance to location 
decisions. Most of the lists include such considerations as product 
markets, transportation, input markets, labor, personal preferences, 
taxes, community factors, site factors and fuel. 
Carrier and Schriver (5) noted that the survey-type studies usually 
"have not been conducted within the framework of existing theory" (5, 
p. 450). Nishioka and Krumme (30) have observed that "these studies 
lack the rigor common to empirical studies in other fields of economics 
and spatial analysis, and the findings are generally still very much of 
an exploratory nature" (30, p. 195). 
An additional major criticism of most of the survey studies is that 
they have been limited to a particular phase of a decision-making process. 
This has resulted in only a partial explanation of the decision-making 
process. In the conduct of location surveys, it is critically important 
"to disentangle actual from imaginary reasons, and to separate relevant 
from irrelevant data, and essential from decorative bits of the informa­
tion furnished" (28, p. 170). The difficulties involved in achieving 
these objectives are succinctly stated by Nishioka and Krumme (30). 
The ex post interpretation of decision-makers' ex post rationali­
zation of earlier decisions--in short, the reconstruction of the 
decision-making process on the basis of subjective information--
will require the explicit consideration of the stages at which 
certain variables enter the decision process and the flexibility 
of these variables during subsequent stages. In the mind of the 
survey respondent, certain parts and stages of the location de­
cision process may have shrunk in retrospect into 'the' decision, 
a decision perceived as a highly simplified equation which was 
solved simultaneously some time in the past (30, pp. 195-196). 
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These difficulties place a heavy burden upon the interviewer. 
The process of location decision-making is generally thought to 
include at least two and as many as four or five stages. Thompson (40) 
believes that a normative model of location selection should include four 
main stages. The stages are preplanning, selection of the general area, 
selection of the community and selection of the site (40, p. 2). His 
• . . analysis assumes the existence of a locational problem of 
broad geographic scope. It should be understood, however, that 
many site projects are of more limited scope (e.g., choosing the 
best community within a known region or the best site within a 
given metropolitan area) and therefore do not require all of 
the steps described . . . (40, p. 2). 
Despite the great diversity in the explanations of stages of the decision 
process and the importance of locational factors, the literature clearly 
indicates that the crucial location determinants vary depending on the 
particular phase of the process. The important factors also show consider­
able variation among industries, areas, regions, plant sizes and individual 
firms within particular industries. 
The nature of a decision itself differs, as do the locational fac­
tors, depending on whether the location involves a new firm, a relocation 
or a new branch plant. New firms are often "home-grown" establishments 
started by innovators or former employees of established firms. The new 
plants are usually located close to home and involve a location decision 
of relatively narrow scope. Albert and Kellow (1) note, that with respect 
to relocations and branch plants, 
. . .  a n  e x i s t i n g  f i r m  i s  u s u a l l y  f a c e d  w i t h  e x p a n s i o n  p r o b l e m s  
or an economically inefficient location and must decide whether 
to expand at its present location, find an alternate or new loca­
tion (relocate), or continue its present operation but expand in 
a newly located branch plant (1, pp. 376-377). 
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Despite the many complexities and uncertainties faced by firms 
making location decisions, there are certain locational factors that 
tend to be explicitly or implicitly considered and weighted during the 
decision process. The remaining pages of this review will be devoted to 
a brief presentation of major factors influencing plant location decisions. 
The emphasis will be upon new and changing industrial location determi­
nants. Many writers believe that traditional location theory has gener­
ally been of limited usefulness in predicting most plant locations. As 
Stevens and Brackett (37) have noted, in many cases 
. . .  i t  c o n t i n u e s  t o  d e c r e a s e  i n  r e l e v a n c e  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
disproportionate weight it gives to location factors whose 
importance has been dropping and because factors which were 
not relevant earlier now have a major influence on location 
decisions (37, p. 1). 
Proximity to product markets and raw material supplies have tradi­
tionally been important location factors, and this continues to be the 
case for many industries. However, there is an increasing number of 
"footloose" industries. The term "footloose" refers to "industries 
whose location is not dictated by the necessity of minimizing transpor­
tation costs on either products or material inputs" (12, p. 79). 
Transportation costs have been a major location factor. However, as 
Stevens and Brackett (37) have concluded, 
. . . their relative importance has declined sharply in recent 
years because of the decrease in the weight of raw material 
inputs per unit output for many material processing industries, 
the increase in value per unit weight of output for final product 
industries and the cost reductions in transportation services for 
all industries (37, p. 1). 
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Higher transportation costs associated with current and expected fuel 
shortages are likely to again increase the importance of transportation 
costs as a location factor. Gasoline and diesel fuel prices have 
increased substantially, and further increases are expected. The labor 
cost element of transportation is also likely to increase as lower speed 
limits increase labor requirements. In general, developments associated 
with fuel shortages will substantially increase the costs of transporting 
goods and services. The days of "cheap" fuel are over. Transportation 
costs are likely to increase in significance as a location factor, but the 
overall effect on plant location is not clear. In some industries there 
will be a tendency toward more dispersion while in others there will be a 
tendency for increased centralization. In general, there will be an in­
creased need to locate plants in areas where energy costs may be minimized. 
The quality of transportation services, as reflected in speed, 
dependability and convenience, and access to the transportation system 
have become increasingly important as location determinants. The in­
creased importance of truck transportation increased the need to locate 
plants near interstate highways in order to have access to regional and 
national markets. Energy problems will have an impact upon the quality of 
transportation services, also. Speed and dependability of service will 
probably be reduced in most areas. Areas hit by the most significant ser­
vice problems are likely to be less favored for plant locations. The 
important thing to note, however, is that quality of transportation ser­
vice will probably decrease in importance as a location factor relative 
to the cost of transportation service. 
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Fuel and power availability is not uniform across the country. 
Regions, states and areas with larger supplies of fuel and power avail­
able will tend to receive an increased share of new plants. Fuel and 
power availability will be of increasing importance as location determi­
nants, particularly for industries requiring large quantities of energy. 
The significance of certain labor considerations has decreased while 
for other aspects it has increased. Mobility of the skilled labor force 
and the development of craft labor organizations have largely eliminated 
significant wage differentials for many types of skilled labor. Inter­
regional wage differentials are still substantial for many types of 
unskilled and semi-skilled labor. The importance of labor costs as a 
location factor will largely depend upon the labor intensity of particular 
types of production and upon the type of labor needed. For industries 
employing relatively unskilled labor, the existence of significant 
regional and area wage differentials will ensure the continued importance 
of labor costs as a location factor. Locating firms that look for 
"cheaper labor" presumably are attempting to reduce labor costs per unit 
of output. Thus, the productivity of labor, as well as wage rates, is 
important. 
Labor supply is likely to become more important, particularly "for 
technical, professional and managerial labor. The changes in technology 
and the trend toward automation in many industries have increased the 
demand for such labor substantially faster than the supply" (37, p. 3). 
The location preferences of the labor in highest demand will exert 
considerable influence upon firms to locate in preferred areas. An 
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adequate supply of trainable labor is often a critical location factor 
for locating firms. The increased participation of women in the labor 
force will increase the importance of the female labor supply for indus­
tries employing women. 
The size of the community is an important location determinant for 
many industries. The trend toward non-metropolitan locations is expected 
to continue. As Fulton (12) has observed, "many of the factors con­
sidered by management in selecting the smaller city will probably persist 
and cause a continued movement in that direction" (12, p. 5). 
Tax considerations have long been thought to be of minor importance 
in most location decisions. This was largely because tax costs generally 
account for a very small part of total costs. However, there are indica­
tions that the importance of taxes may be increasing. Local taxes now 
vary much more than in the past. In addition, the increasing spatial 
uniformity of other costs tends to increase the importance of tax 
differentials, especially for intraregional location decisions. 
The relation between tax costs and the quality of public services is 
very important to many firms. "... the industrialist is increasingly 
sensitive to the quality of the public services provided by tax revenues 
and to community attitudes towards industry which may be reflected in 
local tax policy" (37, p. 3). 
Construction cost financing is largely through conventional means, 
with terms and conditions relatively independent of location. In recent 
years, the use of industrial revenue bonds has expanded rapidly. The 
development was initially aimed at smaller companies locating in smaller 
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communities within underindustrialized areas. The scope of the develop­
ment has now become much broader. The availability of this new type of 
financing, at effective rates significantly below that for conventional 
financing, is likely to continue to be an important location considera­
tion for many companies. 
Agglomeration economies have become relatively less important for 
many industries. External economies now exist for many industries out­
side of major metropolitan areas. The trend toward decentralization of 
industry has been reinforced by urban external diseconomies due to high 
land costs, high tax costs, poor quality public services, traffic con­
gestion and environmental pollution. 
The influence of the different levels of government upon industrial 
location is felt either directly or indirectly by virtually every location 
decision maker. Government influence is exerted through a number of 
activities. Four of these types of activities noted by Will (59) are: 
(1) direct ownership or sponsorship of industrial facilities; 
(2) subsidization programs to directly encourage industrial 
development; (3) economic development and improvement projects; 
and (4) legislative and legal actions (59, p. 57). 
It seems likely that government influence will continue to increase. 
A number of relatively new elements that will probably exert in­
creasing influence upon location decisions are environmental concerns, 
land use problems, employee transportation difficulties, employment of 
minority groups and amenities. Amenities, in particular, are increasing 
in importance in many location decisions. Amenities 
. . . are generally non-economic factors such as climate, cul­
tural and recreational facilities, educational institutions, 
pleasant residential neighborhoods, and the like (37, p. 7). 
22 
These factors have an effect upon the quality of living. 
In recent years there has been a tendency for many location decisions 
not to be based on economic factors alone. The spatial distribution of 
many of the important location requirements has become increasingly 
uniform. In many situations in which the economic factors are equally 
satisfied by a number of communities, the final location decision is 
based upon the "personal preferences" of the executive decision maker. 
This factor may even outweigh economic considerations in some cases, re­
sulting in a location choice based upon maximum satisfaction rather than 
maximum profit. 
There exists no perfect formula for making a riskless location 
choice. The important location factors suggested by the literature can 
only serve as general guides for the decision maker. Virtually every 
location decision represents a unique case, and what is important in one 
case may be irrelevant in another. 
Most writers would agree that location decisions are generally based 
upon the objective of profit maximization. However, as Simon (32) has 
observed, in an imperfectly competitive world, "what action is optimal 
for one firm depends on the actions of the other firms" (32, p. 262). 
Also, to make the optimal decision each decision-maker is required to 
"outguess one's opponents, but not to be outguessed by them" (32, p. 266). 
The criticism is that this is logically inconsistent for all firms to 
achieve. The same criticism, however, is equally applicable to the 
general theory of the imperfectly competitive firm. 
23 
A location decision is one of the most important decisions to be 
made by management. The decision generally will have a major effect 
upon the entire scope of the firm's operations. It is generally 
associated with changes in such things as capacity, input combinations, 
type of product, market composition and location, input supply sources, 
transportation requirements, scale of operations or a combination of 
such changes. The typical location decision is complex and of far 
reaching importance to the profitability of the firm. 
C. Hypothesized Location Decision Model 
The hypothesized location decision model for this study consists of 
a series of layers representing the different stages of the decision 
process. It is believed that the process of making plant location 
decisions involves some type of screening procedure in which less desir­
able areas, states and communities are successively eliminated from 
consideration on the basis of particular location factors. Different 
factors are expected to be of significance at the different stages of the 
process. It is also hypothesized that different people would be involved 
in the various stages of the process. It is assumed that plant location 
decisions are generally based upon the objective of profit maximization, 
with different firms weighing cost and demand factors differently. 
The hypothesized model evolved from the review of location theory 
literature and from interest in the question of the probabilities of 
communities being successful in attracting industry. That is, the focus 
is on industrial firms as demanders of plant locations. Plant location 
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demand factors are seen as interacting with the plant location supply 
factors in the process by which firms select plant locations. In general, 
the location decision process is believed to involve a process of 
elimination in which potential locations are screened according to 
increasingly specific locational considerations until all but one 
community are eliminated. The community selected is expected to be the 
"best" or profit maximizing location from the vantage point of firm 
decision makers. 
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III. CASE STUDY METHOD 
A. Introduction 
A substantial number of empirical location studies have been con­
ducted in recent years. The studies have been of many different types 
and have focused on many different aspects of the location problem. The 
usefulness of the studies also varies widely. Even the better studies 
are of limited value in determining the relative importance of factors 
in different stages of the location decision process, and the actual 
decision process generally goes unexplained. 
B. Comparison of Alternative Methods 
The strengths and limitations of the statistical method of research 
have been widely discussed. The method involves making a sample survey 
to gather data. The data generated through the random sample is then 
used to generate estimates of the "true" population values. In other 
words, the researcher generalizes from the randomly selected sample to 
the population. The case study method is less widely used and under­
stood. 
With respect to the comparison of alternative research methods, 
Raymond Bauer of the Harvard Business School noted that 
. . . somehow there has developed a myth that there are two kinds 
of research: "case research" and "scientific research", and that 
these two are in opposition. I want to take a position of firm 
opposition to this dichotomy. It is true that "case research" 
would generally be used at the "exploratory" or "hypothesis 
generating" end of the continuum rather than at the hypothesis 
testing end, although case . . . research can also be used for 
hypothesis testing. It is further true, . . . , that most 
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discussions of research have taken as the paradigm of good 
research the hypothesis testing end of the continuum. However, 
the generating of hypotheses and their formulation in testable 
and significant form is an essential part of the business of 
research and one which is just as vital as the testing of 
hypotheses (42, pp. 50-51). 
A primary disadvantage of the case study method is that it is not 
valid to develop population inferences when the cases are not selected 
at random. That is, the researcher can not generalize to the population 
when there is no random sample. However, as has been observed, the case 
study method may be very useful in generating testable hypotheses. 
The case study method is also useful in analyzing other types of 
research problems. 
When we desire a great deal of information concerning each 
individual or occurrence to be studied, much of our data may be 
non-quantitative by its very nature. In such an event we employ 
the case study method of investigation, the purpose of which is 
to consider in detail the characteristics peculiar to the 
individual case . . . (7, p. 12). 
In effect, the case study method may be utilized to obtain in-depth 
information concerning the situations of interest. 
The basic problem upon which this study is focused is that knowl­
edge of the actual location decision process is very limited. Budget 
and time limitations precluded the drawing of a sizeable random sample 
and the development of population inferences. In addition, the case 
study method seemed well-suited to a detailed analysis of location 
decisions that were expected to involve multiple stages and participants. 
It was believed that, in order to develop a complete understanding of 
industrial location decisions, it was necessary to analyze each decision 
in great depth. The personal involvement of a trained, experienced, and 
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professional investigator was expected to allow the gathering of com­
plete and accurate information from each participant in the respective 
location decisions. 
In general, the case study method seemed to be the most efficient 
way to increase knowledge of the location decision process. Although 
the use of the case study method would preclude making generalizations 
to the population of location decisions, the development of detailed 
knowledge of selected location decisions was expected to be useful in 
generating hypotheses about the actual location decision process. 
C. Interviews of Location Decision Participants 
The case study method was utilized to "surround" a small number of 
location decisions with complete and concise information on the loca­
tion decision process, its stages and the factors of major importance 
at each stage. In-depth personal interviews of industrial management 
decision-makers, plant managers, intermediaries and community develop­
ment leaders were conducted to obtain data pertaining to all aspects of 
the location decision. Formal questionnaires were not used. The use 
of a highly structural interview questionnaire would have provided data 
easy to process and possibly to interpret, but field tests indicated 
that relatively unstructured interviews would provide more complete in­
formation. The interview format used was structured only to the extent 
that the respondent was encouraged to discuss all aspects of the location 
decision process. The decision participants were encouraged to discuss 
the complete location decision but were in no way guided into particular 
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responses. The opinions expressed by the participants in the decisions 
were carefully studied and compared. Every effort was made to ensure 
that the data gathered would permit an accurate and complete understand­
ing of the decision process. 
D. Use of Secondary Data 
Secondary data was extensively used to develop an industry section 
for each of the cases. The industry data used was generally related to 
structure, degree of competition, production processes, technology, 
market demand, input requirements, number and size of firms, size of the 
industry and important industry location factors. The secondary data 
complemented the primary interview data and provided valuable insights 
into particular decisions. Secondary data was also used to resolve the 
few conflicts that existed in the interview data. 
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IV. POPUIATION OF NEW RURAL IOWA INDUSTRIAL LOCATIŒîS 
AND SELECTION OF SEVEN CASES FOR STUDY 
A. Population of New Rural Iowa Industrial Locations 
The population of new rural Iowa industrial locations was taken 
from a 1971 study fay Kaldor and Dahlke (21) which concerned industriali­
zation efforts and experiences in rural Iowa communities. The new plant 
locations were revealed by a survey of all Iowa communities with 1970 
populations of 1,600 to 8,499 and located more than twenty miles from 
a metropolitan center. 
Among the 115 rural towns in the survey, 337 new plants, employing 
three or more people, located in the 1968-70 period. This was an average 
of 3.1 new locations per community. There were 47 towns in the smallest 
town size category (population 1,600 to 2,499), 35 towns in the medium 
town size category (2,500 to 4,499) and 33 towns in the largest town 
size category (4,500 to 8,499). Of the new plant locations, 92 were in 
the smallest towns, 110 were in the medium sized towns and 135 firms were 
in the largest towns. The new locations by type of business, by town 
size and by December 1970 employment are presented in Tables 4.1 through 
4.4. As shown by Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the major portion of the new 
locations in town sizes 1 and 2 had less than 10 employees. However, as 
Table 4.3 indicates, a relatively larger number of town size 3 locations 
employed 10 or more workers. Table 4.4 shows that 234 locations, or 69 
percent of the total, employed less than 10 workers. 
Table 4.1, New locations by type of business and by December 1970 employment, for 
town size 1^ 
3 - 4  5 - 9  1 0  a n d  o v e r  
employees employees employees Total 
Type of Business Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Construction 1 2.3 2 7.7 — -- 3 3.2 
Agricultural 
manufacturing 5 11.4 3 11.5 5 22.7 13 13.4 
Other Manufacturing 7 16.0 4 15.4 3 13.6 14 15.2 
Transportation, 
communication and 
other public utilities 1 2,3 2 7,7 — — 3 3.2 
Finance, insurance 
and real estate 1 2.3 — -- 1 4.5 2 2.2 
Wholesale and retail 
trade 22 50.0 12 46.2 8 36.4 42 45.7 
Business and repair 
service 4 9.1 1 3.8 2 9,1 7 7.6 
Personal service 1 2.3 -- -- — — 1 1.1 
^Source: (21) 
Table 4.1. Continued, 
3 - 4  5 - 9  1 0  a n d  o v e r  
employees employees employees Total 
Type of Business Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Entertainment and 
recreation 1 2.3 1 3.8 1 4.5 3 3.2 
Professional and 
related services 1 2.3 1 3.8 2 9.1 4 4.3 
TOTAL 44 100.0 26 100.0 22 100.0 92 100.0 
Table 4.2, New locations by type of business and by December 1970 employment, for 
town size 2 
3 - 4  5 - 9  1 0  a n d  o v e r  
employees employees employees Total 
Type of Business Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Construction — — 2 5.4 1 5.0 3 2.7 
Agricultural 
manufacturing — -- 4 10.8 6 30.0 10 9.1 
Other Manufacturing 6 11.3 6 16.2 5 25.0 17 15.4 
Transportation, 
communication and 
other public utilities — — 2 5.4 — — 2 1.8 
Finance, insurance 
and real estate 2 3.8 3 8.1 — -- 5 4.5 
Wholesale and retail 
trade 33 62.3 20 54.1 3 15.0 56 51.0 
Business and repair 
service 6 11.3 -- — 1 5.0 7 6.4 
Personal service 4 7.5 — -- 1 5.0 5 4.5 
ource: (21). 
Table 4.2. Continued. 
Type of Business 
3 - 4  5 - 9  1 0  a n d  o v e r  
employees employees employees Total 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Entertainment and 
recreation 1.9 0.9 
Professional and 
related services 1.9 15.0 3.6 
TOTAL 53 100.0 37 100.0 20 100.0 110 100.0 
Table 4.3. New locations by type of business and by December 1970 employment, for 
town size 3® 
3 - 4  5 - 9  1 0  a n d  o v e r  
employees employees employees Total 
Type of Business Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Construction 4 11.1 2 5.3 4 6.6 10 7.4 
Agricultural 
manufacturing 1 2.8 — -- 13 21.3 14 10.4 
Other manufacturing 1 2.8 4 10.5 16 26.2 21 15.5 
Transportation, 
communication and 
other public utilities 1 2.8 2 5.3 3 4.9 6 4.4 
Finance, insurance 
and real estate 3 8.3 -- -- — -- 3 2.2 
Wholesale and retail 
trade 17 47.2 26 68.4 24 39.3 67 49.6 
Business and repair 
service 3 8.3 2 5.3 1 1.6 6 4.4 
Personal service 1 2.8 -- — — — 1 0.7 
^Source: (21). 
Table 4.3. Continued. 
3 - 4  5 - 9  1 0  and over 
employees employees employees Total 
Type of Business Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Entertainment and 
recreation 1 2.8 -- -- -- -- 1 0.7 
Professional and 
related services 4 11.1 2 5.3 -- -- 6 4.4 
TOTAL 36 100.0 38 100.0 61 100.0 135 100.0 
Table 4.4. Total new locations by type of business and by December 1970 employment^ 
3 - 4  5 - 9  1 0  and over 
employees employees employees Total 
Type of Business Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Construction 5 3.8 6 5.9 5 4.9 16 4.7 
Agricultural 
manufacturing 6 4.5 7 6.9 24 23.3 37 11.0 
Other manufacturing 14 10.5 14 13.9 24 23.3 52 15.4 
Transportation, 
communication and 
other public utilities 2 1.5 6 5.9 3 2.9 11 3.3 
Finance, insurance 
and real estate 6 4.5 3 3.0 1 1.0 10 3.0 
Wholesale and retail 
trade 72 54.1 58 57.4 35 34.0 165 49.0 
Business and repair 
service 13 9.8 3 3.0 4 3.9 20 5.9 
Personal service 6 4.5 — -- 1 1.0 7 2.1 
^Source: (21). 
Table 4.4. Continued. 
Type of Business 
3 - 4  5 - 9  1 0  a n d  o v e r  
employees employees employees Total 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Entertainment and 
recreation 2.3 1.0 1.0 1.5 
Professional and 
related services 4.5 3.0 4.9 14 4.2 
TOTAL 133 100.0 101 100.0 103 100.0 337 100.0 
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The new locations by type of business and by primary market area 
are presented in Table 4.5. One hundred and ninety-seven locations, 
representing 58.6 percent of the total, had as their primary market area 
the community in which they were located. There were 86 firms, or 25.4 
percent of the total, with primary market areas outside the community 
but in Iowa. The remaining 54 new firms, or 16 percent of the total, 
marketed more than one half of their products and/or services outside of 
Iowa. 
B. Selection of Cases 
The export locations, that is, the plants marketing most of their 
products outside of the community, tend to contribute more to the local 
economy because the income generated comes primarily from outside the 
community. Plants producing products for sale primarily outside the 
community tend to generate larger multiplier effects than do plants 
selling most of their output within the community. In other words, new 
export plants tend to have a more pronounced impact upon local employ­
ment and income. For this reason, and because competition for such 
plants among communities is intense, the 140 new exporting plants were 
selected for further location study. These 140 industrial locations 
represented 41.1 percent of the new locations and included the plants 
whose primary market area was outside the community of location but in 
Iowa as well as those whose primary market area was outside of Iowa. 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the classification of the new export 
locations by type of business, by principal market area, by town size 
Table 4.5. New locations by type of business and by primary market area 
Type of Business 
In the community 
Number Percent 
Primary Market Area 
Outside the community 
but in Iowa 
Number Percent 
Outside of Iowa 
Number Percent 
Construction 8 4.1 5 5.8 3 5.6 
Agricultural manufacturing 6 3.0 13 15.1 18 33.3 
Other manufacturing 7 3.6 18 20.9 27 48.2 
Transportation, communication 
and other public utilities 5 2.5 4 4.7 2 3.7 
Finance, insurance and 
real estate 3 1.5 7 8.1 
Wholesale and retail trade 136 69.0 28 32.6 1 1.9 
Business and repair service 13 6.6 4 4.7 3 5.6 
Personal service 6 3.0 1 1.2 
Entertainment and recreation 3 1.5 2 2.3 
Professional and related 
services 10 5.1 4 4.7 -- — 
TOTAL 197 100.0 86 100.0 54 100.0 
^Source: (21). 
Table 4.6. New export locations by type of business and by primary market area* 
Outside of community Outside 
but in Iowa of Iowa Total 
Type of Business Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Construction 5 5.8 3 5.6 8 5.7 
Agricultural manufacturing 13 15.1 18 33.3 31 22.1 
Other manufacturing 18 20.9 27 50.0 45 32.1 
Transportation, communication 
and other public utilities 4 4.7 2 3.7 6 4.3 
Finance, insurance and real estate 7 8.1 - —  — 7 5.0 
Wholesale and retail trade 28 32.6 1 1.9 29 20.7 
Business and repair service 4 4.7 3 5.6 7 5.0 
Personal service 1 1.2 — - 1 0.7 
Entertainment and recreation 2 2.3 —  - - - 2 1.4 
Professional and related services 4 4.7 M — M 4 2.9 
TOTAL 86 100.0 54 100.0 140 100.0 
^Source: (21). 
Table 4.7. New export locations by type of business, by town size and by mean 
December 1970 employment 
Town Size 1 Town Size 2 
Mean number Mean number 
Type of Business Number of employees Number of employees 
Construction 3 5.67 2 9.00 
Agricultural manufacturing 10 23.90 9 39.67 
Other manufacturing 11 27.64 16 25.69 
Transportation, communication and other 
public utilities 2 5.50 1 7.00 
Finance, insurance and real estate 2 7.50 4 5.00 
Wholesale and retail trade 8 12.75 8 7.50 
Business and repair service 5 6.40 1 30.00 
Personal service — — 1 3.00 
Entertainment and recreation 2 8.00 
Professional and related services 3 24.67 
TOTAL 46 17.61 42 21.57 
^Source: (21). 
Table 4.7. Continued. 
Town Size 3 Total 
Mean number Mean number 
Type of Business Number of employees Number of employees 
Construction 3 13.00 8 9.25 
Agricultural manufacturing 12 42.08 31 35.52 
Other manufacturing 18 40.06 45 31.91 
Transportation, communication and other 
public utilities 3 16.67 6 11.33 
Finance, insurance and real estate 1 4.00 7 5,57 
Wholesale and retail trade 13 6,77 29 8.28 
Business and repair service 1 50.00 7 16,00 
Personal service -- — 1 3,00 
Entertainment and recreation -- — 2 8.00 
Professional and related services 1 8.00 4 20.50 
TOTAL 52 28.17 140 22.72 
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and by the mean December 1970 employment. There were 31 agricultural 
manufacturing locations and 45 other manufacturing locations among the 
140 new export locations. The two types of businesses accounted for 76 
of the 140 export locations, or 54 percent of the total. 
The 76 agricultural manufacturing and other manufacturing plants 
were selected for case study consideration because the manufacturing 
plants tend to have a relatively more significant impact upon local 
economies than do the non-manufacturing establishments. The manufactur­
ing plants generally employed more workers, and the expected local 
injection of outside money was greater than for the other plants. Among 
the 76 manufacturing plants, approximately 41 percent marketed most of 
their output outside the community but in Iowa, and 59 percent marketed 
most of their output outside of Iowa. 
Tables 4.8 through 4.11 show the new manufacturing plants by primary 
market area, by type of manufacturing, by town size and by December 1970 
employment. The thirty new manufacturing plants with less than ten 
employees were eliminated from consideration for case study analysis, as 
were the home-grown firms. Although a location decision was made in 
these cases, it was believed that the process probably consisted of fewer 
stages than that involving larger firms with a wider range of location 
alternatives. There is also relatively less competition among communi­
ties for the home-grown firms and for the smaller plants. Home-grown 
firms generally consider only one community for the location of their 
first plant. A plant employing less than 10 workers creates less 
additional employment and income than a plant employing a larger number 
Table 4,8. New manufacturing plants with primary market area outside the community but 




Town Size 1 Town Size 2 
Agricultural Other Agricultural Other 
manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing 
plants employees plants employees plants employees plants employe 
1 4 4 3 1 5 2 3 
1 10 2 5 1 6 2 4 
1 12 1 40 1 7 2 5 
1 30 
_1 3^  
3 26 7 62 5 82 6 24 
9 9 16 4 
^Source: (21). 
Table 4.8. Continued, 
Town Size 3 
Agricultural Other 
manufacturing manufacturing 
plants employees plants employees 
1 10 1 4 
1 12 1 14 
1 15 1 15 
2 65 1 23 
_L 30 
TOTAL 5 167 5 86 
Mean 
employment 33 17 
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Table 4.9. Total new manufacturing plants with primary market area 
outside the community but in Iowa by type of manufacturing 








1 4 6 3 
1 5 3 4 
1 6 4 5 
1 7 1 14 
2 10 1 15 
2 12 1 23 
1 15 1 30 
1 30 1 40 
1 34 
_2 65 
13 275 18 172 
Mean 
employment 21 10 
^Source: (21). 
Table 4.10. New manufacturing plants with primary market area outside of Iowa by type 
of manufacturing, by town size and by December 1970 employment^ 
Town Size 1 
Agricultural Other 
manufacturing manufacturing 
plants employees plants employees 
Town Size 2 
Agricultural Other 
manufacturing manufacturing 
plants employees plants employees 
1 3 1 4 1 10 4 
1 4 1 8 1 20 5 
1 7 1 30 1 85 6 
1 8 1 200 1 160 8 
1 19 9 
1 22 20 




TOTAL 7 213 4 242 4 275 10 387 
Mean 
employment 30 60 69 39 
^Source: (21). 
Table 4.10. Continued. 
Town Size 3 
Agricultural Other 
manufacturing manufacturing 





























Table 4.11. Total new manufacturing plants with primary market 
area outside of Iowa by type of manufacturing and 











3 2 4 
4 2 5 
7 1 6 
8 3 8 
10 1 9 
12 1 15 
16 1 16 
19 3 20 
20 2 25 
22 1 26 
40 2 30 
50 1 35 
65 1 40 
75 1 41 
80 1 80 
85 1 167 
150 2 200 
160 _1 217 




of workers, thus there is less community competition for smaller 
plants. 
A wide variety of products are manufactured by the remaining 46 
agricultural manufacturing and other manufacturing plants. Because of 
differences in such factors as industrial organization and structure, 
degree of competition, size and distribution of markets, type of produc­
tion processes, and other location determinants, the location decision 
process was expected to show significant variation among the different 
types of manufacturing plants. While it would have been useful to 
analyze a number of locations producing similar products, the population 
of new locations did not provide a sufficient number of cases satisfying 
the other selection criteria. In addition, one primary objective of the 
study is to understand, from the standpoint of industrial management, 
the demand for industrial locations in rural Iowa, The Kaldor and Dahlke 
(21) survey data indicates that many types of firms, producing many 
different classes of products, demand rural Iowa locations. Given the 
limited existing knowledge of the location decision process as it affects 
rural Iowa communities, it was decided that the more useful approach for 
this study would be to analyze the location decision of a number of 
different types of firms faced with a wide range of location alternatives. 
This approach is expected to generate more hypotheses about the location 
decisions of firms considering rural Iowa for new plant locations. 
It was generally attempted to select typical manufacturing plant 
locations for case study analysis. From the 46 manufacturing firms 
employing 10 or more workers, 7 cases were selected. The seven 
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selections include cases from each of the three town sizes, the agricul­
tural manufacturing and the other manufacturing sectors, the different 
areas of Iowa, the outside of the community but in Iowa and the outside 
of Iowa market area classifications, and from the entire range of 
employment sizes. 
Each of the seven firms produces a different type of product. The 
types of manufacturing industries chosen were meat breaking and fabri­
cation, animal feed, frozen bread dough, modular homes, plastics, 
electronics and steel fabrication. Each of the new locations is, in 
effect, a branch plant, and firms involved are regional or national 
corporations. That is, the firms have multi-state or national market 
areas. 
Each of the manufacturing locations is large enough, in terms of 
the number of employees, to have a significant impact upon the economy 
of the community in which the plant is located. The number of communi­
ties willing to supply a location for such a plant is large relative to 
the number of locations demanded by firms. Thus, these relatively large 
firms have many communities from which to choose a plant location. The 
location decision process in such cases probably involves more speciali­
zation by individuals and differentiation of factors by stages than does 
the location decision process involved in cases of small or home-grown 
firms. The decisions made in the selected cases were also expected to 
be based on relatively explicit location criteria. 
The sample of cases was not randomly selected. However, the 
location decisions chosen for case study analysis are fairly typical 
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of the new industrial locations in Iowa. In addition, the types of new 
locations selected for study are important in terms of their potential 
contribution to the economic growth of rural Iowa. 
53 
V. ATLANTIC STEEL CORPORATION 
(ATLANTIC, ICWA) 
In December, 1969, Venetian Ornamental Iron Works, Inc., of Des 
Moines, located a new steel fabrication branch plant in Atlantic. 
Venetian Iron is a family corporation owned and operated by the Zenti 
brothers. Atlantic Steel Corporation was established as a subsidiary 
of Venetian Iron. Venetian Iron is a custom steel fabricating firm 
that produces structural steel, miscellaneous ornamental iron products, 
architectural metals and anchor bolts. The Atlantic Steel plant pro­
duces structural steel, hand rails and stairs. Most of the output is 
distributed outside of Iowa. 
A. Industry Structure and Trends 
The production of custom structural steel products accounts for 
much of the company's business. Structural steel has been an increas­
ingly important building material over the last four decades. Building 
is one of the oldest productive activities of man. For centuries 
natural stone and timber were the primary building materials. Construc­
tion was often a slow and costly process. The historically important 
development of steel products allowed faster construction at lower costs. 
The strength, hardness, elasticity and other mechanical properties of 
steel were of major importance in its adoption as a building material. 
Over the years, structural steel has been vastly improved through tech­
nological advances. Welding, for example, has largely replaced riveting 
or bolting. 
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The past several years has been characterized by a trend toward 
préfabrication of structural steel. Factory production of structural 
steel components has become increasingly important because of the 
efficiency of the factory assembly process. On-the-site construction 
work, which is dependent on the weather, has been largely confined to 
minimum erection operations. This has tended to decrease construction 
time and costs. The value of shipments of fabricated structural steel 
for buildings increased from $1.4 billion in 1967 to $1.9 billion in 
1971 (51, p. 25; 52, p. 24), and the total value of fabricated struc­
tural steel increased from $3 billion to $3.4 billion during the period 
(50, p. 179). 
The custom structural steel fabricating industry is characterized 
by many relatively small firms. It tends to be a highly competitive 
industry. The number of firms in the industry increased from 1,636 in 
1963 to 1,865 in 1967. During the same period, the market share of the 
four largest firms decreased from 15 percent to 13 percent, and the 1970 
figures indicate that the degree of concentration in the industry has not 
changed significantly since 1967 (53, p. 29). Thus, the industry is not 
dominated by a small number of very large firms. The combined employment 
of 115 for the two Venetian Iron plants makes the company one of the 
largest custom steel fabricating plants in the Midwest. The economies 
of scale in the industry are such that it is possible for relatively 
small firms to operate efficiently and, thus, to compete effectively for 
many contracts. There are many steel fabricating firms with only 10-25 
employees. 
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The procedure of bidding for contracts together with the uncertain­
ties involved in developing cost estimates for different types of jobs 
tend to make it possible for custom steel fabricating firms to compete 
on a national basis. As an illustration of the nation-wide competition 
in the industry, Venetian Iron Works currently has jobs in such cities 
as Des Moines, Iowa; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Dallas, Texas; Atlanta, 
Georgia; Greensboro, North Carolina; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Chicago, 
Illinois. It is not uncommon for firms with West Coast plants to com­
pete effectively for construction jobs on the East Coast. In general, 
a high degree of competition exists in the industry. Firms compete not 
only with other firms in the same state or region but also with firms in 
other states or regions. This seems to indicate that the transportation 
costs per mile, as a percentage of output value, are relatively low for 
many of the products of the custom steel fabricating industry, 
B. The Location Decision 
The decision to locate the new branch plant in Atlantic was the 
culmination of a location search by Venetian Iron Works. The company 
wanted to expand its operations, but it was having serious labor prob­
lems in its Des Moines plant. Therefore a significant expansion of the 
existing facility was ruled out. Manpower in the Des Moines metropolitan 
area was in short supply, and the wage rates were set high by the com­
petition for labor. Venetian Iron was having to compete for labor with 
large companies such as John Deere, Firestone and Ford. The Des Moines 
plant was not unionized because the union plan had been voted down, but 
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the company felt that the plant might soon be organized. The company 
produces according to contracts which are fixed in terms of product price 
and in terms of completion dates. Because of the contracts, the company 
lacks flexibility to profitably deal with sudden large wage increase 
demands or with strike activity. The employee turnover rate at the 
Des Moines plant was very high and this was creating additional problems. 
The skills required in steel fabrication take several months to master, 
so high labor turnover rates tend to decrease labor productivity. The 
company decided to build an additional plant to increase profits and to 
increase their alternatives and flexibility in dealing with the existing 
and expected labor problems. 
The president of Venetian Iron, Mario Zenti, was the primary company 
official involved in the plant location decision. He at first considered 
building a plant outside of Des Moines but within a 20-40 mile radius of 
the city. However, after studying the situation the company decided that 
to locate the plant so close to Des Moines would give them the same type 
of metropolitan area labor problems that they already had. 
The company decided that, because of labor problems in metropolitan 
areas, it wanted to locate the new plant 50-70 miles from any major 
metropolitan area. The president of the company wanted to locate the 
plant in western Iowa, away from most industry. The Dodge Report 
indicated that 75 percent of all Iowa industry was concentrated in 
eastern Iowa. Mr. Zenti believed that, because of the greater concen­
tration of industry in eastern Iowa, there would likely be serious labor 
availability problems there. The desire to locate away from the major 
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concentration of industry in the state established the western one half of 
Iowa as the general area in which the plant would be located. Much of the 
company's business was east of Des Moines and the U.S. Steel Corporation 
plant in Gary, Indiana was the primary source of steel input. However, 
the company felt that the high productivity of the rural Iowa workers 
would more than offset the higher transportation costs and, thus, allow 
the company to be competitive in bidding for construction contracts. 
Within western Iowa, the communities closer than 50 miles to Omaha or 
Des Moines were eliminated. The company wanted the plant reasonably close 
to Interstate 80 and that eliminated many communities in southwestern 
Iowa and in northwestern Iowa. 
The Iowa Development Commission was contacted, provided with the 
company plant location specifications and asked to recommend a few Iowa 
communities meeting the specifications. The specifications included 
those discussed above as well as others dealing with such things as labor 
needs, utility service, plant site, organized labor activity, rail ser­
vice, community size and community attitude. 
Labor costs generally account for more than one third of total costs 
in the industry. The company wanted to locate in a rural farm community 
because it was believed that such a community would provide more produc­
tive labor than that of urban areas. The key labor factors to the com­
pany were the willingness to work and the "generally superior attitudes" 
of the rural workers. In effect, a rural location was demanded because 
the company officials believed the productivity of rural workers would 
be high. The wage rates were expected to be lower in the rural areas. 
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but this seems to have been relatively less important than labor produc­
tivity as a location factor. The critical factor favoring rural areas 
was, in effect, the expected low labor costs per unit of output. 
The president of the company was very interested in the existing 
industries in the towns being considered for the new plant location. He 
looked at the number of male employees, at the number of female employees 
and at the union affiliations. The number of women working indicated 
the stability of the work force because if the women were working it 
tended to mean that the family would stay in town. Also, if the wife 
was working, then the family would have more than one source of income 
and that would tend to constrain wage demands. Home ownership was also 
considered an indication of labor force stability. 
The company wanted a readily accessible site complete with the 
necessary utility service. The availability of a large and constant 
supply of electricity was very important due to the large electrical 
power requirements of the steel fabrication process. 
The president of the company wanted to locate the plant adjacent 
to a rail line in case there was a need to receive inputs or ship outputs 
by rail. The availability of rail service was also considered to be 
important in providing bargaining power when the company was negotiating 
with trucking firms. 
The attitude of the community with respect to industrial development 
was also important. The company wanted the plant to be a welcome addi­
tion to the economy of the community. The company was not seeking gifts, 
but they needed the cooperation and help of the local industrial 
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development people in getting the land, the utilities and other 
necessary services. 
The Iowa Development Commission utilized the plant location 
specifications of Venetian Iron Works in recommending three western Iowa 
communities for consideration. The three communities recommended were 
Atlantic, Greenfield and Missouri Valley. The population of Atlantic 
was approximately 7,300. It is seven miles from Interstate 80 and 
approximately 60 miles from Omaha. The population of Greenfield was 
approximately 2,200. It is thirteen miles from Interstate 80 and 55 
miles from Des Moines. The population of Missouri Valley was approxi­
mately 3,500. It is five miles from Interstate 80 and only 25 miles 
from Omaha. 
Missouri Valley was eliminated from further consideration because 
it was too close to the Omaha metropolitan area. The president of the 
company believed that it was too close to Omaha to allow the plant to 
stay away from metropolitan area labor problems. As discussed earlier, 
the company believed that rural workers were much more productive. In 
addition, the problems with organized labor activity were expected to 
be less in the rural areas. 
The availability of labor and the transportation facilities became 
the critical location factors in choosing between Atlantic and Green­
field. The two communities were about equal with respect to transpor­
tation facilities, with Atlantic perhaps having a slight advantage. 
Each of the two communities had rail service, but Atlantic was on a main 
line. Atlantic was six miles closer to Interstate 80 than Greenfield. 
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Atlantic was also situated on a good north-south highway (U.S. 71) while 
Greenfield was situated on a poorer north-south (Iowa 25) route. The 
relative labor availability of the two communities seems to have been the 
most important factor in deciding between the two. It was decided that 
Greenfield was too small to provide an adequate supply of labor. The 
expected greater labor availability of Atlantic (population 7,306) as 
compared to Greenfield (population 2,212) eliminated Greenfield and left 
Atlantic as the new branch plant location. 
The most important location factors in the approximate order of 
significance in the decision to locate the plant in Atlantic were the 
availability of highly productive rural labor, the relatively low wage 
rates, the low degree of organized labor activity, the good transporta­
tion facilities, the cooperative attitude of the local residents and the 
quality and availability of essential public services. 
The availability of labor of expected high productivity was the 
single most important location factor. The rural Atlantic area workers 
were expected to have the desire to work, to be more conscientious and 
to generally be much more efficient than urban workers. Skilled metal 
workers were not available in sufficient quantity, but the important 
thing to the company was to be able to employ workers who could think 
and who would be willing to do so to improve their productivity. The 
president of the company believed that the rural workers were well-
educated and very trainable and, thus, that they would make a strong 
contribution to a profitable operation. 
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The existing wage scales and the extent of organized labor activity 
were relatively low. These were important factors in the location 
decision, but they were much less important than the supply of produc­
tive labor. 
The transportation facilities of Atlantic were excellent in the eyes 
of the company. The community was served by good north-south and east-
west highways, by a main line railroad and was only seven miles from 
Interstate 80. The good transportation facilities increased the expected 
ease with which the plant could receive its inputs and ship its outputs. 
The attitude of the Atlantic industrial development officials was 
important in the location decision. The president of the company met 
with the president of the Atlantic Industrial Development Corporation to 
discuss plant site needs. He said he wanted a five-acre site, complete 
with utilities and located next to the railroad. The development corpora­
tion officials optioned the land and worked with Mr. Zenti to get the 
necessary utility service. The only difficulty encountered was the 
uncooperative attitude of a local utility company official. Because of 
the problem, the president of the company almost decided against locating 
the plant in Atlantic. However, the problem was resolved, adequate ser­
vice was assured and the decision to locate in Atlantic was finalized. 
The company then bought the land, and the community shared the cost of 
utility development. 
The local tax structure was favorable, and the company was pleased 
with it, but tax rates were not a significant factor in the location 
decision. The president of the company believed that the local tax 
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structure was not significantly different among communities. The company 
had their own financing making the availability of mortgage credit un­
necessary. 
The primary steel input sources of the company were the Bethlehem 
Steel and the U.S. Steel plants near Gary, Indiana and the C.F. and I. 
Steel plant in Pueblo, Colorado. At the time the plant location decision 
was being made, the steel companies used "freight equalization" to 
eliminate differences in transportation costs from the various steel 
mills. This significantly lessened the importance of input transporta­
tion costs as a location factor. The freight equalization policy has 
now been eliminated so that steel fabricating firms must pay higher 
freight charges if inputs are purchased from steel companies located 
further away from the fabrication plant. 
Despite the higher transportation costs that resulted from the 
abandonment of the freight equalization policy, the management of the 
company believes that the location decision was optimal with respect to 
their primary motive, profit maximization. As discussed earlier, the 
primary location determinant was the expected availability of highly 
productive labor. The company's expectations about the profitability of 
the plant were primarily labor productivity expectations. The key 
expectation was that the rural Atlantic area workers would be very 
productive, and that this factor would tend to make the plant highly 
profitable. The expectations have been realized. The output per hour 
of the Atlantic plant employees is 40-50 percent higher than that of the 
Des Moines plant workers. In addition, the Atlantic workers are paid 
approximately $1 per hour less than the Des Moines workers. In other 
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words, the labor costs per unit of output are substantially lower in the 
Atlantic plant than in the Des Moines plant, even though the level of 
technology utilized is essentially the same in the two plants. 
The management of the company believes that the economies of scale 
involved in having larger plants are more than offset by the higher 
productivity of workers in relatively small rural plants. Man for man, 
the Atlantic workers are much more productive than the Des Moines workers. 
The attitude of the rural workers seems to be of critical importance in 
explaining their high productivity. The rural people, many of them with 
farm backgrounds, know how to work and are generally willing and anxious 
to do a good job. 
Another factor contributing significantly to the higher labor 
productivity in the Atlantic plant is the low turnover rate of the 
employees. The metal working skills required in structural steel fabri­
cation plants generally take at least six months to be mastered. Thus, 
labor turnover is particularly important. Of the 25 original employees 
of the Atlantic plant, 19 are still there, are well-acquainted with their 
responsibilities and are very efficient at their jobs. This is in sharp 
contrast to the Des Moines plant where over 200 workers must be hired 
during a typical year to keep the production crew at 50-60 employees. 
The lower labor turnover rates at the Atlantic plant result from 
many interrelated factors, one of the most important of which is probably 
the relatively stable rural community environment. There seems to be 
fewer distractions and other pressures that in urban areas tend to 
create employment instability. In a small town there are fewer 
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employment alternatives available so a worker tends to stick with a job 
for a longer period of time than his urban counterpart. In Des Moines, 
for example, "workers will often change jobs at the drop of a hat" if 
they can get an additional 5ç per hour. This type of thing is much less 
prevalent in the rural community, partly because of the relative scarcity 
of alternative employment opportunities, but also because rural workers 
tend to develop a greater sense of loyalty to their employers. In other 
words, labor attitude is again very important. 
The management of Venetian Iron Works, Inc., based their location 
decision largely upon their expectations of relatively higher labor 
productivity in rural communities. Although several other factors were 
important at various stages of the location decision process, the com­
pany's location search concentrated upon finding a rural community with 
a good supply of high "quality" labor. The labor "quality" that was the 
object of much of the location search was not a particular skill but 
rather something much more abstract. The critical factor to the company 
was the quality of labor where "quality" was reflected by willingness to 
work, interest in the job, general educational level, turnover rates, 
absenteeism and general productivity. The company located Atlantic Steel 
Corporation in Atlantic because Atlantic remained after all other 
communities had been eliminated. Atlantic was expected to be the most 
profitable location for the plant. Although it is impossible to determine 
whether the location has resulted in maximum profit, the operation has 
been a highly profitable one, and it seems that several location factors 
relatively unique to Atlantic have contributed to its profitability. The 
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company probably made at least a near optimal location decision given 
the information available and given the expectations of the management 
of the company. There is little evidence to suggest that the expecta­
tions were invalid. The company officials still believe, after almost 
four years of experience with the Atlantic location, that their location 
choice was the optimal one. 
The employment of the plant will increase from the present 35 to at 
least 45 when a current expansion program is completed. The company had 
been seriously conducting an additional location search for another 
branch plant. However, the current shortage of basic steel inputs has, 
at least temporarily, halted the location search. The company is now 
operating subject to severely constrained input supplies, and the company 
officials believe that it would not be to their advantage to locate a 
new plant in the near future. The location decision process was proceed­
ing along the same lines as the earlier one, and the same location fac­
tors were being utilized in the process of elimination of prospective 
communities. This is a further indication that the company was pleased 
with the decision process that was culminated by the choice of Atlantic 
for its branch plant location. 
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VI. DAKOTA BAKE-N-SERV, INC. 
(NEVADA, lOWA) 
Dakota Bake-N-Serv, Inc., of Jamestown, North Dakota, located a 
branch plant in Nevada in October, 1968. The plant employs approximately 
70 workers, 30 to 45 of whom are Oak Park Academy students that work 20 
hours per week. The students work four-hour daytime shifts. Oak Park 
Academy is a secondary school operated by the Seventh Day Adventist 
Church. The plant produces frozen bread dough, and most of the product 
is distributed outside of Iowa. 
A. Industry Structure and Trends 
The frozen bread dough industry is a new, relatively small industry. 
Total industry sales in 1972 were approximately $40 million and there 
were only ten to twelve firms in the industry. Frozen bread dough has 
been commercially produced and sold only for about the last twelve years. 
Most of the development of the industry occurred within a two-year period 
during the early 1960's. The industry has been characterized by a trend 
toward more automated production techniques in the mixing and shaping of 
the dough. The efficiency of the freezing process has been increased 
substantially through the use of advanced quick-freezing methods. The 
development and adoption of efficient packaging and labeling equipment 
was one of the more recent technological innovations. 
The general acceptance of, and widespread increased consumer demand 
for, frozen food products in recent years has had a big impact upon the 
frozen bread and roll dough industry. Millions of households have home 
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freezers which are utilized to store a variety of foods, including bread 
dough. The bread and rolls may be baked between visits to the super­
market, and, thus, fresh bread is available in the home throughout the 
week. 
The dough usually includes no preservative because freezing retards 
spoilage. The lack of preservatives and the fact that the bread is baked 
at home combine to give the bread the home-cooked flavor that many people 
prefer. In addition, when the frozen dough is purchased by the consumer 
and baked in the home, the unit cost of the bread is significantly lower 
than that of baked bread. This is a particularly important consideration 
to large families that consume a large quantity of bread products. At a 
time when many food prices are rapidly increasing, saving a few pennies 
per unit on a staple food product such as bread can make a big difference 
in the total household food budget. 
Dakota Bake-N-Serv, Inc. started operation in 1964 in Jamestown, 
North Dakota. The company is a franchise organization which is licensed 
to use the name and processes of Rhodes Bake-N-Serv, Inc. of Portland, 
Oregon. The president of Dakota Bake-N-Serv founded the company when he 
recognized Rhodes frozen bread dough as an outstanding product with great 
growth potential. The company began by obtaining the Rhodes franchise 
for North Dakota and South Dakota. The original plant was located in 
Jamestown, North Dakota in 1964. Since that time, the company has grown 
to eight manufacturing plants serving thirty states. The market area 
served by the company stretches from the East Coast to the West Coast and 
south to approximately the Mason-Dixon line. The company plants are 
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located in the states of North Dakota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, 
Michigan, Massachusetts, Colorado and Washington. Of the eight plants, 
three were purchased from other companies and five were new locations. 
The company has doubled its sales for each of the last several years, and 
it now is the largest firm in the frozen bread dough industry. The 
products are sold to supermarket chains and to wholesale distributors 
throughout much of the country. 
B. The Location Decision 
The original Dakota Bake-N-Serv plant, located in Jamestown, North 
Dakota, served the market area of North and South Dakota. By 1968, the 
company had developed a significant market area in Minnesota, of which 
Minneapolis-St. Paul was particularly important. The market area of the 
company was expanding to the southeast. The management of the company 
decided, on the basis of expected sales potential, to expand the company 
operations by locating a new frozen bread dough plant. One alternative 
was to locate the plant in Minnesota to serve the already developed 
Minneapolis-St. Paul market. However, the management of the company did 
not want their plants so close together that they would compete with each 
other for sales. Also, the president of the company was very aggressive, 
and he had high expectations about the future growth of the company. He 
decided that, in terms of long run profit, rather than locate the plant 
in Minnesota, it would be better to "leapfrog" to Iowa. An Iowa plant 
would have the existing Minnesota market for support while it developed 
other market areas. The decision was made, on the basis of product mar­
ket considerations, to locate the plant in Iowa. 
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The selection of a particular Iowa ccmnunity for the plant location 
involved some very unique considerations by the management of the company. 
In particular, the objective function of the company does not consist 
solely of profit maximization. The company is not a strict profit maxi-
mizer. The company, in effect, has two complementary objectives. The 
first is to earn a profit from company operations. The second objective 
involves the relation between the management of the company and the 
Seventh Day Adventist Church. The company is a privately owned corpora­
tion, but the management has very close ties to the church. 
The church operates a number of private educational facilities for 
the young people of the Seventh Day Adventist faith. The academies 
(secondary schools) try to attract private industries to provide work for 
the sixteen years of age-and-older students. The arrangement is con­
sidered beneficial to the academy students, to the academy and to the 
companies involved. The employment enables students to earn money to 
pay their way through school. Also, student employment is consistent 
with the strong church belief that learning should take place everywhere, 
including places of business, and that the academies should try to train 
the students to be productive workers. The cooperating companies thus 
provide needed employment opportunities in which students may do some­
thing worthwhile. The students provide the companies with highly produc­
tive labor services at reasonable wage rates. The companies help the 
academy by furnishing a flow of outside money through student work con­
tracts. The three-way complementary relationship between the private 
companies, the students and the academies seems to be mutually beneficial 
to all of the parties concerned. 
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Dakota Bake-N-Serv has a history of close interaction with the edu­
cational program of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. The company manage­
ment has a strong belief in the "work ethic" and in the contribution that 
gainful employment makes to the development of young people into produc­
tive members of society. Of the eight company plants, six are located 
in communities where the church operates private educational facilities. 
The objective function of the company includes the earning of profit, 
but it also includes the provision of meaningful employment opportunities 
for academy students. 
The decision to locate the new frozen bread dough plant in Iowa was 
based on the product market considerations discussed earlier. The selec­
tion of the particular community of Nevada was largely a function of the 
unique labor situation in the community. The company wanted to locate 
in a Seventh Day Adventist academy town in order to employ academy 
students in the plant. Oak Park Academy, located in Nevada, was the only 
church academy in Iowa. The academy, at the time, was looking for indus­
try to provide student employment. The company management wanted to 
employ students because of their expected high productivity at reason­
able wage rates. The management also wanted to provide work to the 
students, including some of their own children, because of the strong 
belief that it would be good training, and it would "keep the students 
out of trouble". An adequate number of academy students was expected to 
be available to work in the plant, and the academy was anxious to attract 
industry to provide student employment, so an agreement was reached to 
locate the plant in Nevada. The church owned the land, and they agreed 
to build the building and to lease it to the company. 
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Nevada was chosen for the plant location primarily because of the 
unique academy labor situation. However, the community also happened to 
be near ideal in terms of the market area the plant was to serve. Within 
a 250 mile radius of Nevada was what was expected to be a very strong 
market area for the company products. The area included Minneapolis, 
Omaha, Des Moines and the Quad Cities. More generally, the primary mar­
ket area to be served by the plant was composed of Iowa, southern 
Minnesota, central Illinois and eastern Nebraska. Nevada was near the 
center of that market area. The plant would probably have been located 
slightly closer to Des Moines if it had not been for the academy in 
Nevada. 
The management of the company, in addition to favoring an academy 
town, wanted to locate in a rural area. Local people would be employed 
to supplement the student labor, and the management believed that rural 
areas would provide more productive labor than metropolitan areas. They 
were of the opinion that rural people generally know how to work and are 
less likely to look for excuses not to work. They were also expected to 
take pride in their work. "Many of them have grown up on farms, so they 
have learned to get out of bed and get with it." The management of the 
company also preferred rural areas because of the lower probability of 
organized labor activity in such areas relative to that of metropolitan 
areas. The president of the company wanted to "run his own business and 
make his own decisions", and he believed that there was no way that could 
be done if the plants were unionized. He also preferred rural areas as 
a place to live and work. In general, even without the consideration of 
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the academy, the company management would not have located the plant in 
a metropolitan area. 
The critical locational factors, in the approximate order of impor­
tance were the productivity, availability and wages of needed labor; the 
strength of labor unions in the community; the nearness of markets for 
outputs; the nearness of markets for raw materials; the quality of the 
transportation system; and the attitude of local residents toward indus­
trial development. The desire to locate in the center of the expected 
market area established Iowa as the general area for the plant location. 
Once Iowa was chosen as the area for the plant location, the decision 
process was collapsed immediately, and Nevada was selected because there 
was no other academy located in Iowa. Nevada was selected as the plant 
location, and the unique labor situation connected with the academy was 
by far the most important location determinant. Although other locational 
factors were of relatively less importance, the factors ranked earlier 
also increased the attractiveness of Nevada as a plant location. There 
was very little existing or expected organized labor activity in the 
community. It was near the center of the expected market area, thus, 
product transportation costs would be near minimum, and fast service could 
be provided to customers. Nevada was also well situated with respect to 
raw material markets such as Fergus Falls, Minnesota; Minneapolis, Minne­
sota; Chicago, Illinois; and Clinton, Iowa. The company operates its own 
transportation service, and all the output is shipped by truck. Thus, a 
good highway system was important to the company. Nevada is located just 
one mile from a good east-west highway (U.S. 30) and only seven miles from 
a good north-south highway (1-35). Rail service was less important 
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because rail transportation was to be used only for inputs which 
occasionally would come from distant points. With respect to the 
attitude of the local residents toward industrial development, the most 
important thing to the company was that the administration of the 
academy showed a genuine interest in, and a need for, the proposed 
plant. 
The decision to locate the frozen bread dough plant in Nevada is 
believed to have been optimal, particularly with respect to the dual 
objectives of the company. The company wanted the plant to be a 
profitable addition to its operations, but it also wanted to provide 
employment for the academy students. With respect to the Nevada 
location decision, the evidence strongly suggests that the two objectives 
were noncompeting. In effect, this means that the firm behaved as if 
it were a strict profit maximizer. 
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VII. DESIGN HOMES, INC. 
(HUMBOLDT, IOWA) 
Design Homes, Inc., Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin, manufactures modu­
lar homes and mobile homes for direct sale to consumers. Mr. Frank A. 
Weeks founded the company and established the first plant in Prairie du 
Chien in 1967. Mr. Weeks, the president of the company, grew up in the 
Prairie du Chien area. He had a farm background and also had earlier 
experience in home building before Design Homes, Inc. was established. 
In 1970, Design Homes located a new modular home branch plant in 
Humboldt. The plant started operating in December, 1970, with a work 
force of fifteen employees. The plant now employs thirty workers. The 
majority of the output of the plant is sold outside of the community but 
within Iowa. 
A. Industry Structure and Trends 
Modular homes are constructed with interchangeable parts according 
to standardized patterns and designs. Assembly line techniques are 
applied in order to take advantage of economies due to specialization of 
labor and capital equipment. The production process encourages gains in 
labor productivity from relatively low-skilled workers. The factory-
produced homes are transported to the buyer's lot after the sale. In 
this sense, prefabricated modular homes are more mobile than traditional 
on-the-site constructed homes but less mobile than "homes on wheels". The 
assembly line production processes utilized in the modular home industry 
and in the mobile home industry are similar. The cost economies realized 
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give the industries a competitive advantage over the conventional home 
construction industry in the low-cost housing market. The modular home 
industry constitutes a relatively new field of industrialized housing. 
With respect to cost and mobility, it occupies an intermediate position 
between the conventional constructed-on-the-lot housing industry and the 
mobile home industry. 
The production of modular homes accounts for a major part of the 
output of the prefabricated wood structures industry in which the value 
of shipments increased from $322 million in 1958 to over $1 billion in 
1971 (50, p. 77). The value of shipments of ready-cut and prefabricated 
wood buildings increased from $348 million in 1967 to $862 million in 
1971 (51, p. 12; 52, p. 11). The number of firms producing prefabricated 
wood structures grew from 364 in 1958 to 549 in 1967. The portion of 
industry shipment accounted for by the four largest companies in the 
industry decreased from 28 percent in 1958 to 21 percent in 1967, indi­
cating a lessening of concentration in the industry. However, from 1967 
to 1970, the four-firm concentration ratio increased from 21 percent to 
30 percent (53, p. 14). Despite the growth in the number of firms, the 
market share held by the largest companies in the industry actually in­
creased. This implies that the new firms in the industry are generally 
small companies operating on a local market basis and that much of the 
growth in demand in recent years has been filled by the larger companies. 
The modular home industry is characterized by a large number of 
relatively small firms, with no single firm or group of firms dominating 
the industry. The industry constitutes a new field of industrialized 
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housing and occupies a position between the conventional constructed-on-
the-lot housing industry and the mobile home industry with respect to 
cost and mobility. 
The production of modular homes is a relatively new industry in the 
housing field. The rapidly increasing costs of building conventional 
homes have priced many potential home buyers out of the market. Many 
lower income people want to own their own homes, but often find that the 
cost of buying conventional housing is beyond their means. Large numbers 
of people, particularly young married couples and older people, are turn­
ing to other home-owning alternatives. The growth in the under-30 and 
over-55 groups of the U.S. population has created a huge market for non-
conventional housing. 
The mobile home industry has succeeded in capturing the major pro­
portion of the low cost housing market. Approximately 600,000 mobile 
home units worth approximately $4 billion were sold in 1972, which means 
that the industry accounted for more than 40 percent of all new single-
family homes sold in the U.S. that year (39, p. 105). The growth in the 
industry has been stimulated by the low price and convenience of mobile 
homes. The average cost of a fully furnished mobile home in April, 1973, 
was estimated to be $7,000 as compared to approximately $27,000 for a con­
ventional unfurnished home (39, p. 105). Federal Housing Administration 
statistics show that average family income for mobile home buyers is less 
than $8,500, compared to an average income of over $13,000 for buyers in 
regular FHÂ programs (29, p. 147). 
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The market for non-conventional housing is expanding rapidly, and 
mobile home manufacturers have captured a large share of the market 
largely because of their production efficiency and mass production tech­
niques. A mobile home cost $11 a square foot to build in 1965, and by 
1972, the cost of building was down to $8.50 a square foot (29, p. 147). 
The modular home industry has faced stiff cost competition in the 
housing market, particularly from the mobile home industry. The competi­
tion from the conventional housing industry has also been tough in some 
markets. The cost per square foot of some modular homes in some areas 
has been higher than that of conventionally built housing. Many conven­
tional home builders are holding their costs down by utilizing factor-
made components and, thus, achieving factory efficiencies. 
Modular home manufacturers in some states have not been able to 
produce efficiently because the units must conform to building codes which 
vary among localities. This problem has become less severe as a number of 
states have adopted uniform building codes. 
As advanced technology is utilized and more efficient factory pro­
duction methods are developed, the modular home industry is expected to 
grow, but it is unlikely to match the success of the mobile home industry. 
Some of the more efficient modular home manufacturers are producing and 
selling homes for less than $16 a square foot, making their product very 
competitive in the housing market. 
The nature of the modular home industry is such that transportation 
cost of the finished product is a critical location factor. Shipping a 
"box of air", as the modular unit has been described, is very costly. The 
high transportation costs per mile add substantially to the purchase price 
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as the distance between the production plant and the consumer increases. 
This tends to eliminate some of the competitive cost advantage which a 
modular home manufacturer has over a regular home builder. 
Another factor dictating a relatively small market area for a modu­
lar home plant is the fact that consumers are very reluctant to drive long 
distances to examine the modular home models. The models are generally 
situated close to the plant where the sales personnel are available. 
B. The Location Decision 
In the case of the Design Homes, Inc. modular home branch plant in 
Humboldt, the president decided on the basis of Design Homes' capital, 
debt and earnings, to expand the company's operations by locating a new 
plant away from the main plant in Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin. He felt 
that it was "good business to have separate profit centers" and to be 
able to lise the local bank for real estate financing. 
The first step in the location decision process was to determine the 
general geographical area where the company wanted the new plant to be 
located. The expected strong market potential of Iowa was the primary 
reason why the company wanted to locate the plant in the state. The 
right-to-work law was another important factor in Iowa's favor. The next 
criteria set by the president of Design Homes was to locate the plant 
between 150 and 200 miles from the home plant in Prairie du Chien, Wiscon­
sin. Mr. Weeks wanted the branch plant far enough away from the home 
plant that the two plants would not compete with one another, but yet he 
wanted the branch plant within one hour's flying time of the home plant. 
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Mr. Weeks flies his own airplane, and he wanted to be able to fly to the 
plant in one hour so that he could readily supervise and coordinate the 
plant's operations. 
A number of Iowa communities falling within the 150 to 200 mile range 
were selected for investigation. Design Homes was concerned with finding 
a place large enough to have good rail and truck service, an adequate 
labor supply and an airport, but yet small enough not to have strong 
organized labor activity. Both good rail service and good truck service 
were important because the company expected to use 50 percent rail and 50 
percent truck in the transportation of the homes from the plant to the 
customers' lots and of the lumber from the West Coast to the plant. 
The company wanted to locate in a rural community with an adequate 
supply of rural workers that had farm backgrounds. The president believed 
such labor to be more work oriented and, thus, more productive. The type 
and degree of training of the labor force was relatively unimportant be­
cause the employees would be trained in the necessary skills. The company 
would not have located the plant in a town of, for example, 40,000 people 
where most workers were unionized and where there was a history of labor 
strife. The preference was for a community with a population between 
2,500 and 5,000, although the communities investigated ranged in size up 
to almost 10,000. 
Mr. Weeks selected a number of communities from the desired geographi­
cal area and of the preferred size and spent a few days driving around in 
the area without talking to anyone about building a new plant. He drove 
through the towns, looked at their overall appearance, looked at the air­
port, asked about rail and truck service and generally tried to determine 
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whether the community was progressive. The communities that were found 
to be lacking with respect to the specifications set by Mr. Weeks were 
eliminated from the list of potential locations. Letters were then 
written to the industrial development people in the communities meeting 
the general specifications set by the company. The possibility of 
locating a plant in their community was discussed and the communities 
failing to take positive action were eliminated from further considera­
tion. After this stage in the process of elimination, the three 
communities of Humboldt, Webster City and Iowa Falls remained as serious 
contenders for the new Design Homes branch plant. The three communities 
met the specifications such as good rail and truck service, an airport, 
adequate labor supply, limited organized labor activity and a population 
of 2,500 to 10,000. 
The final stage involved the selection of one of the three communi­
ties for the plant location. There was nothing really negative about 
Humboldt, Webster City or Iowa Falls, although Webster City was larger 
than preferred. The primary determining factor in the decision to locate 
in Humboldt rather than in Webster City or Iowa Falls was the cooperation 
shown by the people of Humboldt. The officers of the local industrial 
development corporation checked to see if Design Homes was sound finan­
cially, and when they were convinced that it was, they actively worked to 
get the plant located. When they were told that Mr. Weeks, if possible, 
wanted a site within walking distance of the airport, they optioned a 
piece of land adjacent to the airport, flew to Prairie du Chien, sat down 
in Kfc. Weeks' office and showed a real interest in the proposed plant. 
The help and cooperation provided by the community industrial development 
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leaders convinced the president of Design Homes that the community was 
very progressive. The progressive nature of the people of the community, 
the cooperation provided and the availability of the site between the 
airport and the railroad were the critical factors in Mr. Weeks' decision 
to locate the new plant in Humboldt. He was a busy man with little time 
to devote to the location decision, and he wanted to be sold on the idea 
of locating his plant in a particular town. The people of Humboldt did 
the best job of selling their community. 
Mr. Frank Weeks, the president of Design Homes, Inc., studied the 
location problem and made the location decision within a relatively short 
period of time. The decision was based on profit maximization and at the 
time it was made, Humboldt seemed to be the optimal choice. The plant 
has proven to be profitable, but Mr. Weeks now believes the location 
choice was sub-optimal. Given the location specifications set by Design 
Homes, the decision was probably the best one. However, the indications 
now are that an error was made in specifying that the plant be located 
between 150 and 200 miles from the home plant in Prairie du Chien, 
Wisconsin. Humboldt is approximately 180 miles from Prairie du Chien. 
The Prairie du Chien plant sells houses in an area half way to Humboldt, 
and the Humboldt plant sells houses half way to Prairie du Chien. That 
is, each of the plants sells within a 90 mile radius, and the area has 
proven to be too large for one plant to handle. Neither of the plants is 
doing a good job of selling in the middle area between the two plants. 
People are generally not willing to drive 90 miles to shop for a modular 
home. It seems that 50 or 60 miles is about as far as potential customers 
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will travel. The plants were located too far apart to be able to fully 
develop the intermediate market area. Locating the branch plant closer 
to the home plant would have tended to provide more complete market cover­
age, and, in addition, it would have reduced the cost of transporting men 
and materials between the two plants. 
The specification of locating the branch plant between 150 and 200 
miles from the home plant was based on the need to have the two plants 
far enough apart that they did not compete with one another but yet close 
enough together that the president of the company could fly between them 
in an hour or less. The error seems to have been in the company thinking 
that the plants had to be at least 150 miles apart in order not to com­
pete with one another. The evidence suggests that the location decision 
was sub-optimal because the expectations upon which the specification 
that the plants be 150 to 200 miles apart was based were unrealistic. 
With the exception of the error in the specified distance between 
plants, the specifications set by Mr. Weeks were realistic, and the 
location factors considered, were the important ones with respect to the 
Design Homes objective of maximizing profit. The basic location decision­
making process was efficient, and it has been used with success in making 
two additional location choices. 
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VIII. GOLDEN SUN FEEDS, INC. 
(GRINNELL, lOWA) 
In October of 1969, Golden Sun Feeds, Inc. started operation of its 
new livestock and poultry feed plant in Grinnell. The company relocated 
the branch plant from Des Moines. The plant, which employs 45 to 60 
people, is 95 percent automatic when in normal operation, and embodies 
the most advanced technology available at the time of construction. Most 
of the output of the plant is distributed outside of the community but 
within Iowa. 
A. Industry Structure and Trends 
The structure of the livestock feed manufacturing industry is 
characterized by a few large firms and an active competitive fringe of 
small firms. In 1967, there were approximately 2,400 establishments 
producing prepared feeds for animals and fowls. The four largest firms 
in the industry accounted for 23 percent of industry sales (50, p. 16). 
The large firms generally compete through nonprice means such as product 
differentiation, quality control and advertising. Price competition and 
cost reduction are more often used by smaller firms. As the trend toward 
fewer but larger farms continues, price competition can be expected to 
become increasingly important (56, p. 483). 
The quantity of feed concentrates fed in the U.S. increased from 
133 million tons in 1955 to 195 million tons in 1969 (46, p. 424), while 
during the same period, the number of animal units fed annually increased 
from 104 million to over 115 million (46, p. 71). The value of industry 
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shipments increased from approximately $3.2 billion in 1958 to over 
$5.8 billion in 1971, with much of the growth occurring since 1965 
(50, p. 16). The growth of the feed industry has been closely associated 
with improved protein nutrition and the development of new feeds. 
The livestock feed manufacturing industry is both demand and resource 
based. Manufacturing of livestock feed is basically a fast turnover, 
low inventory industry. The high costs involved in transporting the raw 
materials and the finished product make it very important to locate the 
feed plants near the feed consumption markets as well as near the raw 
material sources. Iowa, located in the center of the Corn Belt, has 
long been a very important livestock feeding state and the number of 
livestock fed increased substantially in the decade of the 1960's. Over 
the ten-year period of 1960 to 1969, the number of fed cattle marketed 
in Iowa increased from 2,565,000 head to 4,550,000 head, or 82 percent 
(31, pp. 2-3). The majority of the cattle fed in Iowa come from outside 
the state. The leading Iowa suppliers of feeder cattle and calves have 
been South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Nebraska and Missouri. 
The number of beef cows in Iowa increased from 993,000 in 1960 to 
1,394,000 in 1969, or approximately 40 percent (31, pp. 2-3). The availa­
bility of the additional calves in the state provided impetus to the Iowa 
cattle feeding industry and contributed to the increased demand for live­
stock feed. In the late 1960's, Iowa accounted for almost 20 percent of 
U.S. fed cattle marketed. 
Iowa has led the U.S. in the production of hogs for many years, and 
has consistently contributed 20 to 25 percent of total U.S. hog produc­
tion. During the late 1960's, over 20 million head of hogs were marketed 
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annually in Iowa, and the demand for hog feed has been an important 
component of the total demand for livestock feed in the state. The 
demand for poultry, sheep and lamb feed has been important in absolute 
terms, but relatively much less important than the demand for cattle 
and hog feed. 
The supply of the major livestock feed inputs, corn and soybeans, 
in Iowa during the late I960's was large, with the state accounting 
for 16 percent of the nation's production of soybeans and 20 percent of 
U.S. corn production. Soybeans were the primary protein source, and 
corn was the primary energy source for the livestock fed in Iowa. 
The supply of the two feed ingredients in Iowa increased significantly 
from 1960 to 1969. Soybean production increased from 65,961,000 
bushels to 174,258,000 bushels for a 164 percent increase. The pro­
duction of corn in the state increased by 22 percent during the period, 
from 764,288,000 bushels to 932,900,000 bushels (31, pp. 2-3). 
Higher per capita income in the I960's substantially increased 
consumer demand for meat products, and the feed grain surplus states 
such as Iowa experienced growth in the livestock feeding industry. 
The livestock feed manufacturing industry in the state responded to 
the corresponding feed demand expansion by increasing productive 
capacity. In 1963, Iowa accounted for almost 20 percent of the 341 
feed facility expansions in the U.S. which were recorded in a 1964 
study (56, p. 484). 
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B. The Location Decision 
The decision by Golden Sun Feeds, Inc. to locate a new branch plant 
in Grinnell in 1969 resulted largely from the company's appraisal of the 
existing and expected feed industry situation. Golden Sun Feeds, Inc. 
was founded by the Jenson brothers, and by the late I960's the company 
had been very active in the livestock and poultry feed business for many 
years. The home office is in Estherville where the company also has a 
feed manufacturing plant and a research center. 
In 1960, Golden Sun Feeds, Inc. was sold to John Morrell and Co. 
At about the same time, John Morrell and Co. purchased an existing feed 
plant in Des Moines„ The Des Moines plant had good sacked feed facilities 
but had very inadequate bulk feed facilities, and the overall plant 
operation was very inefficient. Much of the company's business, as well 
as that of the industry, was in bulk feed concentrates. By the late 
1960's, the lack of adequate facilities developed into a serious problem. 
The plant had been unprofitable because of the inefficiencies, and there 
was a strong need to correct the situation. 
Golden Sun considered expanding the Des Moines plant because its 
location just off the interstate highway was approximately in the center 
of the existing market area. However, the company decided that an ex­
pansion of the Des Moines plant was not feasible. The plant was unionized, 
and it had been faced with labor problems which would have remained after 
the expansion. The needed plant addition would have been very expensive 
with one of the main reasons being the high wage scales of the metro­
politan area construction workers. Also, the tax load in Des Moines was 
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considered to be inequitable. Other locations were considered to have 
greater profit potential because of the problems facing the Des Moines 
plant. 
The company decided that one or two new, more efficient feed plants 
were badly needed. The Golden Sun executives felt that the market area 
served by the Des Moines plant should be divided, with one new plant 
west of Des Moines and another new plant east of Des Moines. Iowa City 
was proposed for the eastern location and Atlantic for the western 
location. The John Morrell and Co. executives vetoed the idea of two 
new plants, but agreed that one new plant should be built. The two-
plant concept was rejected on the basis of the higher fixed costs in­
volved in constructing two plants rather than one. The feeling was that 
the economies of scale resulting from one relatively large feed plant, 
incorporating the most advanced technology available, would more than 
offset the relatively higher transportation costs. 
The decision to build one new plant meant that the company needed 
a location near the center of the existing Des Moines area product mar­
ket which could also service expected future market expansions. The 
company wanted to locate fairly close to Des Moines in order to minimize 
transportation costs, but it also wanted a location where the new pldnt 
could efficiently serve new growth areas. The company also wanted to get 
far enough away from the metropolitan area to escape the problems ex­
perienced there. An additional consideration at the early stages of the 
location decision process was the need to locate the new plant near the 
John Morrell and Co. packing plant in Otturawa because the meat scraps 
were to be used in the livestock feed produced. 
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The desire of the company to locate the plant in the center of its 
anticipated product market was the most important location factor because 
of the need to minimize product transportation costs. This important 
factor narrowed the feasible area down to an area a few miles east of 
Des Moines. The nearness of markets for feed inputs such as soybean 
meal and feed grains together with the availability of meat scraps from 
the Morrell packing plant in Otturawa was the second most important loca­
tion consideration. This further reduced the optimal area of location to 
between 30 and 60 miles east of Des Moines. 
A number of other location specifications important to Golden Sun 
were utilized to eliminate specific communities within the location 
choice area. The factors will be listed and discussed briefly in the 
approximate order of their importance in the location decision. 
Transportation facilities were a very important factor in the 
location decision. The company wanted to locate on a main line railroad 
where daily switching service was available. A rail spur was not accept­
able. The company also wanted the plant to be near an interstate highway. 
The local labor market situation was an important location factor. 
Tha new company wanted rural workers because "rural workers are 100 per­
cent better workers". There was a strong feeling that rural Iowa people, 
in general, make very productive employees and, thus, could contribute 
to the profitability of the plant. The company had confidence that the 
rural people would provide high quality labor services and have excellent 
attitudes because many of them have lived on farms and know how to work. 
Their mechanical skills and experience with livestock feed were considered 
to be readily adaptable to feed manufacturing. The company did not want 
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to locate in a town in which the labor market was dominated by one large 
employer who determined the wage structure. The company is a family-type 
of business run on a non-union basis, and it believes that with this 
arrangement, the operations go smoother and involve fewer problems. 
Although the preference of Golden Sun was for a community without strong 
union activity, the company is not anti-union. The company had shown that 
it was willing to pay its workers fair wages and to try to see that the 
employees were happy with their work. 
The quality and availability of local public services was a signifi­
cant factor in the location decision. The new plant was to be highly 
automated and would require large quantities of natural gas and electric 
power. Therefore, the availability of adequate supplies and the rates 
charged were important considerations. The Golden Sun officials also 
wanted good living conditions for its employees and that included good 
schools, streets, parks, housing and a healthy social atmosphere. 
Largely on the basis of minimization of product and input transporta­
tion costs, the location decision was very close to being made in favor 
of Grinnell when the president of John Morrell and Co. decided to hire a 
consulting firm to study the location problem and to recommend feasible 
locations for the plant. He wanted an expert outside of the company to 
analyze the situation before the final location decision was made. An 
agri-business research firm in Manhattan, Kansas was employed for that 
purpose. The firm studied the number of cattle and hogs and estimated 
future trends in Iowa livestock feeding to determine where growth could 
reasonably be expected. Golden Sun wanted to locate the plant where the 
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demand for their products was growing. Market shares were considered 
along with demand factors. 
The research indicated strong expected growth in cattle and hog 
production toward the Cedar Rapids area. The consulting firm then 
recommended that the new feed plant be located in one of three communi­
ties. The consultants' recommendations in order of preference were 
Newton, Grinnell and Marshalltown. The Golden Sun executives eliminated 
Marshalltown because it was too far north in the product and factor 
market areas. Newton was eliminated because of concern about possible 
labor problems. The labor market was dominated by the big Maytag opera­
tions, and the wage scales in the community were determined by that 
company. 
Grinnell was then chosen for the location of the plant. The primary 
factors favoring Grinnell were its nearness to product markets and to 
major feed ingredient sources. It was estimated that transportation 
costs would be minimized with a Grinnell plant site. A number of other 
considerations also pointed to the community as being the optimal loca­
tion choice with respect to the specifications established by Golden Sun. 
The plant site was just one mile from Interstate 80 and was located on a 
direct rail line from Ottumwa so the plant would have ready access to 
the Morrell packing plant meat scraps. In addition, there was another 
rail line through Grinnell and daily switching service was available. 
There was an adequate supply of rural labor, and because the existing 
industry was so diversified, no one industry dominated the local labor 
market. It was not a situation in which the industries were hurting 
each other by hiring away workers and upsetting standard wage scales. 
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The quality and availability of utilities was more than sufficient to 
satisfy the plant requirements. Grinnell was also considered to be a 
good place to live and work. The community had good public facilities 
such as a hospital, schools and parks. The supply of housing was 
adequate and the social setting favorable to stability of the work 
force. In effect, Grinnell had many more pluses than any other location. 
The Golden Sun people went to Grinnell to meet with the development 
corporation officers, and they were given an excellent reception by the 
people of the community. The company officials talked to some of the 
existing industry people and were impressed by their comments about the 
favorable business climate in the community. The people of Grinnell were 
very friendly and anxious to cooperate in any way possible. The company 
had their choice of sites in the industrial park, and the five acre site 
chosen was obtained at a fair price. The city brought the necessary 
utilities to the site and generally provided "good follow-up and first-
class help". The action by the people of Grinnell sealed the location 
decision in favor of the community. The Grinnell plant started operation 
in the fall of 1969, and the Des Moines operation shut down a short time 
later. 
The location decision was based on profit maximization. The primary 
Golden Sun people involved in the decision were the president and the 
executive vice-president. The two individuals were very knowledgeable 
of the industry situation and of the important factors to consider in 
making the location decision. The primary considerations were economic, 
and the new plant was located in Grinnell because it was decided that it 
would be the most profitable location. The plant has been in operation 
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for almost four years, and the Golden Sun executives feel very strongly 
that the Grinnell location was the optimal choice. The operation has 
been very profitable. The location decision was made on the basis of 
expectations about future growth in the demand for their products, and 
those expectations have been realized. 
The new plant incorporated the most efficient technology available. 
The profit picture would have likely improved had the new plant been 
located in Des Moines or some other community because of the increased 
production efficiency resulting from the use of the more advanced tech­
nology. However, much of the increased profit probably resulted from 
the company's decision to locate the plant in Grinnell rather than some­
where else. The situation rapidly changed from loss to profit with the 
relocation of the plant from Des Moines to Grinnell. This happened even 
before the market expansion that has since taken place. Profit from the 
operation further increased when the anticipated growth in product demand 
actually occurred. 
Golden Sun recently made another location decision, and the company 
had the advantage of almost four years of experience and hindsight to 
guide them in their choice. The company is now completing a new plant in 
Fremont, Nebraska that is almost a replica of the Grinnell plant. This 
indicates that the company is pleased with the efficiency of the highly 
automated plant in Grinnell and that part of the profit earned in recent 
years has been due to the adoption of advanced technology. The interest­
ing thing about the new plant to this study is that the location decision 
was made on the same basis as the earlier decision to locate in Grinnell. 
The same criteria were utilized to narrow the range of alternative 
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locations until the process was culminated with the choice of a particular 
community. The use by Golden Sun of the same decision-making process 
implies that the company's decision to locate the new plant in Grinnell 
was near optimal, if not optimal. The primary objective of Golden Sun is 
to maximize profit, and the company is very much aware of the impact that 
a location choice has upon profit. A considerable amount of time, effort 
and money was expended by Golden Sun in the process of making the de­
cision to locate the new plant in Grinnell. The evidence strongly 
suggests that their choice of location was an excellent one and that the 
location has made a substantial contribution to the profits earned by the 
company. 
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IX. MONROE PLASTICS CORPORATION 
(ALBIA, IOWA) 
The Monroe Plastics Corporation plant in Albia was put into opera­
tion in November of 1969. The plant is, in effect, a branch plant under 
the control of the parent company, Chicago Molded Products, Inc., of 
Park Ridge, Illinois. Employment at Monroe Plastics increased from less 
than 15 in the early stages of the operation to approximately 100 in 
1973. Approximately 80 percent of the employees are female. The plant 
produces thermo-set plastic components for industry, and most of the 
products produced are distributed outside of Iowa. In the production 
process, the plastic material is placed into heated molds, compressed 
and allowed to cure. 
A. Industry Structure and Trends 
The parent company, Chicago Molded Products, Inc., is in the custom 
plastic molding industry. In effect, the firms in the industry are basi­
cally engineering service organizations because they do not have their own 
products. The industrial customers specify what products are needed and 
the custom molding firm uses the specifications to build the molds and 
other tooling required to produce the products. The tooling is then often 
sold to the customer, but the custom molding firm produces the specified 
products. That is, the custom molding firms sell their capability to 
machine the tooling, to mold the products and to ship a specified quantity 
according to time tables established by the industrial customers. The 
contracts agreed upon by the custom molding firms are really promises to 
provide specified services to the customers. 
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The custom plastic molding industry is composed of two distinctly 
different types of operations so that in analyzing the structure of the 
"industry" it is misleading to lump the different "product groups" 
together. There are two basic types of plastics produced by the custom 
plastic molding industry, and the degree of competition differs signifi­
cantly between the two product groups. The two basic types of plastics 
are thermo-set plastics and thermo-plastic plastics. 
The thermo-set plastics are produced by placing the plastic material 
in heated molds, compressing it and allowing it to cure. In other words, 
the plastic is thermo-set by heat, and an actual chemical and physical 
change takes place in the plastic material. Once the plastic is cured, it 
cannot be changed or re-used. There is a smaller number of firms in this 
product group and relatively less competition than in the thermo-plastic 
plastics group. There is a smaller number of firms and less competition 
in the thermo-set plastics group because of the high degree of technology 
required for the heat, pressure and secondary finishing equipment. The 
relatively small number of firms that stay ahead in the development and 
adoption of advanced technology in thermo-set plastics are the firms that 
compete effectively for contracts to produce new and unique industrial 
plastic components. In many situations one of the firms is able to pro­
duce something that no other firm can produce. 
The thermo-plastic plastics are produced by heating the plastic 
material until it is melted and then injecting it into a closed and cooled 
mold. The cooling sets the plastic material to a shape, but if it is 
heated, it softens again and, therefore can be changed or re-used. There 
are many firms in the injection molding business, and there is a high 
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degree of competition because much less advanced technology is required. 
The firms produce relatively homogeneous products, and the barriers to 
entry into the product group are much lower than in the thermo-set 
plastics product group. 
Custom plastic molding is basically a demand based industry because 
the unit transportation costs of the low density products are relatively 
high. The cost of servicing customer accounts also increases signifi­
cantly as the distance between production points and consumption points 
increases. Most of the customers are within 300-400 miles of production 
plants. 
The plastics industry has grown rapidly and consistently over the 
last several years. The value of miscellaneous plastics products ship­
ments increased from approximately $1.9 billion in 1958 to over $7.7 
billion in 1971, for an average annual increase of 11.6 percent. During 
the same period, the number of employees in the miscellaneous plastics 
products industry increased from 116,000 to 282,000, and the value added 
per production worker manhour increased at an average annual rate of 5.2 
percent. Capital expenditures in the industry were estimated to have 
been almost $2.2 billion during the 1966-71 period (50, p. 134). 
The miscellaneous plastics products industry is characterized by a 
large number of relatively small firms and a high degree of competition. 
In 1967, there were almost 5,000 establishments in the industry, and the 
four largest firms accounted for only 8 percent of industry sales 
(50, p. 134). The plastics industry is often referred to as a secondary 
income industry because many housewives are employed and wage rates are 
relatively low. 
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The rapid growth of the plastics industry has occurred as industries 
such as construction, motor vehicle, household durables and packaging 
have shifted away from traditional materials such as steel, wood and glass 
and toward materials such as plastics. The substitution of plastics for 
the more traditional materials may be explained by a combination of cost 
and service factors. In the motor vehicle industry, which is a major 
market for plastic products, performance and operating costs depend to a 
large extent on the weight-to-power ratio. Extra weight means poorer 
fuel efficiency and rising fuel prices increase the seriousness of the 
problem. Plastics have a low density relative to metals. Thus, there 
has been a tendency to reduce the weight of passenger cars and commercial 
vehicles by substituting plastics for metal in components such as heater 
parts, cooling fans, instrument panels, handles, ventilation grills, 
light gears, housings, bearings, pumps, tubing and internal trim. The 
cost of small plastic automobile parts is often less than comparable metal 
parts. In addition, in many uses plastic parts are more resistant to 
friction and, thus, require less lubrication than similar components. A 
single intricately shaped plastic part is often used to replace several 
shaped steel parts. The near future is likely to bring automobiles with 
fenders or entire bodies of flexible plastic. This has already occurred 
in some recent models. 
The construction industry is another major consumer of plastic 
products. The cost of plastics along with their lightness, corrosion 
resistance and workability have contributed to their widespread use in 
the industry. Plastics are used to produce such varied products as wall 
tiles, gutters, shower enclosures, plumbing fixtures, pipes, lighting 
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fixtures, ductwork, decorative partitions and electrical wiring devices. 
Plastics compete mainly in light products for which the load-bearing 
strength of metal or wood is not essential. Plastic pipe, for example, 
is easy to install, and it does not rust. 
The use of lightweight, transparent plastics is large in the con­
tainer and packaging industry. The substitution of light, low-cost 
plastics for metal and glass containers was increased substantially by 
the use of one-way, disposable containers. In the household durables 
industry, plastics have been substituted to a large extent for metal and 
wood in the production of such products as washing machines, refrigerators, 
vacuum cleaners, sewing machines, furniture and hand tools. The primary 
competitive advantages of plastics in household products lie in its low 
cost, its permanent integral color, its durability and its light weight. 
The strong growth in the plastics industry is expected to continue 
as many industries substitute plastic for traditional industrial materials. 
The primary limiting factor in the growth of the industry is the shortage 
of high volume plastic resins which are the basic raw materials used in 
plastics production. The petroleum industry provides the basic "feed 
stocks" for plastic resins, and the shortage of crude oil limits the 
supply of the critical input. Thus, the energy crisis has created prob­
lems for the plastics industry just as it has for many others. 
Chicago Molded Products, Inc. produces both thermo-set plastics and 
thermo-plastic (injection molded) plastics. Monroe Plastics Corporation 
was established to produce thermo-set plastics, and the plant makes only 
that type of plastic. Much of the company's business is carried out 
through long term contracts with customers. The company produces 
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intermediate industrial products. No consumer goods are produced. Every­
thing manufactured by the company is a component to be used by other 
industries. In the mid-1960's, approximately 50 percent of the customers 
were household appliance manufacturers. Now relatively more of the 
business is with the automobile industry although the company still pro­
duces components for the appliance, electronics and portable tool indus­
tries . 
B. The Location Decision 
The location of the Monroe Plastics Corporation plant in Albia 
resulted largely from the changing philosophy of the parent company, 
Chicago Molded Products, Inc. In 1968, the management of Chicago Molded 
embarked on a serious re-appraisal of what the company was doing, of its 
long term objectives, and of the optimum way of achieving the objectives. 
The company had two plants at the time, and the two different arrangements 
were compared in order to determine which of the types, if either, would 
be more profitable to the company. The large Chicago plant was compared 
to the relatively small (100-125 employees) Georgetown, Illinois plant. 
Georgetown is a small (population of approximately 4,000) rural town 
in east central Illinois. The relatively small plant had been in opera­
tion for 25 years and the company had had sufficient time to observe the 
advantages and disadvantages of the operation. The plant was small enough 
that the manager was well aware of all activities at the plant and could 
effectively coordinate the production process. He was able to know the 
workers well and to keep open the channels of direct communication. The 
plant did not have the problem of many layers of management and 
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supervisory people as was the case in the large Chicago plant. That is, 
in the small plant there was efficient total control of the plant by one 
individual. The plant was large enough to allow for most production 
economies resulting from specialization of labor. The efficient plant 
lay-out, adequate labor supply, good transportation facilities and the 
absence of urban problems were other advantages of the Georgetown plant. 
In the opinion of the management of Chicago Molded Products, Inc., the 
Georgetown, Illinois plant was the ideal situation. 
The Chicago plant was a conglomeration of various buildings that had 
been built or bought by the company at different times for different 
reasons. The physical make-up and arrangement of the plant was not con­
ducive to an efficient flow of production. The plant was so large and the 
number of employees so great that the diseconomies of scale associated 
with limitations to efficient management had become very substantial rela­
tive to the economies of large scale production. The management of the 
plant was not able to efficiently control and coordinate the activities of 
the plant. Another problem in the Chicago plant was the municipal codes 
with respect to the type of workers that had to perform various functions 
in the plant. Many of the potential cost saving advantages of automation 
and modernization were lessened by the "featherbedding" practices which 
the company was forced to accept. An additional factor that created 
severe problems in the Chicago plant was the extremely tight labor supply 
situation in the area. The company was having difficulty finding produc­
tive workers to perform many of the essential production tasks. The 
company was also upset about increasing tax rates in Chicago and with the 
failure of the local government in providing essential services. 
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The company decided, on the basis of their analysis of the alterna­
tive types of plants, that rather than have one or two large plants, it 
would be more profitable to have several relatively small plants with 
100-125 employees, thus avoiding the diseconomies associated with manag­
ing large operations. The smaller plant, according to the experiences 
of the company, could be efficiently managed by one individual. Due to 
the nature of the plant operations, it was considered important for the 
manager to be close to the actual production processes. In addition, 
such plants were believed to be sufficiently large to take advantage of 
most production economies. In effect, the small rural plant concept was 
compared with the large metropolitan plant concept, and the small plant 
concept was judged to be more profitable, given the company's expecta­
tions, The company decided to phase out the Chicago plant and build a 
new plant. The new plant would be patterned after the highly profitable 
Georgetown, Illinois plant. 
The selection of a broad area for the location of the plant was the 
first decision for the company to make after the decision to build a new 
plant was finalized. The president and the executive vice-president of 
Chicago Molded Products, Inc. were the primary participants in the early 
stages of the location decision-making process. The company wanted the 
plant to be somewhere in the Midwest so that it would be near the majority 
of the company's customers. The primary customers were in an area in­
cluding Chicago, St. Louis, Detroit, South Bend (Indiana) and Centerville 
(Iowa). The company executives wanted to locate the plant in the "hub" 
of the nation in the center of the transportation system. 
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The search for a plant location was at first concentrated in the area 
of the existing Georgetown, Illinois, plant in east central Illinois. The 
idea was to establish a satellite plant that could be supported by the 
existing operation. The company considered a number of Illinois communi­
ties but none of them was acceptable. 
The company officers abandoned the satellite plant concept because 
they were unable to find a suitable community close to Georgetown. The 
location efforts of the company were then directed toward Iowa in an 
attempt to get away from the highly industrialized cities around the 
Chicago metropolitan area and, thus, to find a rural community with a 
good supply of labor available. The company executives believed that, 
politically, Iowa was "a much cleaner state" than Illinois. The Iowa 
government was observed to be relatively more stable and to be more 
efficient in performing essential public services. The fair tax struc­
ture of the state of Iowa was also appealing to the company. 
The company's location search attracted the attention of a number of 
industrial development people whose business was to find plant sites. 
One of the groups contacting the company was the Iowa Development Commis­
sion. The executives of the company were leaning heavily toward an Iowa 
location at this stage of the location process. From this point forward 
in the location decision process, the Iowa Development Commission was 
very active. The company gave the IDC a list of specifications with 
respect to plant requirements such as land, energy, quantity of labor, 
types of labor, transportation service and accessibility from the corpo­
rate home office in metropolitan Chicago. The company wanted a site in 
an uncongested area complete with essential utilities. The availability 
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of energy was a big factor because of the high energy requirements of the 
thermo-set plastic molding process. The labor supply needed to be suffi­
cient to furnish 100-125 employees of which approximately 80 percent would 
be women. The availability of special labor skills was relatively 
unimportant because the company had learned from experience that unskilled 
people could be quickly trained to perform production work. The business 
of making plastic was seen as an art to be learned by doing. General 
mechanical ability, rather than specific skills, was the important re­
quirement for most of the workers to be hired. The cost of the labor was 
important although the company did not anticipate any tremendous labor 
cost saving by moving out of Chicago. The minimum wage laws eliminate 
most of the potential labor cost saving in the industry. Except for 
highly skilled people, the industry wage rates in rural areas are not 
much lower than they are in the metropolitan areas. Transportation 
requirements of the company included daily truck service, access to good 
highways and a site that was situated such that the company people could 
get to the plant easily from the metropolitan Chicago area. Because of 
the accessibility problem, there was a need to be reasonably close to a 
commercial airport. 
The Iowa Development Commission utilized the general company 
specifications, as discussed above, in recommending several Iowa communi­
ties for consideration as potential plant locations. The Commission 
helped the company by eliminating communities that did not meet the 
criteria set by the firm. In other words, the Iowa Development Commis­
sion tried to fit the company needs with what the communities had to 
offer. The company was provided information about the communities by the 
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Iowa Development Commission and by the communities themselves. Much of 
the information was compiled in "fact files" for the individual communi­
ties. The fact files included data concerning such things as population, 
labor force, unemployment rates, wage scales, labor union activity, local 
industries, transportation facilities, utility rates, utility availa­
bility, tax rates, indebtedness, community facilities, housing and site 
availability. 
The company evaluated the recommended communities on the basis of 
their potential as profitable plant locations. At this stage, the 
manager of industrial relations for Chicago Molded Products, Inc., became 
very active in the location decision process. By a process of elimination 
the company narrowed the list down to the four communities that offered 
the most with respect to the location factors that the Chicago Molded 
executives considered important. The location factors that were most 
inportant in eliminating the other communities were labor availability, 
natural gas and electrical energy availability and the nearness of markets 
for output. The company wanted a community large enough to furnish an 
adequate supply of labor without being so big that union activity was a 
problem. The company had been pleased with their Georgetown, Illinois 
plant, and the four communities chosen for serious location consideration 
were of roughly the same size as Georgetown. The populations of the four 
communities were in the approximate range of 3,000 to 6,500. Energy 
availability in the four communities also seemed to be adequate to meet 
the requirements of the plant. The company had a preference for a south­
eastern Iowa location in order for the plant to be relatively closer to 
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the output markets. In other words, the company wanted an Iowa location, 
but they wanted it to be as close as possible to their big customers to 
the east and south. Toastmaster, a big customer of the company during 
the location search, had a plant in Centerville, and the Chicago Molded 
officials were well aware of the advantages of locating their new plant 
near the key consumption point. A southeastern Iowa location would also 
have relatively easy access to some of the other primary market areas such 
as Chicago and St. Louis. 
The final four communities which were most seriously considered for 
the plant location included Albia, Centerville, Chariton and another 
community further west in Iowa. One reason that Albia was in contention 
for the plant was that the president of the company had a relative in the 
town. As a result, he knew about the community. However, it seems that 
this was a relatively minor factor in the final location decision. Albia, 
Centerville and Chariton all satisfied the company preference for a 
southeastern Iowa community, so the three communities had an advantage 
with respect to the market accessibility location factor. Among the 
three communities, Centerville was the closest to the primary market 
areas. A Centerville location would have put the plastic molding plant 
almost next door to the Toastmaster plant so that the product transporta­
tion costs to Toastmaster would have been minimized. A Centerville 
location would also have been relatively close to the other markets. 
However, Centerville was eliminated because there were a number of 
relatively large industries in the town, and the company was very con­
cerned about possible labor availability problems. It was decided that 
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the strong competition for labor in Centerville would hamper the com­
pany's efforts to hire an adequate number of employees at reasonable 
wages. 
The primary location factors responsible for the choice of Albia 
over Chariton were the availability of energy, the attitudes of the 
local industrial development people, the unemployment rates in the two 
counties and the per capita income of the respective counties. The 
availability of energy was a big factor, and Iowa Southern Utilities 
assured the company that an adequate supply of natural gas and electrical 
power would be available in Albia. 
The Albia Industrial Development Corporation officials were very 
significant in causing the company to choose Albia over the other 
communities. They were very active, straight-forward and cooperative. 
The company executives were very impressed with the good job that the 
community development leaders did of selling the community of Albia and 
its people. The development corporation had the site available, and they 
agreed to furnish the utility connections plus a paved access street. 
The big water line to be furnished would allow the company to install a 
sprinkler system and, thus, to greatly reduce insurance costs of the 
plant. When the company bought the site, the community annexed the land 
so the company would have police and fire protection. 
Monroe County (Albia) had one of the highest unemployment rates in 
the state at the time the location decision was made. The rate was much 
higher than in Lucas County (Chariton). Monroe County was also reported 
to be one of the poorest counties in the state in terms of per capita 
income. The company believed that because of the high unemployment rate. 
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the low income level and the existence of relatively little industry in 
Albia, the area would furnish a more than adequate supply of labor at 
acceptable wage rates. There was simply not much competition for labor 
in the Albia area. The industrial plant location search was completed 
when Chicago Molded Products, Inc. chose Albia for their new plant loca­
tion. The relative importance of various location factors at different 
stages of the decision process has been discussed earlier. The location 
factors, important with respect to the decision as a whole and in the 
approximate order of their significance, were the availability and the 
wage rates of labor; the quality and availability of local public ser­
vices; the attitude of local residents toward industrial development; 
the nearness of markets for output; the availability of transportation 
facilities; the weakness of labor unions in the community; state and 
local tax rates; the quality and availability of local housing; and the 
nearness of markets for raw materials. 
The company based its plant location decision upon the location 
factors it considered to be most important in determining the profita­
bility of the plant. The objective was to find a location which would 
result in maximum profit in the long run. Monroe Plastics Corporation is 
now earning a profit, and the company executives are relatively pleased 
with their location choice, but they now believe that the choice was not 
optimal. In retrospect, it seems that there were probably better loca­
tions available. The biggest problem with the location, although it is 
probably not unique to Albia, is a shortage of good skilled and semi­
skilled labor. In particular, the plant needs a plastics engineer and 
equipment maintenance personnel and their unavailability has created 
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problems for the company. The company believes that the labor supply was 
oversold. The labor supply is much tighter than the company expected it 
to be. The primary factor explaining the shortage of labor is that the 
biggest plant in town (Chamberlain Manufacturing Corporation) now employs 
400 people rather than its usual 200. 
The labor turnover in the Albia plant is slightly higher than the 
company expected, but it is still much lower than it was in the Chicago 
metropolitan area. The main factor contributing to the higher than 
expected turnover rate is that "many of the people have not worked in a 
factory before, and after trying it, some of them decide it is not their 
cup of tea". 
Labor productivity in the Albia plant has been increasing, but it 
is still not as high as it was in the Chicago plant. This is primarily 
because the company had many long time employees in the Chicago plant 
who were "craftsmen" from an earlier generation. The Chicago plant had 
a good core of highly productive employees who took great pride in their 
work. The company executives believe that with time, the same sort of 
thing will develop in the Albia plant. The company also had an incentive 
plan in Chicago which tended to increase labor productivity. The company 
expects to institute such a plan in the Albia plant, but it has not yet 
done so. 
On the plus side, the attitude of the Albia workers is quite good. 
The farm background of many of the employees seems to have had a positive 
impact on their productivity. The employees generally expect to work in 
order to earn their pay. This is in sharp contrast to the company's 
experiences in Chicago where many of the workers acted as if it were the 
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company's responsibility to make them work. The Albia workers tend to be 
more interested in understanding what they are doing and in how they can 
contribute to a more efficient operation. The mechanical aptitude of the 
Albia workers is generally high because of their rural background. "They 
know which end of a wrench to grab." 
The company based its location decision upon the objective of maxi­
mizing the long run profit of the new plant. Given their expectations, 
the location choice was probably near optimal. However, some of their 
expectations, at least with respect to the short run, were invalid. The 
failure of some of the expectations being realized resulted in a sub-
optimal location decision. However, the plant is profitable and the 
company's long term profit expectations are still very high. This 
expectation is based largely upon the company's experiences with the very 
profitable plant in Georgetown, Illinois. 
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X. SPENCER FOODS, INC. 
(HARTLEY, IOWA) 
In June, 1969, Spencer Foods, Inc., of Spencer, Iowa, established 
a beef breaking and fabrication operation in Hartley, Iowa. The plant is 
a branch operation that is closely linked to the company's beef slaugh­
tering facility in Spencer, twenty miles to the east. The original 
company plans for the Hartley plant included the establishment of a 
cryogenics research facility. The research was to involve the production 
of very low temperatures and their effect upon beef, but the plans never 
materialized. The facilities were found to be not readily adaptable for 
research and, in addition, general consumer acceptability of frozen beef 
was limited. 
The company's headquarters and a beef slaughtering operation are 
located in Spencer. In addition, the firm has a slaughter facility at 
Schuyler, Nebraska, and a pork processing operation in Miami, Florida. 
The Hartley plant now specializes in beef breaking and fabrication. 
Approximately 90 percent of the beef that is processed in the plant comes 
from the company's slaughter plants, much of it from Spencer. In the 
Hartley plant, beef carcasses are broken into primal cuts such as chucks 
and rounds. Some of the beef is then fabricated into smaller, retail-
ready cuts. The output of the 150 employee plant is vacuum-packed in 
uniform size boxes, and most of it is distributed outside of Iowa. The 
primary market area is the East Coast, but the output is shipped all over 
the country. Approximately 80 percent of the beef goes directly into 
retail channels and some goes into the export market. The by-products 
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such as edible tallow, inedible tallow and meat scraps are shipped to 
the packing plant in Spencer for processing. The meat scraps are sold 
for animal feed and much of the tallow is sold for export. 
A. Industry Structure and Trends 
The meat packing industry was for years characterized by a high 
degree of concentration. In 1935, the four leading packers (Swift, 
Armour, Wilson and Cudahy) accounted for 46.6 percent of all commercial 
cattle slaughter in the U.S. The share of the big four decreased to 38.3 
percent in 1947 (58, p. 353). Value added by the four largest packers 
decreased from 41 percent of the industry total in 1947 to 26 percent in 
1967 (27, p. 165). The evidence indicates that the trend toward decreased 
market shares of the larger firms has continued to the present time. 
A number of factors influenced the early development of meat packing 
into a highly concentrated industry. Among the more important were the 
development of railroads, the development of refrigeration, the develop­
ment of mechanical power and the use of the corporate form of business 
organization. The development of the railroad system made it possible to 
assemble large numbers of livestock at terminal markets. Packing plants 
tended to be concentrated near the terminal points. The development of 
refrigeration and the use of refrigerated rail cars made it possible to 
slaughter and distribute meat year-round. Technological innovations such 
as mechanical power provided the physical means for the establishment of 
large scale, efficient operations by the firms. The dominant firms 
utilized the corporation and other forms of business organization to gain 
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the economic power to organize and finance large scale operations, thus 
giving them a real competitive advantage (27, p. 156). 
An additional early development that helped foster and perpetuate 
the high degree of concentration in the meat packing industry was the 
growth in branch houses and car routes operated by the dominant firms. 
The branch house and car route system was the means of product distri­
bution in the late 1800's and early 1900's. Only the large packers had 
sufficient capital to develop large scale distribution systems. This 
also contributed to the severe competitive disadvantage of the smaller 
packers (3, pp. 3-6). The large packers used other methods, many of them 
illegal, to gain additional advantages over their competitors (3, pp. 12-
21) .  
The Federal Trade Commission was authorized in 1917 to investigate 
the meat packing industry. The resulting investigation provided evidence 
of a high degree of monopolization of the industry by the large firms. 
The Department of Justice brought court proceedings against the "big 
five" of the industry. In 1920, the case was settled in an out-of-court 
agreement known as the Consent Decree. The packers agreed to cease 
activities mentioned in the suit and to sell certain properties. Since 
that time, the meat packers and the courts have engaged in a number of 
legal conflicts. The packers have at various times sought relief from 
the provisions of the Decree, and the government has filed additional 
complaints against the big packers. The court action against the big 
packers almost certainly had some impact upon the structure of the meat 
packing industry. The big packers did become less aggressive in their 
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competitive policies. However, it is probable that economic forces were 
dominant in bringing about decreased concentration. 
The meat packing industry has, for the last four decades, been 
characterized by decentralization as well as by déconcentration. Although 
these were two different developments, the evidence indicates that their 
causes were closely interdependent. 
The data indicates that much of the decline in market shares has 
been at the expense of the largest firms. In recent years, Iowa Beef 
Packers, Inc. has grown rapidly, and the firm is now probably the leading 
beef packer in the United States. However, its growth has probably not 
altered the overall degree of concentration (27, p. 166). 
The basic causes of the déconcentration of the industry included 
the influx of independent packers brought about by reduced entry barriers 
and the decreased growth rates of the large national packers relative to 
the overall industry growth rate (3, p. 53). Some of the reduction in 
barriers to entry resulted from the provisions of the Consent Decree and 
from other anti-trust regulations. The industry structure was also 
affected by such factors as innovations in plant technology, development 
of the motor truck, development of the highway system, specialization by 
species, specialization of processes, changes in wholesale and retail 
meat markets, increased demand for meat, adoption of federal grades and 
factor market alterations. These developments tended to lower entry 
barriers and to decrease the optimum scale of plants. In general, the 
competitive position of small, new packers was improved relative to that 
of the large, dominant firms, and this contributed to a lessening of 
concentration in the industry. 
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The meat packing centers near the large terminal livestock markets 
continued to be of primary importance in the industry until after World 
War I. Since that time, centralized terminal marketing has declined with 
the movement of slaughter facilities to communities nearer livestock pro­
ducing areas (27, p. 20). The greatest decrease in cattle slaughter was 
in large terminal market areas such as Chicago and Kansas City, There 
was also a very substantial decline in the extent of packer livestock 
purchases at terminal stockyards. During the period of 1947 to 1961 
alone, packers' terminal livestock purchases, as a percent of total pur­
chases, decreased from 76 to 42, and the trend has continued (3, p. 25). 
The forced sale of terminal stockyards by the large packers 
lessened the advantages of centralized packing. However, it seems that 
economic factors were at least as important as institutional constraints 
in explaining the trend toward decentralization of the meat packing 
industry. The two major factors in causing the change were probably the 
use of truck transportation and innovations in plant technology. The 
development of rail transportation earlier contributed to the development 
of centralization in the industry. The later development and widespread 
use of truck transportation greatly increased the speed and flexibility 
of distribution systems and contributed to decentralization because packer 
reliance on rail transportation and on terminal markets was reduced. Thus, 
it became feasible to locate slaughter facilities away from consumption 
centers. Advances in refrigeration techniques and other technological 
innovations complemented truck transportation and contributed to the 
efficiency and profitability of smaller, more specialized and decentral­
ized packing facilities (3, pp. 22-26). 
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It is tempting to say that decentralization of the meat packing 
industry occurred largely because the cost of transporting meat products 
became less than the cost of transporting livestock. However, that would 
be misleading, if not erroneous. The shifting comparative advantage of 
packing plant locations is not that easy to explain. In the long run, 
the comparative advantage of packing plant locations depends upon the 
entire range of factors affecting the profitability of the alternative 
locations. The tendency has been for the meat packing industry to become 
more supply oriented. This indicates that meat packing profits are 
relatively higher for locations near slaughter livestock producing areas. 
The evidence suggests that the comparative advantage of decentralized 
packing plant locations is due to factors other than relative livestock 
and meat transportation rates. Until the late 1950's, the transportation 
rate structure was near neutral with respect to the shipping of meat 
versus the shipping of livestock. In effect, even though approximately 
35 percent of the live weight of cattle is lost during slaughter, until 
the last fifteen years it cost proportionately more to transport meat 
than to transport livestock. Thus, there was no real cost saving in 
shipping meat rather than livestock (58, p. 717). 
Relative transportation rates have changed in recent years to 
decrease the cost of transporting meat relative to livestock and, thus, 
to favor supply oriented locations. However, at least in earlier years, 
other factors have been more important in the determination of the 
comparative advantage of competing beef packing plant locations. The 
changing location of the industry has been largely due to advantages 
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associated with such factors as fed cattle location and density, tech­
nological innovations, labor costs, labor productivity, unionization, 
property taxes, utility costs and external economies. These and other 
factors such as improved marketing information, improved meat grading 
standards and changes in the retail food industry have contributed to 
the tendency to locate beef packing plants at interior points near fed 
cattle producing areas. 
The beef packing industry has become increasingly deconcentrated and 
decentralized. The dominance of the industry by a few large packers has 
diminished. Many large, old, inefficient plants near terminal markets 
have been shut down and new, more efficient plants have located in major 
slaughter livestock producing areas. The plants have also tended to 
become smaller, partly because there are few additional economies of scale 
for beef packing plants with capacity of more than approximately 100 head 
per hour (27, p. 164). 
The rate of technological advance in the meat packing industry has 
generally been low relative to that of other industries. However, there 
have been a number of significant technological improvements in recent 
years. One of the more important has been the development and use of 
continuous on-the-rail systems. The process, in effect, involves the 
assembly line technique in reverse. The process has been complemented by 
the development and adoption of labor saving equipment such as mechanized 
stunners, conveyors, power saws and hide pullers (58, p. 429). With the 
use of more capital per unit of labor has come a substantial increase in 
labor productivity in the meat packing industry. This is reflected by the 
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doubling of the value added per production worker manhour in the industry 
from 1958 to 1971. During the same period, employment decreased from 
201,000 to 160,700 while the value of shipments increased from approxi­
mately $12 billion to approximately $19 billion (50, p. 6). 
The meat packing industry has been characterized by low profits. 
Profits as a percentage of stockholders equity and as a percentage of 
sales have been low relative to that of other food processing industries. 
Industry sales increased from $13.2 billion in 1960 to $22.7 billion in 
1970. However, net return on sales was only 1.1 percent or less during 
the period (2, p. 2). In the 1960's, investors were attracted to the 
meat packing industry, primarily because of the potential for increased 
profit in the industry. Many meat packers became targets for conglomer­
ates hoping to boost meat packing profits through the use of more 
efficient management techniques. The packing industry in general became 
more aware of the realities of competition. A new breed of more aggres­
sive and more efficient packers brought about long overdue changes. Unit 
labor costs were generally lower for the new breed of packers than for 
the "old-line" packers. These developments tended to accelerate the 
structural changes and to increase the degree of competition within the 
industry. 
The historical distribution of livestock slaughter plants is given 
by Tables 10.1 - 10.3 and by Figures 10.1 and 10.2. There were 455 
federally inspected plants in 1955 and 725 in 1970. The 725 federally 
inspected plants, representing only 19 percent of the total number of 
commercial plants, accounted for almost 90 percent of total commercial 
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Table 10.1. Number of federally inspected slaughter plants 
by states*, March 1, 1955, 1960, 1965 and 1970 
State 1955 1960 1965 1970 
N. Eng. 19 14 12 13 
N.Y. 23 30 34 36 
N.J. 17 17 11 11 
Pa. 21 26 29 26 
Ohio 29 32 35 39 
Ind. 14 13 14 14 
111. 32 39 35 35 
Mich. 4 4 5 10 
Wise. 17 19 19 21 
Minn. 10 12 15 17 
Iowa 21 27 31 41 
Mo. 13 17 18 22 
N. Dak. 2 - — 2 3 
S. Dak. 6 7 7 9 
Nebr. 18 29 33 34 
Kansas 16 16 19 22 
Del. - Md. 11 10 8 8 
Va. 9 12 12 19 
W. Va. — - 1 
N.C. 2 3 4 11 
S.C. 1 5 3 2 
Ga. 7 5 6 6 
Fla. 4 6 8 8 
Ky. 7 7 10 13 
Tenn. 9 9 10 15 
Ala. 4 6 7 7 
Miss. 3 5 6 6 
Ark. 2 4 4 9 
La. 2 4 2 3 
Okla. 3 3 4 11 
Texas 22 30 37 67 
Mont. 4 5 6 6 
Idaho 5 6 7 10 
^ew England includes Maine New Hampshire, Vermont 9 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut. 
^Source: (44, p. 5; 48, p. 3). 
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Table 10.1. Continued. 
State 1955 1960 1965 1970 
Wyom. 1 1 1 2 
Colo. 12 14 17 23 
N. Mex. — — 1 3 21 
Ariz. 1 1 2 6 
Utah 4 6 7 9 
Nev. 2 2 1 1 
Wash. 13 15 17 25 
Oreg. 9 9 9 14 
Calif. 56 59 60 69 
TOTAL 455 530 570 725 
(48 States) 
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Table 10.2. Other commercial® livestock slaughtering establishments, 
by states^, March 1, 1955, 1960, 1965 and 1970^ 
State 
Medium^ Laree® 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1955 1960 1965 1970 
N. Eng. 55 46 34 39 18 13 12 4 
N.Y. 80 65 59 63 36 29 25 14 
N.J. 36 31 26 13 10 8 8 3 
Pa. 217 228 175 172 87 92 91 48 
Ohio 133 125 130 147 83 81 66 42 
Ind. 89 87 55 143 33 23 24 24 
111. 73 49 48 159 30 22 25 20 
Mich. 113 103 91 110 82 87 78 56 
Wise. 12 26 18 96 30 12 14 9 
Minn. 24 17 24 250 9 2 6 5 
Iowa 21 15 11 170 7 9 8 4 
Mo. 20 24 18 42 26 23 20 12 
N. Dak. 7 7 6 47 2 3 3 2 
S. Dak. 9 5 5 33 2 3 3 — — 
Nebr. 21 22 21 50 11 7 7 7 
Kans. 33 55 100 113 12 12 11 7 
Del. - Md. 39 22 26 36 17 16 14 10 
Va. 25 19 16 19 12 11 11 3 
W. Va. 20 25 21 34 12 13 11 9 
N.C. 65 55 46 53 33 29 30 25 
s .c .  34 32 25 38 11 13 13 17 
Ga* 48 56 50 62 33 38 38 25 
Fla. 36 29 28 29 26 19 13 11 
Ky. 21 20 14 36 18 21 16 4 
Tenn. 38 41 33 40 24 22 18 17 
Ala. 47 34 29 44 11 16 10 14 
Miss. 24 22 23 41 5 6 4 7 
Ark. 37 38 31 34 12 13 17 15 
La. 57 58 50 69 14 20 18 20 
Okla. 39 25 33 38 27 37 37 26 
Texas 121 119 106 121 75 71 69 35 
Mont. 19 17 16 21 9 10 11 9 
Idaho 20 38 35 40 9 11 11 8 
Wyom. 10 7 5 11 - — 2 2 - -
*Non-federally inspected commercial livestock slaughter plants. 
New England includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island and Connecticut. 
^Source: (45, p. 5; 48, p. 3). 
^Output of 300,000 to 2 million pounds live weight annually. 
^Output of more than 2 million pounds live weight annually. 
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Table 10.2. Continued. 
Q 6 
Medium Large 
State 1955 1960 1965 1970 1955 1960 1965 1970 
Colo. 17 20 20 33 12 10 8 5 
N. Mex. 16 22 16 8 2 3 6 - -
Ariz. 3 7 8 9 9 9 10 7 
Utah 16 12 16 31 10 8 7 8 
Nev. 4 3 2 4 - — — - -- 1 
Wash. 56 41 22 20 19 17 22 8 
Ore g. 33 34 35 54 21 13 13 12 
Calif. 22 11 11 10 53 48 39 9 




Table 10.3. Number of livestock slaughter plants , by states , 
March 1955, 1960, 1965 and 1970^ 
State 1955 1960 1965 1970 
N. Eng. 92 73 58 56 
N.Y. 139 124 118 113 
N.J. 63 56 45 27 
Pa. 325 346 295 246 
Sub Total 619 599 516 442 
Ohio 245 238 231 228 
Ind. 136 123 93 181 
111. 135 110 108 214 
Mich. 199 194 174 176 
Wise. 59 57 51 126 
Sub Total 774 722 657 925 
Minn. 43 31 45 272 
Iowa 49 51 50 215 
Mo. 59 64 56 76 
N. Dak. 11 10 11 52 
S. Dak. 17 15 15 42 
Neb. 50 58 61 91 
Kans. 61 83 130 142 
Sub Total 290 312 368 890 
Del. - Md. 67 48 48 54 
Va. 46 42 39 41 
W. Va. 32 38 32 44 
N.C. . 100 87 80 89 
s .c .  46 50 41 57 
Ga. 88 99 94 93 
Fla. 66 54 49 48 
Sub Total 445 418 383 426 
^Includes all federally inspected plants plus all plants 
not under federal inspection with an output of 300,000 pounds 
or more live weight annually. 
^New England includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut. 
^Source: (44, p. 5; 48, p. 3). 
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Table 10.3, Continued. 





















Sub Total 467 
TOTAL 3,217 
(48 States) 
48 40 53 
72 61 72 
56 46 65 
33 33 54 
55 52 58 
82 70 92 
65 74 75 
220 212 223 
631 588 692 
32 33 36 
55 53 58 
10 8 13 
44 45 61 
26 25 29 
17 20 22 
26 30 48 
5 3 6 
73 61 53 
56 57 80 
118 110 88 
462 445 494 
3,144 2,957 3,869 
* cxcLUoes HO/tse SLAucHTemNe PLANTS 








* EXCLUDES HORSE SLAUGHTERING PLANTS 
Source: (48) 
Figure 10.2. Number and location of Federally inspected slaughter plants , March 1, 1970 
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live weight slaughter in 1969 (44, pp. 3-5; 48, pp. 1, 3). Table 10.1 
and Figures 10.1 and 10.2 show the change in distribution of federally 
inspected plants that occurred from 1955 to 1970. The movement was 
generally away from the primary consumption areas and toward the major 
livestock feeding areas. 
The largest numerical increase occurred in the medium-sized category 
of non-federally inspected plants. These plants slaughter from 300,000 
to 2 million pounds live weight annually. As Table 10.2 shows, the 
number of medium-sized plants increased from 1,538 in 1965 to 2,582 in 
1970. The number of large non-federally inspected plants decreased from 
849 to 562 during the same period (48, pp. 1-3). Some of the decrease 
resulted from large plants becoming federally inspected facilities, but 
a significant portion of the decrease was probably caused by closings of 
inefficient operat ions. 
Slaughter plants under federal inspection and non-federally inspec­
ted plants with an annual live weight output of 300,000 pounds or more 
numbered 3,869 in the 48 states on March 1, 1970. This compares to 
3,217 such plants in 1955, to 3,144 in 1960 and 2,957 in 1965 (44, p. 5; 
48, p. 3). The number of commercial slaughter plants by states is pre­
sented in Table 10.3. The data indicates a persistent trend toward 
decentralization of the meat packing industry. 
The distribution of slaughter plants with beef as part of their 
output is presented for 1955 and 1970 in Table 10.4. The number of plants 
slaughtering beef decreased in the densely populated consumption areas and 
increased in the major fed cattle producing areas. The decline in the 
number of plants slaughtering only cattle and calves implies a decrease 
Table 10.4. Number of livestock slaughter plants slaughtering cattle and calves, by 
species slaughtered, by states®, March 1955 a d 1970 
Cattle and 
calves; hogs. Cattle and Cattle and 
sheep and Cattle and calves; and calves; sheep Total cattle 
lambs calves only hogs and lambs and calves 
State 1955 1970 1955 1970 1955 1970 1955 1970 1955 1970 
N. Eng. 27 29 24 7 17 3 19 14 87 53 
N.Y. 18 67 66 16 27 6 22 20 133 109 
N.J. 19 9 7 3 9 1 19 11 54 24 
Pa. 98 50 49 56 107 98 55 31 309 235 
Sub Total 162 155 146 82 160 108 115 76 583 L 
Ohio 78 101 37 29 80 54 37 26 232 210 
Ind. 37 9 16 17 73 142 2 8 128 176 
111. 18 146 35 18 54 34 17 2 124 200 
Mich. 37 107 61 24 74 15 13 19 185 165 
Wise. 14 71 18 15 21 31 5 6 58 123 
Sub Total 184 434 167 103 302 276 74 61 727 1 
Minn. 6 99 15 12 21 158 1 1 43 270 
Iowa 8 35 17 23 18 142 — — — — 43 200 
Mo. 5 34 12 11 34 23 4 2 55 70 
N. Dak. 2 29 — — 1 9 21 — — 1 11 52 
S. Dak. 7 27 — 4 7 9 1 — — 15 40 
Nebr. 13 31 18 28 17 30 2 1 50 90 
Kans. 10 67 14 14 36 59 — — 1 60 141 




^ew England includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and 
Connecticut. 
^Source: (45, p. 5; 48, p. 7). 
Table 10 A Continued. 
Cattle and 
calves; hogs, 
sheep and Cattle and 
lambs calves only 
State 1955 1970 1955 1970 
Del. - Md. 33 18 4 6 
Va. 17 19 3 
W. Va. 8 14 8 2 
N.C. 24 13 8 5 
S.C. 9 8 — — 2 
Ga. 1 5 2 3 
Fla. 11 15 12 9 
Sub Total 103 92 37 
Ky. 17 12 1 5 
Tenn. 26 26 4 2 
Ala. 7 5 — — 1 
Miss. 2 - - — — 4 
Ark. 1 2 2 4 
La. 28 23 7 14 
Okla. 5 4 11 15 
Texas 66 57 23 26 
Sub Total 152 129 48 
Cattle and Cattle and 
calves; and calves; sheep Total cattle 
hogs and lambs and calves 
1955 1970 1955 1970 1955 1970 
8 15 14 13 
16 16 3 2 
13 23 3 2 
59 60 — — — — 
37 45 - - — — 
81 78 — — — — 
39 20 1 1 
253 257 21 
18 29 3 1 
31 33 1 2 
55 53 — — — — 
30 49 — — — — 
48 49 — — — — 
37 54 — — — — 
52 51 — — 2 
127 127 2 5 


















Table lOA Continued . 
Cattle and 
calves; hogs. Cattle and Cattle and 
sheep and Cattle and calves; and calves; sheep Total cattle 
lambs calves only hoRs and lambs and calves 
State 1955 1970 1955 1970 1955 1970 1955 1970 1955 1970 
Mont. 19 25 3 2 6 6 4 3 32 36 
Idaho 24 52 — —  5 9 1 1 — — 34 58 
Wyom. 7 11 -- — - 4 2 — - - 11 13 
Colo. 15 37 7 12 15 5 3 4 40 58 
N. Mex. 12 20 2 2 4 1 — — 1 18 24 
Ariz. 12 12 — 6 1 3 — — 1 13 22 
Utah 23 42 1 2 3 2 3 1 30 47 
Nev. 6 5 — — 1 — — — — — — — — 6 6 
Wash. 61 33 5 10 16 5 6 4 88 52 
Greg. 40 70 4 5 16 1 3 4 63 80 
Calif. 83 35 22 34 5 1 21 16 131 86 
Sub Total 302 342 44 79 79 27 41 34 466 
TOTAL 954 1,474 518 455 1,334 1,555 265 205 3,071 3, 
(48 States) 
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in specialization in cattle slaughter. However, when the data is 
adjusted for the large number of plants closed in the major consumption 
areas, the results indicate a trend toward more specialization by species. 
The spatial distribution of fed cattle production, upon which the 
location of the beef packing industry has been increasingly dependent, 
changed significantly in recent years. In addition, the cattle feeding 
industry expanded rapidly in response to the increased demand for grain-
fed beef by consumers with both the willingness and the ability to pay. 
Per capita disposable income in the U.S. rose substantially over the 
period, and, in addition, consumers generally preferred to eat more beef. 
The number of fed cattle marketed in the U.S. more than doubled from 
13,621,000 head in 1960 to 27,866,000 head in 1972 (13, p. 3). 
The location of the cattle feeding industry is a function of a 
large number of variables including the location of feed grain production, 
the location of feeder cattle production and the location of beef consump­
tion markets. The recent interregional and intraregional shifts in the 
pattern of distribution of the cattle feeding industry can be largely 
explained by the first two of the factors listed. Feeder cattle and 
feed grain are the primary inputs in the production of fed cattle, and 
the availability of the two inputs has a real impact upon the comparative 
advantage of an area in fed cattle production. It is important to note 
that the development of fed cattle production is also facilitated by the 
existence of a local packing industry. 
Iowa led the nation for years in the number of fed cattle marketed. 
In 1969, when 4,618,000 head of fed cattle were marketed in Iowa, the 
state accounted for 18.5 percent of the U.S. total. In 1972, 3,986,000 
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head of fed cattle were marketed in the state. This represented a 13.7 
percent decrease from 1969. As a percentage of the U.S. total, Iowa fed 
cattle marketings decreased from 18.5 percent to approximately 14.3 
percent over the period (13, p. 3). In other words, cattle feeding in 
Iowa decreased in absolute and in relative terms. 
Much of the growth of the U.S. cattle feeding industry has occurred 
in the Southern Plains and in the Range States. The number of feeder 
cattle produced in those areas has historically been large. Until 
recently, however, most of the feeder cattle were shipped toward the Corn 
Belt for finishing. The Corn Belt enjoyed a competitive advantage in the 
production of feed grain, and fed cattle provided a way of profitably 
marketing the surplus grain produced in the area. In recent years, the 
development of irrigation and improved feed grain varieties, along with 
retirement of land from wheat, resulted in increased feed grain production 
in the Southern Plains and in the southern part of the Range States. The 
changing comparative advantage in feed grain production, together with 
the availability of feeder cattle, led to substantial shifts of the cattle 
feeding industry toward the Southern Plains and the Range States. 
Texas, in particular, has become increasingly important as a cattle 
feeding state. In 1962, 756,000 fed cattle were marketed in the state. 
This represented only 5.2 percent of the U.S. total. However, in 1972 
the number of fed cattle marketed in Texas was 4,308,000, and the state 
accounted for approximately 16 percent of the U.S. total (13, p. 3). 
The importance of cattle feeding in Nebraska also increased sub­
stantially over the same period, both in absolute and in relative terms. 
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In 1962, 1,822,000 head of fed cattle were marketed in Nebraska, and the 
state accounted for 12.5 percent of the U.S. total. The Nebraska total 
increased to 3,990,000 head in 1972, and the state accounted for 
approximately 14.7 percent of the U.S. total. Other states that experi­
enced significant growth in the cattle feeding industry in recent years 
were Kansas and Colorado. The two states ranked fourth and fifth, 
respectively, in the number of fed cattle marketed in 1972 (13, p. 3). 
The major cattle feeding states have also been the leading cattle 
slaughter states for the past several years. The ranking of states by 
the number of head slaughtered for selected years is presented in 
Table 10.5. In 1950, the five leading cattle slaughter states were 
Illinois, California, Iowa, Nebraska and Minnesota. By 1960, Iowa had 
become the leading state in the slaughter of cattle, and it maintained 
the position through 1968 when 4,588,000 head were slaughtered in the 
state. Nebraska replaced Iowa as the leading state in 1969. Iowa cattle 
slaughter dropped while slaughter in Nebraska increased. Since 1969, 
Nebraska has remained the leading cattle slaughter state, but in 1972, 
Iowa cattle slaughter recovered strongly and the state was a close second 
to Nebraska. Texas, California, Kansas and Colorado followed in that 
order. Traditionally large cattle slaughtering states such as Illinois, 
California and Ohio have declined in relative importance during the past 
two decades. The big gainers were Nebraska, Texas, Kansas and Colorado 
(47). 
Iowa remains a very important state in the slaughter of beef cattle, 
despite the recent decline. Much of the growth of the beef packing in­
dustry in the state seems to have occurred between 1960 and 1969. The 
Table 10.5. Commercial cattle slaughter, rank of leading states by number of head 
slaughtered, for selected years^ 
1950 1960 1968 1969 1972 
Number Number Number Number Number 
Rank State (000) State (000) State (000) State (000) State (000) 
1 111. 1,818 Iowa 2,499 Iowa 4,588 Nebr. 4,159 Nebr. 4,699 
2 Calif. 1,482 Calif. 2,476 Nebr. 3,847 Iowa 4,130 Iowa 4,662 
3 Iowa 1,398 Nebr. 2,137 Calif. 2,919 Texas 3,011 Texas 3,516 
4 Nebr. 1,180 Texas 1,492 Texas 2,779 Calif. 2,936 Calif. 2,761 
5 Minn. 1,167 111. 1,442 Minn. 1,985 Minn. 1,868 Kansas 2,495 
6 Kansas 1,015 Minn. 1,424 Colo. 1,574 Colo. 1,714 Colo. 2,461 
7 Texas 950 Ohio 1,186 Mo. 1,565 Kansas 1,664 Minn. 1,493 
8 Ohio 900 Kansas 1,167 Kansas 1,504 Mo. 1,590 111. 1,450 
9 Mo. 734 Mo. 1,104 111. 1,407 111. 1,417 Wise. 1,108 
10 Pa. 688 Colo. 1,046 Wise. 1,221 Wise. 1,246 Ohio 1,064 
11 Mich. 629 Wise. 979 Ohio 1,180 Ohio 1,123 Mo. 932 
12 Wise. 608 Pa. 830 Pa. 818 Pa. 762 Pa. 641 
13 N.Y. 507 Mich. 718 S. Dak. 720 Okla. 714 Mich. 628 
14 Ind. 500 Ind. 653 Okla. 699 S. Dak. 682 Wash. 613 
15 Colo. 490 N.Y. 466 Mich. 690 Mich. 670 Okla. 608 
U. S. TOTAL 17,901 25,224 35,091 35,298 35,842 
^Source: (47). 
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growth was largely in response to the growth in the fed cattle industry 
in the state. In 1960, there were 2,565,000 fed cattle marketed in Iowa. 
The total increased to 4,618,000 in 1969 for an increase of 80 percent 
(13). Also, much of the growth of the beef packing industry in Iowa since 
1960 occurred in the areas of the state that exhibited the most signifi­
cant growth in the production of fed cattle. 
Livestock costs generally account for at least 75 percent of the 
total value of sales in a meat packing plant. The prices paid for live­
stock depend largely upon the density of fed livestock production in the 
area and upon the degree of competition for the livestock. Beef packing 
operations generally depend upon a multi-county area for their supply of 
live fed cattle. In analyzing the spatial distribution of beef packing 
facilities, it is helpful to look at the distribution of fed cattle 
marketings in the twelve extension program areas of Iowa as shown by 
Figure 10.3. 
As discussed earlier, the number of fed cattle marketed in Iowa 
increased from 2,565,000 head in 1960 to 4,618,000 in 1969. The four 
western extension areas of Spencer (Area XI), Sioux City (Area X), 
Council Bluffs (Area II) and Fort Dodge (Area VII), accounted for over 
61 percent of the 2,053,000 head state increase. The Sioux City area led 
the state in 1960 in fed cattle marketings with 381,000 head. However, 
by 1962, the Sioux City area was replaced by the Spencer area as the 
leading fed cattle marketing area. The Spencer area has remained number 
one since 1962. In 1969, it accounted for 791,000 fed cattle marketed. 





















































Figure 10.3. Fed cattle marketed by Iowa extension areas for 1960, 1969 and 1970 in thousands (31) 
136 
period, the number of fed cattle marketed in the Sioux City area, which 
adjoins the southwest Spencer area, increased from 381,000 head to 
733,000 head. The two areas together accounted for 1,524,000 fed cattle 
marketed in 1969. This was 33 percent of the state total. The Fort 
Dodge area, which is adjacent to the southeast Spencer area, increased 
its fed cattle marketings from 240,000 head in 1960 to 475,000 head in 
1969. The Spencer, Sioux City and Fort Dodge areas together accounted 
for almost two million head or approximately 43 percent of the state total 
of fed cattle marketed in 1969 (31). 
B. The Location Decision 
The Spencer Foods, Inc. decision to locate a beef breaking and 
fabrication plant in Hartley in 1969 was, to a large extent, based upon 
the fact that the company had a beef slaughtering plant in Spencer. 
Hartley is a small O'Brien County community, twenty miles west of Spencer. 
O'Brien County is in the Spencer (Area XI) extension program area. 
The Spencer beef slaughtering plant was purchased for $6,000 by the 
present chairman of the board and six other Minnesota men in 1952 from a 
group of local businessmen who had unsuccessfully tried to operate the 
plant. The business grew to become the present Spencer Foods, Inc. The 
plant replaced the company's southern Minnesota plant that had burned. 
Rather than rebuild the burned plant, the company decided to buy the 
existing Spencer slaughtering facility and, thus, locate in a major fed 
cattle producing area that was expected to grow. The plant, with a 140 
head per hour slaughtering capacity, has been operated by the company 
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since 1952. It has undergone a number of modernization and automation 
changes which have increased the efficiency of the plant. 
In the late 1960*s, the company was wanting to establish a beef 
breaking, fabrication and cryogenics research facility to complement their 
existing cattle slaughtering plant in Spencer. There was much interest in 
the meat packing industry with respect to the technology required to 
efficiently produce and ship frozen beef. The company believed that the 
future would bring a trend toward the marketing of frozen beef, rather 
than the traditional chilled beef. Also, demand was tending to shift 
away from beef carcasses and toward institutional and retail-ready primal 
cuts. Advances in technology had created a very favorable situation for 
the establishment of beef breaking and fabrication operations utilizing 
assembly line techniques. As a percentage of the value of the product, 
the unit cost of transporting the boxed beef was lower than that of 
transporting beef carcasses. The boxes of beef are more efficiently 
packed and handled, and shrinkage, bruising and spoilage losses are lower 
than for carcass beef. Much of the food processing industry is highly 
competitive, and it is important for companies to stay abreast of changing 
conditions. 
The company wanted the breaking and fabrication plant to be close 
to their cattle slaughtering plant in Spencer because much of the beef 
carcass input of the plant would come from the Spencer operation. The 
multi-county area around Spencer would continue to constitute the primary 
market area for the fed cattle input of the company's slaughtering 
facility in Spencer. In 1969, the area was the most important cattle 
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feeding area of the state and production was expected to continue to 
grow. In 1968, the number of fed cattle marketed in the state was 
4,350,000, and the Spencer extension area accounted for almost 18 per­
cent of the total. The state of Iowa, as a whole, was expected to remain 
a leading cattle feeding state. The company's operations in the Spencer 
area could also draw from the major fed cattle producing areas of 
northwest Nebraska, southeast South Dakota and southwest Minnesota. The 
factors discussed earlier that were tending to decentralize the meat 
packing industry also contributed to Spencer Foods' decision to locate 
a beef breaking and fabrication plant near the company's cattle slaugh­
tering facility in Spencer. The principle of comparative advantage 
favored livestock supply oriented cattle slaughtering and beef breaking 
and fabrication locations. The management of Spencer Foods strongly 
believed that this would continue to be the case. 
The cattle slaughtering plant in Spencer was well established 
as an efficient operation in the middle of one of the major fed cattle 
producing areas in the country. The Spencer plant had been a very profit­
able operation for the company, and one of the primary determinants of 
its profitability was its location. The establishment of a complemen­
tary beef breaking and fabrication plant in the area was expected to be 
a very profitable addition to the firm's operations. The addition of 
a breaking and fabrication facility to the Spencer plant would seem to 
have been the best alternative. However, the estimated construction 
costs of a new facility were believed to be prohibitively high. 
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The chairman of the board of Spencer Foods, Inc. then heard through 
a friend about an available vacant building in Hartley, a small rural 
community twenty miles west of Spencer. The building had previously been 
used for an egg-breaking plant. The company officials were very inter­
ested in the Hartley location because of the potential adaptability of 
the building to a beef breaking and fabrication facility and because the 
company had information that the building could be purchased and remodeled 
for much less than the cost of a new facility. In addition, there was a 
large supply of unemployed labor available at low wage rates, primarily 
because of the shutting down of the egg-breaking facility and of a 
related creamery. Approximately 100 workers had lost their jobs, and 
most of them were expected to be willing to work for the minimum wage. 
Labor costs generally account for about 55 percent of meat packers' 
operating expenses, so the availability of a large supply of labor at 
such low wage rates was very attractive to the company. The average 
hourly wage of beef breakers in the industry at the time was in excess 
of $3.50 (4). 
The company then contacted the Hartley Industrial Development 
Corporation about the possibility of buying the building and locating 
the plant in Hartley. The Hartley Industrial Development Corporation 
people worked hard to get what Spencer Foods needed in order to locate in 
the community. The most significant action taken by the local industrial 
development group was their agreement to buy and tear down four buildings 
adjacent to the vacant building. The land was to be cleared and then 
leased to Spencer Foods for use as a loading and parking area. The 
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company was also given assurances about the availability of necessary 
electric power, water, sewer and other essential public services. The 
cooperation shown by the local development group indicated a favorable 
attitude toward the plant. In fact, the community was quite anxious to 
attract the new industry because the earlier business closing had 
confronted them with possibly severe adjustment problems. 
The company wanted a plant location with good transportation 
facilities, and the Hartley site seemed adequate in that respect. The 
site was adjacent to a rail line, and the community was served by a good 
highway system. 
The output was to be shipped primarily by truck. Daily motor freight 
service was available in Hartley, and this was critical even though the 
company expected to do some of the trucking itself. The plant would have 
relatively little cold storage space making it necessary for most of the 
product to be loaded into trucks immediately. Daily service would also be 
critical in serving the demands of the company's customers. 
The building was available as expected, at a price far below the 
construction costs of a comparable building. It was believed to be 
readily adaptable to a beef breaking and fabrication plant at a moderate 
cost. The company officials believed that buying and remodeling the 
existing structure would cost much less than building a new plant and, 
thus, it would contribute relatively more to the profits of the company, 
A large supply of low cost labor was available in Hartley, partly 
as a result of the closing down of the egg-breaking operation and the 
associated creamery. The necessary labor was available at the minimum 
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wage level, and there was no significant labor union activity in the 
community. The company expected its work force to be unionized in the 
future, but it believed that the cost of labor would remain low relative 
to that in larger cities. Even if wage rates increased to the levels of 
other areas, the company would still have enjoyed a temporary competitive 
advantage. Since labor costs in the operation would account for more 
than one half of operating expenses, the price of labor was a very impor­
tant consideration to the company. 
The decision was made, without serious consideration of other 
communities, to locate the plant in Hartley. The primary factors in the 
location decision, in the approximate order of their importance to the 
company, were the nearness of markets for inputs, the availability and 
cost of the vacant building, the availability and wages of needed labor, 
the quality and availability of transportation services, the attitude of 
local residents toward industrial development, the quality and availa­
bility of local public services and the absence of labor unions in the 
community. 
The availability of an adequate supply of beef inputs was of major 
importance in the decision to locate the beef breaking and fabrication 
plant in the Spencer area. The slaughter plant was located in Spencer 
because the community was situated in one of the major cattle feeding 
areas in the state, as well as in the nation. Because the major input of 
the beef breaking and fabrication plant was to be beef carcasses from the 
Spencer plant, the two plants needed to be close together in order to 
minimize transportation costs. 
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The factors such as the vacant building, the good supply of labor 
at or slightly above the minimum wage, the good transportation facilities, 
the cooperative attitude of the local people and the existence of ade­
quate public services were important in selecting the particular community 
of Hartley for the plant location. The evidence suggests that Spencer 
was the only other community that was at all considered for the location 
of the breaking and fabrication plant. There would have been definite 
transportation cost savings in locating the plant next to the slaughter­
ing plant in Spencer. However, that possibility seems to have been ruled 
out because of such factors as space limitations, high building construc­
tion costs and anticipated labor problems. In effect, the company de­
cided that a breaking and fabrication facility was needed, and Hartley 
was selected for the location without the company seriously considering 
other communities or devoting much effort to the decision. 
The location decision was based upon the motive of profit maximi­
zation. However, it is not at all clear whether the location is optimal 
for the long run. The company was able to buy the existing building at 
a low price, and the officers expected to be able to adapt the facility 
at a reasonably low cost. In fact, the remodeling project actually cost 
much more than was expected, and the plant was still probably not a cost 
minimizing facility. This implies some error in the company's expecta­
tions concerning the relative cost of buying and remodeling an existing 
building versus that of building a new one. Aside from this error in 
expectations, the primary difficulty with the Hartley location is the 
cost of shipping beef carcasses from Spencer to Hartley for breaking and 
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fabrication and then shipping the edible fat, inedible fat and other by­
products back to Spencer for processing. The capacity of the Hartley 
plant is much larger than was expected and there is no room to build 
by-product processing facilities for the larger-than-expected quantity 
of by-products. With respect to transportation costs, it would have been 
more efficient to locate the breaking and fabrication facility adjacent 
to the slaughtering plant in Spencer. However, the company's expecta­
tions about labor cost and supply have generally been realized. An 
adequate supply of labor has been available at lower than average wages 
even though the plant has been unionized. The labor supply would probably 
have been lower and the cost of labor higher if the company had located 
the plant in Spencer. However, the Hartley area workers could probably 
have been induced, by slightly higher wage rates, to work in Spencer. 
Transportation economies, together with increased wholesale demand 
for primal cuts, were important in the decision to locate a breaking and 
fabrication plant near the company's existing beef slaughtering facility. 
The transportation rate relationships favored the shipment of broken, 
fabricated and boxed beef over that of beef carcasses. The fact that 
the Spencer packing plant would be the primary source of carcass beef 
established the Spencer area as the area of location. 
The company was attracted to Hartley by the vacuum created by the 
earlier closing of the previous business. The building and the labor 
were available. Also, the community preferred to incur the costs of 
attracting a replacement industry rather than to bear the adjustment 
costs which would be felt if no new industry were attracted. From the 
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company's standpoint, the location decision involved a compromise between 
the diseconomies of having two separate plants and the expected cost 
savings resulting from the existing building and the supply of unemployed 
labor. The management of the company believes that the Hartley location 
decision was near optimal. However, the evidence suggests that locating 
a modern, efficient beef breaking and fabrication facility adjacent to 
the Spencer slaughtering plant would have resulted in higher long run 
profits. 
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XI. UTAH ELECTRONICS 
(GUTTENBERG, ICWA) 
The Utah Electronics plant in Guttenberg was put into operation in 
April, 1969. The plant is, in effect, a branch plant of the parent 
company, the Utah-American Corporation, of Huntington, Indiana. The 
average level of employment at the plant is 250 workers, of which 90 
percent are female. The plant produces loudspeakers for public address 
systems and private label speakers for such companies as Allied Radio 
Shack, Lafayette and Team Electronics. The company also produces high-
quality speakers for Seeburg, Electro-music and Hammond organ. Most of 
the output of the Guttenberg plant is distributed outside of Iowa. Utah-
American has been designing and producing speakers for over fifty years, 
and the company, which has a reputation for high-quality products, is 
the largest producer of speakers and speaker systems in the U.S. 
A. Industry Structure and Trends 
The U.S. electronics industry, with sales of $30 billion in 1972, 
ranks as one of the largest and most important industries in the country. 
It is smaller than the motor vehicle and the primary metal industries, 
each of which have annual sales in excess of $50 billion, but comparable 
in size to the meat products industry, the textile mill products industry 
and other important industries in the U.S. economy (50, pp. 6, 35, 157 
and 236). 
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The electronics industry has been one of the true growth industries 
of the post World War II period. Total sales increased from $10.1 billion 
in 1959 to an estimated $33 billion in 1973, for an average annual growth 
rate of approximately 9 percent (9, p. 93; 10, p. 49). The growth has 
generally been consistent with the exception of the 1970-72 period during 
which sales first decreased then advanced sharply. The recession, the 
winding down of the Vietnam War and the subsequent economic recovery 
characterized the unusual period for the electronics industry and brought 
about the erratic sales pattern. 
The electronics industry has been responsible for many major tech­
nological advances in the U.S. economy. The development and extensive 
adoption of the electronic computer has significantly affected virtually 
every sector of the economy. Other developments such as integrated 
circuits have also had a major impact upon U.S. industries. The elec­
tronics industry is of unquestionable importance in the economy. However, 
there seems to be no generally accepted definitions of what the industry 
consists of or of how it is structured. One of the main difficulties 
lies in the tremendous variety of products that exist. It is estimated 
that over 30,000 basic electronic products are manufactured in the U.S. 
(33, p. 97). These products range from tiny mini-circuits to large 
computer systems. The electronics "industry" is actually composed of 
many different industries or product groups. 
There is strong pressure throughout the industry to stay abreast of 
technological innovations and changes in consumer demand. Some parts of 
the industry, such as the computer and television segments, are dominated 
by a small number of large firms. However, many segments of the industry 
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are characterized by many firms and intense competition. In these 
segments, capital requirements and other barriers to entry tend to be low 
relative to many other manufacturing industries (33, p. 97). The low 
entry barriers, together with the increasing demand for electronic 
products, have encouraged new firms to enter the industry. The approxi­
mate number of firms in the industry increased from 1,000 in 1947 to 
3,900 in 1964 (33, p. 1). In 1964, the twelve largest firms in the 
industry had average sales of $788 million and accounted for 48 percent 
of total industry sales. At the other extreme were the 3,500 small firms 
with annual sales of less than $1 million. Average sales for the small 
firms amounted to only $200,000 (33, p. 59). However, many technological 
advances are initiated by small, new companies in the industry. 
The loudspeaker industry, which is the focus of this analysis, is 
a growth industry. In recent years, increased consumer demand for 
electric organs, stereophonic sound systems and quadraphonic sound sys­
tems has substantially increased the demand for loudspeakers. The value 
of shipments of speakers systems, microphones, home-type electronic kits 
and commercial sound equipment increased from $185 million in 1967 to 
$259 million in 1969 and to $278 million in 1971 (51, p. 33; 52, p. 31). 
Loudspeakers are essentially microphones operated in reverse. They 
translate electrical impulses into sound waves which can be picked up by 
the ear. The most common loudspeakers are of the electro-magnetic types. 
The technology of acoustics is basic in the electronics oriented tech­
nology of electroacoustics, stereophonies and quadraphonics (33, pp. 5, 
399, and 400). 
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Most of the changes in loudspeaker design in recent years have been 
cosmetic in nature. There seems to have been greater consumer interest 
in how the speaker looks than in its quality. In other words, to many 
consumers if the speaker is attractive, then it is going to sound good. 
In response to the increased demand for good appearance relative to the 
demand for good quality, many companies, for example, are changing from 
plated to painted speakers. Plated speakers tend to give higher quality 
sound, but painted speakers tend to be more pleasing to the eye. Paint­
ing, rather than plating, also has the effect of decreasing costs of 
production. This may or may not result in lower prices to the consumer, 
but it is very probable that it tends to increase the profits of pro­
ducers. 
Loudspeaker production tends to be a labor intensive operation. 
Because labor costs may constitute more than 50 percent of production 
costs, a competitive advantage is often enjoyed by firms located in areas 
where there is an abundant trainable supply of largely female labor avail­
able at low-wage rates. The unit transportation costs of the speakers and 
the electronic components are generally low relative to value. This also 
contributes to the comparative advantage enjoyed by firms located in low 
cost-of-labor areas. Most of the capital equipment used is simple. 
Assembly of the components is done largely by hand with the use of pliers 
and other small tools. As a result, many firms have entered the industry 
to compete for the expanding speaker and speaker system market. 
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B. The Location Decision 
The demand for Utah-American products was increasing rapidly in the 
late 1960's. The company needed additional production capacity because 
it was unable to meet the strong demand for its speakers and speaker 
systems. The firm saw the excess demand as an opportunity to increase 
its profits. However, it was important that the company act quickly. 
There was a real danger that if the excess demand was not satisfied 
quickly by Utah-American, another firm in the monopolistically competi­
tive industry would beat them to it. 
The president of Utah-American, Frank Pyle, was aware of the 
competitive pressure, and he was anxious to establish an additional plant 
as soon as possible. He decided that the Midwest, as the center of the 
company's actual and potential markets, was the geographical area in 
which the plant should be located. Iowa, Kansas and southern Illinois 
were considered as potential locations. 
In early 1969, the Jenson Manufacturing Company shut down its 
loudspeaker plant in Guttenberg, Iowa. The general manager of the plant 
before it closed was Charley Cain, a radio engineer by profession. The 
Jenson Company wanted Mr. Cain to move to southern Chicago to assume 
control of its operations there. However, Mr. Cain did not want to take 
over the Chicago operation because the Jenson Company was in serious 
financial trouble. Also, he did not want to live in the Chicago area. 
He had lived in Guttenberg a number of years and had found the community 
(population 2,177) to be a very pleasant place to live. 
150 
The timing of the Jenson Company plant closing was very important 
in the ultimate decision to locate the Utah Electronics plant in 
Guttenberg. Mr. Cain was aware that Utah-American was expanding and that 
the company needed what the Guttenberg plant could produce. He contacted 
Mr. Pyle of Utah-American about the possibility of a joint venture to 
acquire the building and produce loudspeakers. The labor force was 
trained and available. Mr. Cain had had extensive loudspeaker manufactur­
ing experience, both as an engineer and as a manager. Mr. Pyle had a very 
high regard for Mr. Cain's ability, and he wanted him to manage the 
operation wherever it was actually located. In effect, Mr. Pyle wanted 
Mr. Cain to manage the plant, and Mr. Cain wanted Guttenberg. Mr. Cain 
argued for Guttenberg because the building and trained labor force were 
available, and because he liked living in the community. 
Mr. Pyle believed that a Midwest location was optimal because it was 
centrally located in the company's market area. A Midwest location was 
expected to minimize output transportation costs. A location in the area 
would also be close to electronic component suppliers in Dubuque, Iowa and 
in southern Wisconsin. After talking with Mr. Cain, he became convinced 
that within the Midwest, Guttenberg would be the best location for the 
plant. To Mr. Pyle, the most important locational factors in favor of 
Guttenberg were the availability of trained labor, the high labor produc­
tivity, the stable labor situation, the building availability and the 
availability of Mr. Cain to manage the plant. 
Wt. Cain had lived in Guttenberg and managed manufacturing operations 
in the community. He was well acquainted with the labor market situation 
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and with the other attributes of the community. The necessary skilled 
labor was available, much of it at wage rates of less than $2.00 per 
hour. The plant would employ mostly women, and there was not as much 
competition for female labor as there was in the metropolitan areas. The 
rural area labor supply was composed primarily of people whose belief in 
the work ethic was conducive to high productivity. The people knew how 
to work, partly because of their farm backgrounds, and they were 
generally committed to performing an "honest day's work for an honest 
day's pay". Mr. Cain had found this to be in sharp contrast to the labor 
situation in the many parts of the U.S., Canada and Mexico, in which he 
had managed plants. The lack of organized labor activity in the community 
was also important to Mr. Cain. 
Mr. Pyle seems to have had an initial preference for a southern 
Illinois location. Mr. Cain, however, had a strong dislike for Illinois 
as a plant location. Illinois, to Mr. Cain, had a very restrictive labor 
regulation that allowed women to work more than eight hours per day only 
with the permission of the state. In Iowa, women can work more than 
eight hours per day if they are paid overtime rates. Iowa's right-to-
work law, which permits workers to hold employment with or without union 
affiliation, was also important to Cain. 
Guttenberg was also near electronic components suppliers located in 
such cities as Dubuque, Iowa and Lancaster, Wisconsin. Mr. Cain had been 
well pleased with the efficient transportation facilities in Guttenberg, 
despite its being backed up to the Mississippi River. The adequate 
loading and parking space and the lack of traffic congestion in the 
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community were considered to be important factors favoring Guttenberg 
over a large metropolitan area. The local tax structure in Guttenberg 
was considered to have fewer disadvantages than many other communities, 
and the inventory tax in Iowa was not as high as in many other states. 
However, tax considerations were of minor importance in the location 
decision. 
Mr. Pyle and Mr. Cain reached the agreement, after a very short 
period of consideration, that Guttenberg was the optimal location for 
the plant. Mr. Pyle then contacted the Jenson Company about buying the 
building and about employing Mr. Cain as the general manager of the plant. 
An agreement was worked out and the Utah Electronics plant in Guttenberg 
started operation in April, 1969. Mr. Pyle, who was then president of 
Utah-American Corporation, and Mr. Cain, who would be the general manager 
of the plant, were the primary company participants in the plant location 
decision. They basically agreed upon the most important considerations. 
The significant locational factors in the location decision were the 
skills, the availability and the wages of needed labor; the nearness of 
markets for outputs; the availability of a suitable building; the near­
ness of markets for electronic component inputs; the transportation 
facilities; and the extent of labor union activity in the community. 
Labor and market considerations were the critical ones in the location 
decision. The importance of locating in the center of the market area 
established the Midwest as the geographical area in which the plant would 
be located. This was important because of considerations such as trans­
portation costs per unit and speed of servicing consumption markets. The 
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availability of an adequate supply of trained labor at low wage rates 
was the most important locational factor involved in the choice of 
Guttenberg over other Midwest communities. The availability of the 
building was also of major importance because of the opportunity costs 
involved in the company's shortage of needed production capacity. In 
other words, Utah-American needed to move quickly to expand their pro­
duction capacity in order to satisfy the excess demand for its products 
and increase its profits. The coincidental shut-down of the Jenson 
operation created a vacuum that effectively pulled Utah-American to 
Guttenberg. 
Mr. Pyle and Mr. Cain each believed that Guttenberg was the optimal 
location choice, but their preference was based on different considera­
tions. Mr. Pyle, as the president of Utah-American, was more directly 
concerned about the profitability of the plant. Mr. Cain, as discussed 
earlier, had personal reasons for wanting the plant located in the 
community. However, his broad experience in the industry and his 
generally successful manufacturing experiences in Guttenberg indicated 
that a loudspeaker plant operated by a well-established firm such as 
Utah-American would be highly profitable in the community. Although Mr. 
Cain assumed less risk than Mr. Pyle, he genuinely expected the Guttenberg 
plant to be a very profitable part of the Utah-American Corporation. 
The two men still believe that the location choice was optimal, and 
there is little evidence to suggest otherwise. Their expectations have 
generally been realized. The plant was unionized in 1972 for the first 
time. The labor force was organized primarily because 79 percent of the 
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workers are related to workers at the unionized John Deere plant in 
Dubuque. Mr. Cain sees no real harm resulting from the organization of 
the plant although it requires a great deal of non-productive effort to 
handle paperwork and negotiations. The location decision was partially 
based upon the lack of organized labor activity in Guttenberg. However, 
the recent unionization of the plant could have happened anywhere, and, 
at any rate, the event has not significantly altered the evidence that 
the plant location decision was optimal. 
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XII. COMPARISON OF SEVEN CASES AND HYPOTHESIZED 
LOCATION DECISION PROCESS 
A. Comparison of Seven Cases 
The seven industrial plant location decisions analyzed were not 
randomly selected. The cases chosen are believed to be quite typical, 
but represent a wide range of specific characteristics. It would be 
invalid to calculate "sample" averages or proportions from these cases 
and to generalize to the population of rural Iowa industrial location 
decisions on the basis of the findings of this study. The seven location 
decisions can, however, be compared to gain insights into the actual 
decision process utilized by firms locating plants in rural areas of 
Iowa, The primary emphasis of this study is upon gaining understanding 
of the importance of different location factors in the various stages or 
levels of the decision process, and of the functions performed by the 
various decision participants in the different phases of the process. 
The seven plants were put into operation during the period of October 
1968 through December 1970. Some selected characteristics of the plants 
are presented in Table 12.1. Employment by plant in 1970 ranged from 15 
in the case of the Design Homes plant to 200 for Utah Electronics. From 
1970 to 1973 employment at the Monroe Plastics plant showed the biggest 
absolute and percentage increase. As Table 12.1 shows, employment at the 
industrial plastics plant increased from 30 to 100 during the period, for 
a 233 percent increase. Employment did not increase at all of the plants. 
The number of employees decreased at the Golden Sun Feeds plant and 
Table 12.1. Plant characteristics by case 
Type of % Growth Primary 
Production 1970 1973 in No. of % Male Market 
Case Process Employment Employment Employees Employees Area 
Atlantic Steel Corp. 
Atlantic, Iowa 
Dakota Bake-N-Serv, Inc. 
Nevada, Iowa 
Design Homes, Inc. 
Humboldt, Iowa 
Golden Sun Feeds, Inc. 
Grinnell, Iowa 
Monroe Plastics Corp. 
Albia, Iowa 
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remained constant at the Spencer Foods beef breaking and fabrication 
plant. The proportion of plant employment accounted for by males varies 
from 10 percent to 95 percent. Female workers make up approximately 90 
percent of the 250 employee labor force of the Utah Electronics loudspeaker 
plant. As can be seen in Table 12.1, the industrial plastics plant also 
employs mostly women. At the other extreme are several plants with pre­
dominantly male employees. For example, the Atlantic Steel fabricating 
plant employs almost all men. Intermediate in the range is the frozen 
bread dough plant that employs approximately equal proportions of males 
and females. The seven plants are all export plants in the sense that 
most of the products are marketed outside the community of location. For 
some of the plants the primary market area is the state of Iowa, while for 
others the major market area is outside of Iowa. 
The types of products produced by the seven plants represented in the 
study includes consumer goods (e.g., frozen bread dough) and intermediate 
goods (e.g., industrial plastics). The size of the market area served by 
the respective plants ranges from approximately the northern one-half of 
Iowa in the case of the modular home plant to nation-wide in the case of 
the beef breaking and fabricating plant. The seven cases include demand 
based (e.g., modular homes and livestock feed), resource based (e.g., beef 
packing) and footloose (e.g., loudspeakers) industries. 
A number of characteristics of the respective industries are presented 
in Table 12.2. The size of the respective industries, as represented by 
value of shipments, shows considerable variation. The frozen bread dough 
industry is a relatively new, small industry. The total value of industry 
Table 12.2. Comparison of industry characteristics by case^ 
Value Market Long term 
of Number Share of Output 
Product Shipments of Four Larg­ Growth Wage Labor 
Case Class (mils.of $) Firms est Firms Rate Rates Intensity 
Atlantic Steel Corp. Fabricated 
Atlantic, Iowa structural 3,400 1 ,800-1,900 13% 
steel (1971) (1967) (1970) Average Average Average 
Dakota Bake-N-Serv, Inc. Frozen 40-50 10-12 60-70% Above Below 
Nevada, Iowa bread dough (1972) (1973) (1973) Average Average Average 
Design Homes, Inc. Prefab wood 1,000 500-600 30% 
Humboldt, Iowa structures (1971) (1967) (1970) Average Average Average 
Golden Sun Feeds, Inc. Prepared 5,800 2,400 23% Below Below 
Grinnell, Iowa animal feed (1971) (1967) (1967) Average Average Average 
Monroe Plastics Corp. Miscellaneous 7,700 5,000 8% Above Below 
Albia, Iowa plastics prod. (1971) (1967) (1967) Average Average Average 
Spencer Foods, Inc. Beef, not canned 8,100 N.A.^ 26% Above Above 
Hartley, Iowa nor sausage (1968) (1967) Average Average Average 
Utah Electronics Audio Equipment 
Guttenberg, Iowa (including loud 675 N.A. N.A. Below Above 
speakers) (1968) Average Average Average 
^Source: (50), (51), (52), (53). 
^N.A. - Not available. 
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shipments is estimated to have been approximately $40 to $50 million in 
1972. At the other extreme are the beef packing and the miscellaneous 
plastics products industries, each of which is characterized by annual 
industry shipments valued at several billion dollars. The number of firms 
and the degree of market power concentration also vary widely among the 
seven industries represented. As Table 12.2 shows, the number of firms 
in the respective industries ranges from less than fifteen in the case of 
frozen bread dough to several thousand in the case of miscellaneous plas­
tics products. The market share of the four largest firms in the respec­
tive industries varies from approximately 8 percent in the case of 
miscellaneous plastics products to over 60 percent in the case of frozen 
bread dough. In other words, among the seven industries represented in 
the study, the smallest industry in terms of value of shipments also had 
the smallest number of firms and was characterized by the largest four-
firm concentration ratio, while the industry with the largest number of 
firms had the lowest four-firm concentration ratio. 
Table 12.2 also presents estimates of long-term growth rates, wage 
rates, and degree of labor intensity for the seven industries. The long-
term output growth rate among the seven industries, relative to that of 
all U.S. industry, ranged from average (e.g., fabricated structural steel 
and prepared livestock feed) to above average (e.g., frozen bread dough 
and miscellaneous plastics products). Although the audio equipment 
industry is characterized by only average long-term growth, the elec­
tronics industry as a whole is characterized by growth substantially above 
the average growth of all U.S. industry. Wage rates among the seven 
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industries, relative to rates paid by all U.S. industry, include below 
average rates (e.g., miscellaneous plastics products), average rates (e.g., 
fabricated structural steel and prefabricated wood structures), and above 
average rates (e.g., beef packing). Among the seven industries repre­
sented in the study, the industries paying the lowest relative wages were 
those in which females accounted for a large proportion of total employ­
ment. As can be seen in Table 12,2, the degree of labor intensity in the 
seven industries ranged from below average (e.g., prepared animal feed) to 
above average (e.g., electronic components). Much of the prepared animal 
feed production process is highly automated, therefore the input of labor 
relative to output is low. In the production of loudspeakers, the reverse 
is true. The prefabricated wood structures industry is characterized by 
average labor intensity. This is in sharp contrast to the highly labor 
intensive construction of conventionally built structures. 
The seven plants represented in the location study were new locations 
and/or relocations. As can be seen in Table 12.3, the reasons for locating 
the new plants ranged from the need for additional output capacity because 
of expanded product demand to inefficiencies associated with existing 
plants. For example, in the late 1960's, the existing Golden Sun Feeds 
plant in Des Moines was a very inefficient and unprofitable facility. The 
expected expansion of the market area of the plant to the east and north 
was also creating some pressure to relocate the plant further east, but 
the primary problem with the existing plant was its overall inefficiency. 
The inefficiencies of the plant resulted in high production costs and 
created serious problems in servicing the product market. In contrast. 
Table 12.3, General decision characteristics by case 
Type of Main reason General Main factor 
production for locating area in selection 
Case process plant selected of general area 
Atlantic Steel Corp. 
Atlantic, Iowa 
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the primary factor behind, for example, Utah-American's decision to 
locate a new branch plant was the excess demand for the firm's loud­
speaker systems. 
The size of the general geographic area considered for location by 
the respective firms varied from a specific community (e.g.. Hartley by 
Spencer Foods) to a multi-state area (e.g., the Midwest by Monroe Plas­
tics). The methods used to select the general area of location included 
projections of expected directions of market expansion, analyses of 
existing patterns of industrialization and estimates of resource avail­
ability. 
As Table 12.3 shows, the primary location factors in the determina­
tion of the general geographic area of location varied considerably among 
the seven cases. The principal factors included the need to be near 
product markets in order to minimize transportation costs (e.g.. Design 
Homes), the need to locate in a relatively unindustrialized area to ensure 
the availability of an adequate labor supply (e.g., Atlantic Steel) and 
the need to be near an existing support facility in the primary input 
supply area (e.g., Spencer Foods). 
Among the cases in which a multi-state area was considered for 
location purposes, the reasons for selecting Iowa included the potential 
for product market development in the state and surrounding states, the 
availability of trained and untrained labor of high productivity, the 
existence of relatively unindustrialized areas, the relatively unrestric-
tive labor laws and the stability and efficiency of Iowa government 
agencies. Dakota Bake-N-Serv, for example, selected Iowa because of its 
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location in the center of a potentially strong market area. Utah-
America chose to locate its loudspeaker plant in Iowa primarily because of 
the availability of trained, highly productive labor and because of the 
state's relatively less restrictive labor laws. Among the principal 
determinants in Chicago Molded Products' decision to locate its industrial 
plastics plant in Iowa were the existence of relatively unindustrialized 
areas and the availability of unskilled, but readily trainable labor. The 
company was also attracted by the stability and efficiency of the govern­
ment agencies and by the equitable tax structure of the state. 
There was considerable variation in the sources of community data used 
by the firms in evaluating and selecting potential communities within the 
chosen area of location. Sources of community data included community 
development organizations, state government agencies, consulting firms and 
U.S. government publications. 
The specifications used by the firms in evaluating and selecting 
potential communities are dependent upon the nature of the production 
processes, cost structures, significance of different inputs and other 
technical and economic considerations. However, the linkages involved in 
this early stage of the decision process are still not well understood. 
The specifications used by the firms in evaluating and selecting 
potential communities on their initial lists are presented in Table 12.4. 
Those cases in which very unique considerations precluded the selection 
of more than one potential community are not included in the table. The 
frozen bread dough company, for example, selected a single community within 
its chosen area of location because that particular Iowa community was the 
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Table 12.4. Specifications used to evaluate and select initial list of 














Good supply of trainable 
rural labor Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Limited labor union activity Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Not close to large metro area Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Good truck service No Yes No Yes 
Good rail service Yes Yes Yes No 
Large supply of electrical 
power Yes No Yes Yes 
Large supply of natural gas No No Yes Yes 
Near interstate highway Yes No Yes No 
Progressive community No Yes No No 
only one having the desired church operated secondary school academy. The 
cases for which community specifications are listed in Table 12.4 are 
those in which more than one specification was used to evaluate and select 
more than one particular community. 
There was also a broad range of methods used by firms in evaluating 
and selecting potential communities. Design Homes, for example, used the 
approach of drawing two circles around the home plant, one with a radius 
of 150 miles and the other with a radius of 200 miles. The president of 
Design Homes wanted the new branch plant to be located at least 150 miles 
from the home plant in Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin so the two plants would 
not compete for sales with one another, but he also wanted the new plant 
to be located no more than 200 miles from the home plant so that in 
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approximately one hour he could fly his plane to the branch location. A 
number of Iowa communities situated from 150 to 200 miles from the home 
plant were selected for investigation. The president of Design Homes 
wanted a community large enough to have good rail and truck service, an 
adequate supply of labor and an airport, but small enough not to have 
extensive organized labor activity. 
Venetian Iron decided that, because of labor problems in metropoli­
tan areas, it wanted to locate its new steel fabrication plant 50-70 
miles from any major metropolitan area. The company also wanted the plant 
to be near Interstate 80 so the company would have ready access to the 
nation's truck transportation system. The Iowa Development Commission was 
asked to recommend a few Iowa communities meeting the firm's location 
specifications. 
Golden Sun Feeds wanted to relocate its branch plant in the center of 
its anticipated livestock feed market area in order to minimize output 
transportation costs. The availability of raw material inputs was also 
critical in the establishment of the new location. Golden Sun Feeds 
employed a consulting firm to conduct a market study and to recommend 
feasible communities for location. 
The number of communities included by firms in their final lists 
ranged from one to four. Dakota Bake-N-Serv, Utah-American and Spencer 
Foods each seriously considered only one community. On the other hand, 
four communities were strong contenders for the Monroe Plastics plant. 
Three communities were recommended to Golden Sun by the private consultant 
they employed. Three communities were seriously considered for the Design 
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Homes plant. The lowa Development Commission recommended three com­
munities to Venetian Iron for its steel fabrication plant, but the company 
seriously considered only two of them. 
Table 12.5 presents the location factors mentioned by the firm 
representatives as being important in the respective choices of the final 
community. In each case, a number of factors were mentioned as being 
significant location determinants. However, one or two key considerations 
tended to dominate the final location decision. In the case of the 
Dakota Bake-N-Serv community selection, for example, the location of the 
church academy was by far the most important locational consideration. 
In the case of Spencer Foods' decision as to where to locate its beef 
breaking and fabrication facility, the availability of a vacant building 
and the availability of a large supply of low-cost labor near its existing 
beef slaughter plant were the critical factors in the selection of the 
community. Similarly, the availability of a trained, low-cost supply of 
labor, and of a vacant building, dominated the selection of the community 
for the Utah Electronics plant. 
Table 12.6 presents, for those cases in which more than one community 
was seriously considered, the two most important screening criteria used 
by the respective firms in selecting the location from the final list of 
communities. In the cases of the steel fabricating plant, the livestock 
feed plant and the industrial plastics plant, the availability of train­
able rural labor was the most important location factor. To the president 
of Design Homes, the cooperation and attitude shown by the local people 
Table 12.5, Factors mentioned as being important in the final community choice, by case 
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Good supply of trainable, productive 
rural labor Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Limited labor union activity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reasonably low wage rates Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Good supply of skilled labor No No No No No No Yes 
Near input markets No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Near center of output market No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Cooperative and progressive 
attitude of local people Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Efficient transportation facilities Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Availability of a suitable 
building No No No No No Yes Yes 
Large supply of natural gas and/or 
electricity Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Availability of suitable site Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 12.6. Two most important screening criteria used in selecting location from final list of 
communities, by case 
Case Most Important Factor Second Most Important Factor 
Atlantic Steel Corp. 
Atlantic, Iowa 
Availability of trainable 
rural labor 
Quality of transportation 
facilities 
Design Homes, Inc. 
Humboldt, Iowa 
Cooperation and attitude 
of local people 
Availability of a suitable 
site 
Golden Sun Feeds, Inc. 
Grinnell, Iowa 
Availability of trainable 
rural labor 
Center of product market 
(minimize transportation costs) 
Monroe Plastics Corp. 
Albia, Iowa 
Availability of trainable 
rural labor 
Availability of natural gas 
and electric power 
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was the most important factor determining the choice of the location 
from among the final three communities considered. 
Golden Sun Feeds seriously considered three communities for the 
location of its livestock feed manufacturing plant. Grinnell was selected 
for the location of the branch plant. The major factors favoring Grinnell 
were its nearness to product markets and to feed ingredient sources. 
Transportation costs were expected to be minimized with the Grinnell loca­
tion. The plant site was situated in an industrial park a mile from 
Interstate 80 and was adjacent to a rail line with daily switching service. 
An adequate supply of natural gas and electric power was available for 
the high energy using plant. There was an adequate supply of rural labor 
and no one industry dominated the local labor market. Other factors 
affecting the choice of Grinnell were the amenities of the community and 
the high quality help provided by the local industrial development corpora­
tion. The primary factors important in the elimination of the two other 
communities were expected labor problems associated with labor market 
dominance by one firm and expected higher transportation costs associated 
with locating away from the center of the product market. 
In the case of Venetian Iron's decision to locate its custom steel 
fabrication plant in Atlantic, the Iowa Development Commission recommended 
three communities for consideration by the company. One of the communi­
ties was eliminated from further consideration because it was too close to 
the Omaha metropolitan area. The president of the company believed that 
the plant operation would be hampered by metropolitan area labor problems 
such as a limited supply of trainable labor, high turnover rates and 
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organized labor activity. The management of the firm believed that the 
productivity of rural workers would be higher. The other community was 
eliminated primarily because it was believed to be too small to provide an 
adequate supply of trainable labor. 
The president of Design Homes seriously considered three communities 
before the final decision was mads to locate his modular home manufactur­
ing plant in Humboldt. The principal location factors that contributed 
to the elimination of the two other communities and to the selection of 
Humboldt included the progressive nature of Humboldt and the cooperation 
provided by its industrial development corporation. The people of 
Humboldt "did the best job of selling their community" to the president 
of the company. 
The ranking of factors of overall importance in the seven location 
decisions is given in Table 12.7. The ranking of factors varied substan­
tially among the seven cases. In the steel fabricating plant case, for 
example, the availability of rural labor was the most important location 
factor, and the relative lack of organized labor activity was second in 
importance. Similarly, the availability, wages and skills of labor were 
of primary importance in the loudspeaker plant case. In the modular home 
and livestock feed cases, it was of primary importance to locate near 
output markets because the transportation costs of the products is high 
relative to value. In the beef breaking and fabrication case, it was of 
major importance to locate the plant near large supplies of fed cattle 
inputs. The availability of a suitable, vacant building was listed among 
the five most important factors by only two firms. However, in those two 
Table 12.7. Overall ranking of the five most important location factors, by case 
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Availability, wages, and/or skills of 
labor 
Extent of labor union activity 
Quality of transportation 
facilities 
Nearness of input markets 
Nearness of output markets 
Cooperation and attitude of 
local people 
Quality and availability of 
utility service 
Availability of suitable 
building 
Availability of suitable site 
1  1 - 4 1  3 1  
2 2 2 5 5 -
3 5 5 3 - 4 5 
4 - 2  1 4  
3  1 1 4  -  3  
4 3 - 3 5 -
5 - - - 2 - -
- - - 2 2 
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cases (loudspeakers and beef breaking and fabrication), the availability 
of a suitable building was the second most important location determinant. 
The participants in the respective location decisions, by stage of 
the process, are shown in Table 12.8. The number and type of participants 
varied considerably by stages among the seven cases. In several of the 
cases, the president was the only company representative involved in the 
location decision. In other cases (e.g., industrial plastics), as many 
as three top company executives participated in the decision process. In 
the cases of steel fabrication and industrial plastics, the State Develop­
ment Commission was involved in the selection of potential communities. 
Golden Sun Feeds employed the services of a consultant in the selection 
of feasible communities. In some cases (e.g., livestock feed), utility 
companies were involved in the selection and evaluation of feasible 
communities. In several cases, local industrial development groups were 
involved in the selection and evaluation of final communities. 
The objectives upon which the location decisions of the respective 
firms were based ranged from profit maximization to the maximization of 
an objective function which included personal considerations. The Golden 
Sun Feeds location decision, for example, was based upon the objective of 
profit maximization. In contrast, the Dakota Bake-N-Serv location 
decision, for example, was based upon two complementary objectives. One 
of the objectives was to earn a profit from company operations. The second 
objective was to provide a valuable learning experience for church academy 
students through gainful employment. 
Table 12.8. Location decision participants by stage of process and by case 
Frozen Modular Livestock Industrial Beef 
Stages of Steel Bread Dough Home Feed Plastics Breaking and Loudspeakei 
Process Fabrication Mfg. Mfg. Mfg. Mfg. Fabrication Mfg. 
Preplanning Près ident President Près. 1) Près. 1) Pres. President President 
2) Exec. 2) Exec. 
V.P. V.P. 
Selection of President Près ident Près. 1) Pres. 1) Pres. President President 
general area 2) Exec. 2) Exec. 
V.P. V.P. 
Selection of 1) Pres. N.A* Près. 1) Près. 1) Pres. N.A. N.A. 
initial list of 2) State 2) Exec. 2) Exec.V.P. 
communities Dev. Comm. 3) State Dev. 
Comm. 
Selection of 1) Pres. N.A. 1) Pres. 1) Près. 1) Pres. N.A. N.A. 
final list of 2) State 2) Local 2) Exec. 2) Exec.V.P. 
communities Dev. Comm. I.D. Grps. V.P. 3) Mgr. of Ind. 
3) Consul­ Relations 
tant 4) Local I.D. 
Groups 
5) Utility Co. 
Selection of 1) Pres. 1) Pres. 1) Pres. 1) Près. 1) Pres. 1) Pres. 1) Pres. 
Community 2) Local 2) Local 2) Local 2) Exec. 2) Mgr. of 2) Local 2) Plant 
I.D, Groups I.D. Grps, , I.D. Grps. V.P. Ind. Rel. I.D. Group Mgr. 
3) Utility 3) Church 3) Local 3) Local I.D. 
Co. Academy I. D. Grps, Groups 
Supt. 4) Utility 4) Utility 
Co. Co. 
^N.A. - Not applicable. 
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The location decision, from the point of view of the respective 
firms, ranged from optimal to sub-optimal. For those cases in which 
industrial management believes their location decision to have been 
optimal, the optimality was due to consideration of the relevant location 
factors and to the correct formulation of expectations with respect to 
the important factors. The management of Golden Sun Feeds, for example, 
based their location decision largely upon expectations relating to such 
factors as product market expansion and rural labor productivity. The 
expectations have been realized and this has contributed to the optimality 
of the Golden Sun Feeds location decision. 
For those cases in which industrial management believes their loca­
tion decision to have been sub-optimal, the primary reasons for the non-
optimality of the decisions were related to invalid expectations about 
location factors. In the Monroe Plastics location case, for example, one 
of the primary location determinants was the company's expectation that 
the supply of local labor would be adequate to serve the needs of the 
plant. The labor availability factor was an important one, but the supply 
of needed labor has been smaller than was expected. This incorrect expec­
tation was the major reason why the location decision was not optimal. 
B. Hypothesized Location Decision Process 
The industrial location decision process is believed to consist of 
several stages or levels, with each stage involving a different set of 
location considerations, a different set of participants, and different 
information sources. The location decision process is believed to involve 
a process starting with an entrepreneur expressing a need for new plant 
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capacity, then articulating requirements and specifications for the 
community and site. Several potential locations are identified and the 
more profitable locations are evaluated according to increasingly 
specific location considerations until one community is selected. The 
new plant location selection process is a management function in which the 
general objective is the maximization of expected profit. 
In general, the stages and associated elements of the location 
decision process are hypothesized to be about as follows: 
I. Preplanning 
A. Participants 
1. President of the company 
2. Vice-president of the company 
B. Functions 
1. Determine product, technology, size and other plant 
characteristics 
2. Establish general specifications for area, community 
and site 
3. Determine selection techniques and information sources 
4. Assign responsibilities for various aspects of the 
decision 
II. Selection of general area 
A. Important factors delineating the general area 
1. Location of product markets 
2. Location of input supplies 
3. Degree of industrialization 
4. Location of competitors 
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5. Availability and cost of support facilities 
6. Availability of fuel and power 
7. Labor costs and availability 
8. Labor legislation 
9. State and local business tax structure 
B. Participants 
1. President of the company 
2. Vice-president of the company 
C. Information generation techniques 
1. Product market studies 
2. Transportation studies 
3. Input supply studies 
4. Labor cost comparisons 
D. Information sources 
1. Company records 
2. Government reports 
3. Personal contacts with "intermediaries" or other 
businesses 
4. General knowledge of area reputations 
5. State advertisements 
III. Selection and identification of potential communities by name 
A. Required community characteristics 
1. Availability of workers by skill 
2. Labor-management relations 
3. Size range of communities 
4. Distance to metropolitan areas 
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5. Access to transportation facilities 
6. Quality of needed transportation services 
7. Availability of power, water, and sewer services 
8. Size and type of other industry 
9. Availability of site and/or building 
B. Participants 
1. Company executive 
2. State development agencies 
3. Consultants 
4. Utility companies 
C. Selection techniques 
1. Company analysis of community data 
2. Recommendations by state development agency 
3. Recommendations by utility company 
4. Recommendations by private consultant 
D. Information sources 
1. Community files of state development agency 
2. Community development groups 
3. Community files of utility companies 
4. Consultants 
5. Government publications 
Selection of community and site 
A. Important factors 
1. Availability of labor by skill and/or trainability 
2. Labor costs 
3. Extent of organized labor activity 
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4. Progressiveness of community 
5. Cooperation and attitude of local people 
6. Existing industry-community relations 
7. Availability and cost of suitable sites 
8. Quality of transportation facilities and service 
9. Quality of public facilities and services 
10. Availability of construction financing 
B. Participants 
1. Company president 
2. Local development groups 
3. Utility companies 
C. Selection techniques 
1. Evaluation of community data by company 
2. Talk to community people and analyze their comments 
3. Visual inspection of community facilities 
4. Talk to plant managers of other industry 
D. Information sources 
1. Community data filed with "intermediaries" 
2. Presentations by local development groups 
3. Existing industry executives 
4. Utility companies 
5. People on the street 
Once even a tentative decision has been made to locate a new plant 
somewhere, the location selection process begins. The first stage is 
"spaceless" but focuses on elements needed if the plant is to be profit­
able. This stage typically involves company executives, often only the 
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president. He can start the actual selection process by authorizing the 
planning of, and preparation for, a new or relocated plant. The 
decisions made in this stage shape the rest of the decision process. One 
of the most important functions performed by the company executive at 
this stage is to determine the objectives to be achieved by locating the 
plant. Profit is the general objective, but the expected way of achiev­
ing the objective is also needed. If the primary reason for establishing 
the new plant is to reduce high costs resulting from the current 
inefficiencies of an existing plant, then the firm probably wants to 
retain most of the advantages of the existing plant, but also achieve a 
more efficient operation. This may involve changes such as different 
technology, rearranging input use, reducing input costs, or reducing 
transportation costs. If the primary reason for locating the new plant 
is a shortage of output capacity, then the new plant may just be expected 
to duplicate existing plants and to provide the additional output needed 
to service the market. The objectives to be achieved, together with the 
basic technical and cost characteristics of the plant, will be used in 
establishing the area, community and site specifications. In the 
Atlantic Steel Corporation case, the president of the company was the 
only participant in the preplanning stage. The new plant was needed to 
expand the output capacity of the company. The major problems associated 
with the existing metropolitan facility were limited labor availability, 
high wage rates and low labor productivity. The location specifications 
established by the firm were based largely on the need to achieve lower 
labor costs per unit of output. 
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The determination of selection techniques and information sources 
to be used, and of participants to be involved, will depend upon the 
skills of the company executives, the scope and nature of the location 
problem, the types of information needed, and the services and informa­
tion available from outside the company. The time and effort devoted to 
this stage of the decision process may be quite limited, particularly 
when small companies are involved. The process may be repeated several 
times before the firm enters the next stage. As a result of poor or 
limited preplanning, company executives often do not have a clear under­
standing of objectives or needs. Errors of commission and omission in 
the preplanning stage are probably major causes of location mistakes. 
After the preplanning stage is complete, the firm is ready to 
select the general area of location. The selection of the geographic 
area depends upon demand and cost considerations that are unique to the 
company. The location factors of primary importance in this stage 
include the location of product and factor markets and considerations that 
are expected to vary by geographic area. The frozen bread dough, modular 
homes, livestock feed, and loudspeaker firms based their selection of a 
general area largely upon the location of existing or potential product 
markets. The general area for the beef breaking and fabrication plant 
was selected on the basis of the location of an existing support facility 
in a major input supply area. The selection of the general area for the 
steel fabrication plant primarily involved labor availability and 
concentration of industry considerations. The selection techniques to 
be used in selecting the general area depend largely upon the nature of 
the location problem and include, for example, market or transportation 
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studies. Golden Sun Feeds employed a private consultant to conduct a 
study of the company's existing and expected product market. The need to 
minimize the high transportation costs of the livestock feed to be pro­
duced, together with the need to compete through service, established the 
importance of locating near the center of the product market area. 
Demand growth factors and market shares were considered by the consultant 
in estimating the center of the proposed livestock feed plant's market 
area. The results of the market study were then used by the company in 
making the selection of the general area for the plant location. 
In the selection of the general area, company records are probably 
used extensively to determine primary product and input market areas. 
Government reports and personal contacts may provide valuable information 
relative to such factors as location of existing industry and labor 
availability and cost. The participants in this stage of the decision 
process are probably the president of the company and perhaps a vice-
president or other top level executive. The functions performed in this 
stage are probably best handled inside company headquarters. The factors 
important in the selection of the general area often involve considera­
tions about which the company itself has the most accurate information, 
therefore, there are usually no outside participants involved in the 
selection of the general area. If consultants or other individuals or 
groups outside the company are involved at the general area selection 
stage, it is probably to provide area information or an objective opinion 
with regard to the best general area for the plant location. 
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The general area selected by the firm is expected to contain the 
most profitable community locations for the new plant. The selection of 
potential communities is believed to be the next stage of the location 
decision process. Firms appear to select a number of communities for 
comparison as potential plant locations. The communities are selected 
and evaluated on the basis of general community specifications established 
by the firms. In this stage, location factors such as community size, 
availability of labor, extent of organized labor activity, location 
relative to metropolitan areas, quality of transportation facilities, 
and size and type of existing industry are typically of major importance 
to the locating firm. In selecting potential communities, the modular 
home firm observed in the study utilized general community specifications 
relative to such factors as community size, availability of farm-
background labor, quality of rail and truck service, site availability, 
availability of an airport and extent of organized labor activity. The 
quality of rail and truck transportation service seemed particularly 
important because of the problems associated with transporting modular 
homes to customers and with receiving long distance shipments of lumber 
and other basic inputs. The steel fabricating firm specifications at 
this stage involved considerations such as distance from metropolitan 
areas, community size, rural labor availability, extent of organized 
labor activity, access to an interstate highway, availability of electric 
power and community attitudes toward new industry. Because of the 
intense competition in the steel fabricating industry, labor availability, 
labor costs, and labor productivity were particularly important location 
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factors in this stage of the location selection process. The availa­
bility of electric power was also important because of the large power 
requirements of welding, cutting and grinding activities. 
In the decision stage characterized by the selection and identifica­
tion of potential communities, it is probably efficient for individuals 
or groups outside of the company to become involved as participants and 
information sources. They have more information to contribute in this 
stage than in the earlier stages. This is because firms generally have 
little information about individual communities ou which to base com­
munity selections and comparisons. Also, firms often have limited skills 
or time available with which to select potential communities. In addi­
tion, the firms may not want to reveal their interests at this stage. 
In the industrial plastics case, for example, the company provided the 
Iowa Development Commission with community specifications and asked the 
agency to recommend potential communities and to provide data for the 
ones recommended. The company headquarters were in Chicago, therefore, 
the company executives were aided in their selection process by an 
intermediary with special plant location skills and access to needed 
community information. Utility company representatives were also 
involved in this stage of the company decision because the plastics 
production process would require large and constant supplies of natural 
gas and electric power. The utility company provided community recommen­
dations and data, particularly as related to natural gas and electric 
power availability. In addition, federal and state government publica­
tions were used as a source of data relating to labor costs and 
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availability, particularly for female labor. The availability of 
female labor was important because much of the plant's wotk force would 
be made up of women employees. 
The steel fabricating case also involved the participation of the 
Iowa Development Commission in selecting potential communities and in 
obtaining community information. The livestock feed firm, on the other 
hand, employed a private consultant to recommend potential communities, 
because it was important to management to get an objective opinion from 
someone outside of the company. 
In some of the cases observed, the firm seriously considered only 
one community for the location of its plant. In these cases, the selec­
tion of the general area was followed almost immediately by the selection 
of one particular community for the plant location. The meat packing 
firm, for example, selected a very small area in the immediate vicinity 
of its existing beef slaughter plant for the area of location of its 
proposed beef breaking and fabrication facility. The selection of a 
particular community followed almost immediately, without the firm 
seriously considering other possible locations. Very strong attracting 
forces, in the form of a vacant building and of a large supply of low-
cost labor, precluded the consideration of other communities. In the 
case of the frozen bread dough firm, the state of Iowa was selected as 
the general area of location on the basis of product market potential. 
Once Iowa was selected, the community of location was predetermined 
because the chosen community was the only one having a particular desired 
type of church-related academy. Similarly, in the case of the loud­
speaker firm, the community search was limited in scope by the 
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availability of a vacant building, of a supply of trained, low-cost 
labor, and of an experienced, well-qualified plant manager who would 
not agree to leave the community. The three cases discussed above were 
not characterized by the selection and evaluation of several potential 
communities. In effect, once the general area was selected, very 
unique considerations seemed to predetermine the actual community choice. 
It seems probable that, the more unique are the location requirements, 
the more likely the location search is to be limited in scope. 
The final stage of the hypothesized location decision process 
involves the selection of the community and site for the plant. The 
location factors which are of major importance in this stage probably 
include the availability of trainable labor, progressiveness of the 
community, cooperation and attitude of local people, existing community-
industry relations, availability and cost of plant sites, and quality of 
public facilities and services. In this stage the local industrial 
development groups typically become very active participants and sources 
of information in the location decision process. In addition, several of 
the significant location factors are subject to some degree of control 
by the local people. At this stage of the location selection process, 
the 3-5 communities still in contention for the plant may be quite equal 
with respect to a number of considerations utilized earlier by the firm 
to eliminate less desirable communities. The competition among similar 
communities tends to be very intense at this stage of the decision 
process. Therefore, it is particularly important what the communities do, 
or do not do, at this stage of the community selection process. 
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In the modular home case, the progressiveness of the community and 
the cooperation shown by the local development group were probably the 
most important location factors involved in the selection of one com­
munity from the list of three finalists. The local industrial develop­
ment organization did the best job of selling their community to the 
president of the company. An additional important consideration was the 
availability and cost of a strategically located plant site. In the 
industrial plastics case, the cooperation shown by the local industrial 
development group and the availability of a suitable site were critical 
factors in the company's selection of a location from among the four 
communities on the final list. The local development group evidently 
made the most of their meetings with the company president, the vice-
president, and the manager of industrial relations, because the executives 
were impressed with the good job that the development leaders did of 
selling the community and its people. In the case of the steel fabrica­
ting firm, the primary factor favoring the selected community over the 
other two finalists was the proven availability of trainable rural labor 
of expected high productivity. Because of competitive forces, the 
availability of relatively low-cost, highly productive labor was of 
primary importance to the company. The chosen community had the figures 
to prove that it had the quantity and type of labor needed by the company. 
The existing industry-community relations were an additional considera­
tion of importance to the president of the steel fabricating firm. The 
community had done an effective job of helping its existing industry, 
therefore, the discussions with the managers of the existing plants 
exerted a positive attracting force upon the locating firm. 
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In general, the hypothesized location decision process involves 
multiple stages. In addition, the importance of different location con­
siderations, participants, and sources of information is believed to 
vary by stage of the process. In some of the cases, one stage of the 
process was eliminated. This does not alter the basic hypothesis of a 
multi-stage decision process. A multi-stage process was observed, as 
was significant variation in the importance of different location 
factors, participants, and information sources. 
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XIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR USERS AND USES OF FINDINGS 
The plant location decision is one of the most important decisions 
faced by industrial management. It is important because cost and demand 
conditions vary by location. The location decision is closely related to 
other major decisions regarding timing, product mix, technology and size. 
Because each location is characterized by unique cost and demand condi­
tions, some plant locations tend to be more profitable than others, almost 
regardless of the product mix or efficiency of the production process. 
A well-designed, efficiently operated facility may be unprofitable 
because it is poorly located. 
Location choices are often among the more difficult decisions to 
make because many tangible and intangible location factors must be 
considered, and because many uncertainties are involved. Alternative 
locations are difficult to compare because each generally has weaknesses, 
as well as strengths. One alternative location is rarely better in every 
way than every other location. Plant location decisions will probably 
always entail significant risks and sub-optimal decisions will continue 
to be made. However, an increasing awareness of the importance of loca­
tion decisions has contributed to the development of more systematic and 
thorough location decision processes among industrial decision-makers. 
Iowa communities and the state of Iowa will continue to allocate re­
sources for activities to attract industry. Hcwever, there will probably 
continue to be a shortage of new plants and an excess supply of potential 
industrial plant locations. This means that not all rural Iowa communi­
ties are likely to be successful in their industrialization efforts. To 
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avoid waste and to increase the chances of attracting industry, it is 
important that local development resources be efficiently allocated. 
Because many communities do not fully understand the important elements 
of plant location decisions, they may be spending too much on factors of 
relatively little importance to industry, or too little on factors of 
great importance. The misallocation problem may be a matter of the type 
of community actions as much as it is the level of community development 
spending. It seems likely that community industrialization efforts could 
be made more efficient through increased awareness of the needs of indus­
try and of the process involved in location selection. Communities can 
and should learn from the experiences of others. 
The decision process employed by locating firms is generally com­
posed of several stages, with different location factors important in 
the various stages. In most plant location decisions, the early stages 
of the process probably are beyond the influence of community industrial 
development organizations. The latter stages of the process, on the other 
hand, usually involve information gathering from, and negotiation with, 
communities as participants in the decision. While some of the signifi­
cant location factors can not be affected by community action, other 
factors can be changed. 
The early stages, preplanning and selection of general geographic 
area, are generally conducted in corporate headquarters, beyond the 
influence of local development organizations. In the preplanning stage 
a high-ranking company officer, often the president, first determines 
the objectives the company hopes to achieve fay locating the new plant. 
190 
The location specifications, decision technique, decision participants 
and information sources to be used may then be determined. The community 
and site specifications established by the firm are dependent upon 
closely related decisions regarding, for example, type of product to be 
produced or technology to be utilized. The nature and the scope of the 
preliminary planning stage varies considerably among firms, as does the 
time devoted to this phase of the decision process. The point is that 
local development officials are not involved. 
The selection of the general area of location is also usually done 
independently of community development efforts. The choice is probably 
based upon management's best judgment regarding where the more profitable 
communities may be found. In other words, the general area selected is 
expected to contain the most profitable locations. The determination of 
the community location expected to yield maximum profit comes later in 
the decision process. The general geographic area selected may be as 
large as a multi-state region or as small as a few square miles. 
In most plant location decisions, the primary factor involved in 
the choice of the general area is probably location relative to product 
markets. The closely related considerations of transportation costs and 
speed of delivery seem to be of major concern at this stage. Other 
primary location factors often influencing the firm's choice of a general 
area are access to raw material sources, availability and cost of labor, 
and availability of fuel and power. Considerations of less general 
importance in the area selection stage include right-to-work laws and 
other labor legislation, availability of construction financing, state 
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and local tax structures, location of existing company support facilities, 
climate, location of competitors and degree of industrialization. 
A general area is selected for location by the firm because the 
area is expected to contain communities having characteristics well-suited 
to the needs of the company. Different areas are chosen because different 
firms have different location requirements. Each industry has unique 
location needs, thus the process of selecting a general area of location 
varies considerably by industry. Communities should resist the tendency 
to lump all industries together. They are not all the same, and they do 
not all have the same requirements. 
Most of the factors influencing the firm's choice of a general area 
of location are not subject to the control of individual community 
development groups. The local group obviously can not significantly 
influence the location of a firm's product markets, for example, or 
change an area's climate. However, through political action the local 
industrial development groups can and should attempt to shape state laws 
and programs having an effect upon industrialization. If prospective 
locating firms, are repelled by, for example, the state's pollution, road 
conditions, business taxation, labor legislation or the quality of its 
public schools, the chances of individual communities successfully 
attracting the firms may be reduced. The competitive position of partic­
ular communities, relative to that of their in-state neighbors, may be 
changed by local actions to promote industrialization, while state 
actions may improve the competitive position of all state communities 
relative to that of communities in oLhar states. 
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Once the general geographic area of location is determined by the 
firm, the next step typically involves the selection of several communi­
ties to be investigated as potential plant locations. It is in this 
stage of the location process that efforts by local industrial develop­
ment organizations may first have a significant impact upon the industrial 
location decision. The list of potential communities in the general area 
selected is compiled on the basis of specifications set by the firm. At 
this stage of the location process, the firm often utilizes the services 
offered by state or area development groups, utility companies, railroads, 
or consultants. These "intermediaries" may simply provide community in­
formation requested by locating firms, or they may play an active role in 
the process of screening communities. The community data available to, 
for example, the state development agency often forms the basis for pre­
liminary screening of communities. Thus it is of critical importance 
that communities keep an up-to-date, accurate and complete "fact book" 
on file with state industrial development agencies and other development 
organizations. 
The location specifications used to screen-out or eliminate unsuit­
able communities typically are related to such factors as size of communi­
ty, availability and cost of labor, extent of labor union activity, 
quality of transportation service and facilities, location relative to 
metropolitan areas, and quality and availability of utility services. At 
this stage, the important location factors are, for the most part, not 
subject to the control of community development groups. However, 
communities can often avoid early elimination by providing, directly or 
through intermediaries, ready access to an easy-to-understand, neat, 
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accurate, compact and up-to-date source of community data. In order for 
a community to effectively sell itself to a locating firm, it must at 
least avoid being eliminated before the company representative visits the 
community. When company specifications are not satisfied by the com­
munity, the best of fact files Vwill not prevent elimination, but if what 
the community has to offer seems to be consistent with the needs of the 
firm, the "fact file" often helps to keep the community in contention 
for the plant. The typical locating firm wants to avoid as much uncer­
tainty as possible. Although a community can not generally change the 
size and quality of its labor force, for example, it can provide needed 
information about it, and about other important location factors. 
Communities not providing ready access to such information are at a 
severe disadvantage in the competitive struggle for new plants. 
A very important opportunity for the community to influence the 
location decision comes when the representative of the firm visits the 
community. The fact that the community is still in contention for the 
new plant indicates that the community may be a feasible location. In 
visiting the community, the company representative hopes to obtain 
additional data, to check previously obtained data, to inspect sites, to 
observe available facilities, to gain an impression of the people, and 
to check on intangible factors such as the progressiveness of the com­
munity, the labor climate, the quality of local government services, and, 
in general, to gather information upon which community comparisons may be 
based. 
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The community must sell itself to the firm. The final location 
decision often depends upon what the community does or does not do. The 
real selling job often takes the form of a personal presentation by 
local development leaders. Companies often rely heavily upon local 
presentations as a basis for evaluating potential communities and in 
eliminating less desirable ones. The presentation should be well-
organized, factual and relatively brief. It is important to remember 
that the representative of the firm is often trying to learn more about 
the people of the community, among other things. The presentation should 
be made by a small group of key development leaders who have the know-
how and authority to bargain with the firm and to make definite community 
commitments. If the people really want the firm to locate its new plant 
in their community, then they should take positive action to show their 
interest and willingness to cooperate. 
It is important that local developers are aware of the fact that 
firms know all communities have problems. Although problem areas should 
not be emphasized by community development leaders, an objective, business­
like approach to the location problem will tend to be well-received and 
appreciated by the representative of the firm. Honesty is important to 
prospective firms. In addition, local development groups often know very 
little about the real needs and priorities of prospective firms. If the 
community development leaders emphasize the factors they believe to be 
important, the real important considerations may not even be discussed. 
Each firm has its own unique way of viewing the local situation and of 
ranking the location factors. If an honest, objective policy is not 
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followed by local developers in their discussions with prospective firms, 
the wrong factors may be emphasized. In addition, the firm representative 
may be repelled by what he observes to be a misrepresentation of the 
facts. 
Many, if not most, location factors can not be affected by individual 
communities. In addition, some of the factors subject to local control 
may be unimportant to prospective firms. One very important consideration 
over which the community has a considerable degree of control is existing 
industry-community relations. The community should be careful to take 
care of its present industry. Prospective firms often want to talk to 
the manager of existing plants regarding local support and cooperation. 
If the community has shown strong interest in, and full cooperation to, 
the industry it already has, and if community promises have been kept, 
then the existing managers may be the best salesmen the community could 
possibly have. If existing industries and people are happy, others will 
be attracted. 
The availability of developed industrial sites is important to many 
locating firms. It is important that communities be able to give a com­
plete estimate of the land, road and utility development costs associated 
with available sites. Many firms need to act quickly, therefore esti­
mates of construction time are also important. It is not generally 
advisable for communities to build speculative buildings. The community 
outlay is relatively large, the availability of the empty building may 
weaken the community's bargaining position relative to that of the 
prospective firm, and the building is unlikely to be well suited to 
particular plant requirements. In most cases, the advantages of having 
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an available building are probably not worth the cost. 
A seemingly obvious, but often overlooked, aspect of industrializa­
tion efforts involves checking into the financial strength and stability 
of prospective firms. Without being overly inquisitive, community 
development leaders should attempt to ensure that only sound, stable 
operations are attracted by their development efforts. Community indus­
trialization efforts can be set back for years by new plants that result 
in more additional community costs than benefits. It is also suggested 
that communities generally refrain from extensive subsidization of 
industries. Industries attracted by such considerations are often 
marginal or weak companies that, in the long run, are not likely to 
contribute to local economic growth. Also, community development leaders 
should keep in mind the possibility that some firms may want to exploit 
the local situation. 
Communities should work at being progressive and at projecting a 
progressive attitude with respect to industrial development. These 
efforts should include sound community planning, with the involvement of 
local government officials as well as development groups. The community 
should be developed as a good place to live and work. Local people should 
be made aware of both benefits and costs associated with industrialization. 
The progressive nature and the quality of living in the community can be 
of major importance to prospective firms, particularly in the latter 
stages of the decision process. The competitive position of many rural 
Iowa communities is so similar that these factors may well make the differ­
ence in the efforts of particular communities to attract industry. 
197 
Most manufacturing plants continue to be found in metropolitan 
areas. However, there is a substantial demand for rural plant locations. 
This indicates that, for many types of manufacturing operations, the 
advantages of rural locations outweigh the disadvantages. It seems that 
industrial firms most likely to benefit from rural plant locations would 
be those which (1) require low labor costs per unit of output in order to 
compete; (2) do not require large numbers of professional or highly 
skilled labor; (3) utilize purchased inputs with higjh unit value relative 
to transportation costs; (4) produce products of high unit value relative 
to transportation costs; (5) can afford to train most of their workers; 
and (6) are repelled by problems associated with metropolitan area loca-
tions. 
The rural communities which are most likely to be successful in 
attracting industry will probably be those which have (1) a large supply 
of trainable labor; (2) no large, dominant industry; (3) access to a good 
highway system; (4) a large supply of fuel and power; (5) relatively 
little organized labor activity; (6) developed industrial sites; 
(7) efficient public services financed by reasonable tax rates; and 
(8) strong, active industrial development organizations. 
Labor considerations probably represent the most significant loca-
tional advantages enjoyed by rural communities. Proven availability of 
a large supply of trainable labor is a critical factor to many locating 
firms. The functional literacy rate in Iowa is very high. In addition, 
farm background rural workers generally have good work habits, have 
mechanical experience, and tend to be well-equipped for mastering manu­
facturing skills. Rural Iowa workers also tend to be emotionally stable, 
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honest and loyal. Rural areas have important labor related advantages, 
but they also have some disadvantages. In some areas, for example, there 
is a shortage of needed skills and of manufacturing experience. 
Cost of labor is often mentioned by firms as an important location 
factor. It seems that what they usually want is low labor costs per unit 
of output. In other words, labor productivity is of substantial impor­
tance, as is the hourly wage rate. The value added per Iowa worker is 
significantly higher than the national and Midwest averages. The lack 
of significant organized labor activity found in many rural communities 
is an additional labor-related factor that many firms believe to be of 
importance in their location decisions. Firms prefer making their own 
decisions without being limited by fixed labor-management procedures. 
Good labor-management relations tend to add to the income and utility of 
locating firms. 
Access to a good highway system is important to most locating firms. 
Many firms prefer to locate near an interstate highway, but of more 
general importance is access to both a good north-south and good east-west 
highways. 
The availability of a large supply of fuel and power is critical to 
many firms, particularly those which require very large quantities of 
power in their production processes. This factor is expected to be in­
creasingly important as fuel and power shortages continue. 
The availability of reasonably priced, developed industrial sites is 
an important location factor to many firms. This does not mean a full-
scale industrial park, but rather a site not subject to flooding, with 
utility connections to the boundary, and ready for construction with a 
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minimum of grading required. Many companies require a water line large 
enough to furnish sufficient water to operate a sprinkler system. Such 
a system significantly reduces fire insurance rates. 
The quality of public services relative to the existing tax structure 
is often an important locational consideration. Local tax rates are 
generally not a critical location factor, but the level of taxation and 
the rate structure may be viewed by firms as an indication of community 
attitudes toward new industry. An equitable distribution of the tax load 
represents an expression to locating firms that the community wants 
neither to gouge, nor to subsidize, local industry. 
In general, rural Iowa communities enjoy a number of advantages in 
the competitive struggle for new industry, but they have their problems 
as well. Communities would benefit by taking a hard, objective look at 
their particular problem areas, and by careful planning and implementa­
tion of programs to alleviate them. 
The existence of a strong, active industrial development organiza­
tion often means the difference between success and failure in attracting 
new industrial plants. New industry can substantially increase local 
income and employment, and expand the tax base. However, new industry 
will not always provide an easy solution to community problems. A new 
plant may well provide substantial benefits to the community, but it will 
also involve additional costs. If the additional tax revenue generated 
by a new plant is not sufficient to pay for required expansions of public 
services, the additional burden must fall upon some element of the com­
munity. The tax structure should be adjusted such that the people or 
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groups benefiting the most from the increased business activity are 
required to bear the greatest additional burden. The costs and benefits 
associated with industrialization should be carefully measured and equit­
ably distributed. Industrial development must be an important element in 
most rural community development programs, but industrial development at 
any cost is not the answer to rural community problems. 
Many rural Iowa communities are likely to grow and prosper through 
successful industrial development efforts, but success will not come to 
all. There will probably continue to be an excess supply of rural plant 
locations. This means that locating firms will enjoy a buyer's market 
in their search for new plant locations. Not all rural Iowa communities 
will succeed in attracting the desired amount and types of new industry. 
The net benefits of community growth and development are likely to 
accrue to those with the most efficient industrialization programs. It 
is not only how hard the community works, how lavishly it spends, or 
how eager it is, but also how well the community is run, how well all 
businesses and people are served, and how appropriately the leaders 
inform potential industry of the profitability of locating in their 
particular rural Iowa community. 
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